Carrie Vanden Broek

The defendant, Patrick Thiruchelvam, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 660 days (21 months and 22 days).

The court attributed 161 days of this as defence delay due to unavailability for earlier trial dates that provided sufficient preparation time.

This resulted in a net delay of 499 days (16.41 months), which falls below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown's argument for an exceptional circumstance deduction due to a judge's family loss was rejected because significant disclosure remained outstanding, meaning the pre-trial could not have proceeded regardless.

The court found that the defence did not demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings, nor did the case take markedly longer than reasonable for its complexity.

Consequently, the application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, Walid Wakeel, was charged with dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and two counts of failing to stop his vehicle after an accident with intent to escape civil or criminal liability.

The trial judge found that the accused's driving was objectively dangerous and constituted a marked departure from the actions of a reasonable person, having accelerated through a red light at high speed.

The court also found that the accused fled the scene with the intent to escape liability, despite arguments that he was in shock or later surrendered to police.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The offender pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after intentionally striking three teenagers with his vehicle following an earlier assault and robbery.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the severity of injuries and the deliberate use of the vehicle as a weapon, and mitigating factors, such as the offender's youth, remorse, guilty plea, and rehabilitation efforts.

The judge imposed an intermittent sentence of 90 days for aggravated assault, followed by a 22-month conditional sentence for the driving offences, and 8 months of probation, along with a 5-year driving prohibition and other ancillary orders.

This is a ruling on the admissibility of photographic and video evidence in a youth criminal justice trial for armed bank robbery.

The prosecution sought to introduce images from a co-accused's cell phone, allegedly showing the young person wearing clothing identical to that of a suspect.

The defense challenged the evidence's provenance and authenticity.

The court, applying principles of conditional admissibility for photographic evidence, found the images relevant and material.

Despite limited information on their origin, the court ruled them admissible, emphasizing that authentication requirements vary with probative value and that issues of weight are for the trier of fact.

The young person, T.P., charged with armed bank robbery, brought an application to exclude DNA evidence obtained via a warrant, alleging breaches of Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 10(a)).

The court found that the police failed to inform the issuing justice of T.P.'s status as a young person, thereby omitting statutory protections under s. 487.07(4) of the Criminal Code, and that the DNA sampling procedure was improperly executed (failure to sterilize).

Applying the Grant test for exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court found the Charter breaches serious and their impact significant, outweighing society's interest in admitting the reliable DNA evidence.

The application to exclude the DNA evidence was granted.

The defendant pleaded guilty to failing to stop at the scene of an accident involving a death, contrary to section 320.16(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the seriousness of the offence, the defendant being a suspended driver, and being on probation at the time of the offence.

Mitigating factors included the early guilty plea, genuine remorse, no evidence of improper driving or impairment, and strong family support due to parental health issues.

The Crown sought a 6-month jail sentence and a 2-year driving prohibition, while the defence sought 90 days intermittent and an 18-month prohibition.

The court imposed a 90-day jail sentence (in addition to 8 days pre-sentence custody credit) and an 18-month driving prohibition, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation while acknowledging the absence of dangerous or impaired driving.

The Crown sought to admit a prior video-recorded statement made by a child witness to police as substantive evidence of hearsay.

The child witness had failed to adopt the statement at trial and testified with apparent memory loss regarding the events.

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm, assault by suffocation, sexual assault, assault of a child, and threatening bodily harm.

The court conducted an admissibility voir dire to determine whether the hearsay statement met the threshold reliability and necessity requirements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The defendant pleaded guilty to luring a child under the age of 16 for the purpose of committing a sexual assault contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The victim was a 15-year-old girl whose family the defendant had known for years.

The defendant engaged in sexually explicit communications with the victim over Snapchat while heavily intoxicated, requesting nude images and making sexual advances.

The defendant apologized the following morning and subsequently engaged in extensive counselling and therapy.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months imprisonment followed by three years probation, along with ancillary orders including a 20-year prohibition on using computer systems to communicate with minors and restrictions on internet use.

The accused was charged with robbery and wearing a disguise in connection with an alleged robbery on October 28, 2016.

The Crown's case relied on hearsay evidence: a 911 call and a videotaped statement from a witness who claimed complete amnesia at trial.

The court excluded both pieces of hearsay evidence, finding that the 911 call did not satisfy the res gestae exception and that the witness's statement failed to meet the threshold reliability requirements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule as refined in R. v. Bradshaw.

The court found the witness's testimony at trial was not credible and that the corroborative evidence from other witnesses was tainted and unreliable.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) following a 911 call reporting erratic driving.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results and statements to police, alleging violations of Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand under sections 8 and 9, but found a breach of section 10(b) when police made only a token effort to facilitate contact with the defendant's counsel of choice.

Under section 24(2), the court excluded the defendant's statements but admitted the breath test results.

The defendant was found guilty of both impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

The applicant, Mr. Mallia, sought a mistrial or, alternatively, permission to reopen his case following his conviction for attempted murder.

He alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, claiming counsel inadequately prepared him, failed to pursue a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defence, and misled him into believing the attempted murder charge was "off the table," which influenced his decision not to testify.

The Crown argued counsel's actions were strategic.

The court found no incompetence regarding trial preparation or the NCR defence, but noted counsel's failure to obtain written instructions for Mr. Mallia's decision not to testify, especially given counsel's misleading statement about the attempted murder charge.

The court denied the application for a mistrial, stating it was not one of the "clearest of cases," but granted the application to reopen the case, finding that Mr. Mallia's failure to testify was not a tactical decision and his anticipated evidence could reasonably affect the outcome.

During a sexual assault trial, defence counsel brought a motion for the trial judge to recuse himself based on comments the judge made criticizing counsel's professional conduct.

The judge had reprimanded counsel for introducing evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity without a prior ruling under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding that the comments, while critical of counsel, did not demonstrate a predisposition against the accused or create a reasonable apprehension of bias.