David Salter

The court granted the defendants' motion to strike the Amended Statement of Claim in its entirety, with leave to amend, on the grounds that it amounted to an abuse of process and was time-barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The claim, brought by G. Scott Paterson against the Royal Bank of Canada and others, alleged a campaign of defamation and economic interference culminating in regulatory proceedings by the Ontario Securities Commission.

The court found that the claim sought to re-litigate issues already settled by the OSC and that Paterson was aware of the essential facts giving rise to his claim well before the expiry of the limitation period.

The plaintiff, a senior executive at RBC, was dismissed following an investigation into his financial dealings with a subordinate.

He sued for wrongful dismissal, claiming entitlement to 24 months' reasonable notice under Ontario common law.

RBC argued the employment contract was governed by UK law, which limited notice to 12 weeks, and alternatively pleaded after-acquired cause based on the plaintiff's dishonesty during the investigation.

The court held that UK law governed the contract and the plaintiff had received his contractual notice.

Furthermore, the court found that RBC had established after-acquired cause because the plaintiff deliberately withheld material information about his real estate investments with the subordinate during the investigation.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed, save for unpaid vested compensation, and RBC's counterclaim for mistaken tax overpayments was allowed.

The plaintiff, Bluemoon Capital Ltd., sought court approval under s. 29 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, to discontinue a proposed class action against the defendants on a with-prejudice and without-costs basis.

The action, alleging secondary and primary market misrepresentation under the Securities Act, was commenced to preserve claims while a Norwich application was pending.

Following the denial of the Norwich application by Justice Pattillo and its confirmation on appeal, the plaintiff determined the action was no longer viable.

The court approved the discontinuance, finding it was for a proper purpose and would not prejudice putative class members who were unaware of the action.

The plaintiff's request to suspend the discontinuance for 60 days to allow for potential class member action was denied, as no purpose would be served by giving notice or suspending the discontinuance.

This is a costs endorsement following an application concerning the allocation of sale proceeds from two properties.

The court found York University largely successful in the underlying application, as nearly all remaining sale proceeds were paid to York's benefit after mortgage discharge.

The applicant's allegations were unfounded, and her conduct (attempting to list property in contravention of an order) prolonged the litigation.

The court awarded York University costs on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $54,705.38, and also allowed $16,813.56 for legal fees incurred by York with McCarthy Tétrault LLP, payable from the sale proceeds.

The court declined substantial indemnity costs because some relief sought by York would have been necessary anyway.

The appellant, Bluemoon Capital Ltd., appealed the dismissal of its application for a Norwich order and the quashing of a Rule 39.03 notice of examination.

The appellant, a shareholder of Ceridian HCM Holding Inc., sought pre-action discovery regarding the alleged undervaluation of LifeWorks Corporation Ltd. shares during Ceridian's 2018 distribution and subsequent sale to Morneau Shepell.

The application judge dismissed the Norwich order, finding it unnecessary and not in the interests of justice, and quashed the notice of examination as moot.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, affirming the application judge's discretionary decision that the appellant had sufficient information to commence its class action and that the Norwich order was not sought for a legitimate purpose.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The applicant sought an equitable remedy to allocate the payment of a mortgage and a costs award from the proceeds of sale of a property (Osprey) that had been fraudulently conveyed to her, rather than from an adjacent lot.

The respondent university, a judgment creditor of the applicant's former partner, opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that previous court orders had nullified the applicant's interest in Osprey and granted the university enforcement rights against it.

The court also held that the mortgagee was entitled to pursue its remedy against the adjacent lot, and that the equitable doctrine of marshalling would have compelled this result to protect the university's unsecured interest.

The applicant sought a Norwich order for pre-action discovery against the respondents to obtain documents relating to a corporate distribution and subsequent acquisition.

The respondents brought motions to quash a notice of examination and for a sealing order over confidential tax information.

The court dismissed the application for a Norwich order, finding the applicant had sufficient information to commence its claims and lacked a legitimate objective.

The court granted the sealing order to protect highly sensitive tax information and quashed the notice of examination as an abuse of process.