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The court allowed the bankruptcy trustee's appeal, finding the creditor failed to perfect its security interest in a vehicle brought into Ontario.
The Trustee in Bankruptcy appealed a Registrar's decision that allowed a secured claim by Snap Auto Finance Corp. The Trustee had initially disallowed Snap's claim, arguing that Snap failed to perfect its security interest in a vehicle within the timeframes required by Ontario's Personal Property Security Act (PPSA) after the vehicle was brought into Ontario.
The Registrar found the vehicle had not been "brought in" to Ontario.
The Superior Court found the Registrar erred by not considering the debtor's assignment in bankruptcy in Ontario and his sworn Statement of Affairs, which indicated Ontario residency.
The Court concluded the vehicle was "brought in" to Ontario in November 2015, and Snap failed to perfect its security interest within the statutory 60 days or 15 days of notice.
The Trustee's appeal was allowed, restoring the disallowance of Snap's secured claim, making Snap's interest subordinate to the Trustee's.
A vehicle temporarily in Ontario for convenience is not 'brought in' under the PPSA; out-of-province security remains valid.
The bankrupt purchased a vehicle in Alberta, financed by the creditor who registered its security interest under the Alberta PPSA.
The bankrupt later spent time in Ontario and brought the vehicle there, but maintained his Alberta employment, driver's license, and vehicle registration.
Upon bankruptcy, the trustee disallowed the creditor's secured claim, arguing the creditor failed to register in Ontario within 15 days of the vehicle being 'brought in' under s. 5(2) of the Ontario PPSA.
The court allowed the creditor's appeal, finding the vehicle was merely physically present in Ontario for convenience and had not been 'brought in' within the meaning of the Act, thus preserving the creditor's secured status.
Co-lessee released from liability after vehicle lease was materially extended without his consent.
The appellant co-signed a vehicle lease as a principal debtor.
At the end of the lease term, the lessor and the lessee entered into two extension agreements without the appellant's knowledge or consent.
The vehicle was subsequently stolen and not returned.
The lessor sued the appellant for the vehicle's residual value.
The Court of Appeal held that the extension agreements constituted material alterations to the lease that increased the appellant's financial burden and risk.
Because the appellant did not consent to these material alterations, he was released from his obligations under the lease.
Appeal of order returning seized truck to conditional sales contract assignee dismissed; adjournment refusal upheld.
The appellant was arrested for possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking, and his truck was seized as offence-related property.
The assignee of the conditional sales contract for the truck, Ally Credit Canada Limited, applied for its return under s. 490 of the Criminal Code.
On the application date, the appellant's counsel's assistant requested an adjournment, which the application judge refused, ordering the truck returned to Ally.
The appellant appealed the order.
The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge did not err in refusing the adjournment and that Ally had established it was entitled to possession of the truck due to the appellant's breach of the contract.
Court fixes lump-sum costs after mixed success on motion and cross-motion.
Following a motion and cross-motion that resulted in mixed success for both parties, the court invited written costs submissions.
The moving party sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $11,000, while the responding party sought approximately $8,800 or alternatively no order as to costs.
The court observed that the motion prompted the parties to moderate their positions and engage in compromise.
Taking into account the mixed success and proportionality considerations, the court exercised its discretion to fix a lump sum costs award payable to the moving party.
Court orders broad document production in financing dispute despite privilege and relevance objections.
The plaintiff brought a productions motion in a contractual dispute concerning a 2007 central financing agreement.
The plaintiff alleged the defendant breached the agreement due to pressure from GM dealers and sought production of documents relating to a proposed Consillium financing structure, GM dealer meeting records, internal credit policies, and redacted communications.
The court found several categories of documents relevant to the pleaded theory and ordered production of documents concerning the creation of Consillium and internal policy materials, including menus of credit policy titles.
The defendant was also required to request relevant records from a dealers’ association and provide sufficient descriptions for documents claimed as privileged.
The motion and cross‑motion resulted in mixed success, with further costs submissions invited.
Appeal dismissed; inventory financier's security interest in motor vehicle maintained priority over unpaid seller.
The appellant sold a motor vehicle to a dealership that financed its inventory through the respondent.
After the dealership made an assignment in bankruptcy and its cheque to the appellant bounced, the appellant took possession of the vehicle.
The appellant argued that the respondent had disposed of the vehicle under s. 63 of the Personal Property Security Act, thereby discharging its security interest.
The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that no such disposition occurred and dismissed the appeal, confirming the respondent's priority.
Appeal dismissed as the trial judge correctly found the financial advance was only repayable upon separation or divorce, which did not occur.
The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision regarding the terms of a financial advance.
The trial judge found that the money was advanced with an obligation to repay on demand only in the event of separation or divorce, a condition that did not arise.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting they were well justified on the evidence and owed significant deference.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Appeal of wrongful dismissal judgment dismissed; unauthorized salary increases did not constitute just cause.
The employers appealed a trial judgment awarding the plaintiff damages for wrongful dismissal.
The employers argued the plaintiff was dismissed for just cause because she gave herself and another employee unauthorized salary and vacation pay increases.
The trial judge found the conduct was an indiscretion rather than dishonesty and served as a pretext for a planned dismissal.
Applying the McKinley contextual analysis, the trial judge concluded the employers failed to prove just cause.
The Court of Appeal upheld this finding.
The plaintiff's cross-appeal on damages and the employers' appeal on the dismissed counterclaim were also dismissed.
Appeal allowed and trial directed for interrelated claims of payment and set off.
The appellants appealed an order granting judgment on the respondent's claim for payment.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent's claim and the appellants' claim for set off were so interrelated that judgment should not have been granted on the former if the latter was to proceed.
The court directed a trial for both claims and ordered the funds held in trust to remain as security pending further court order.
Appeal allowed; order requiring payment of money between parties attracts automatic stay pending appeal.
The appellants appealed an order of the motions judge which found that a previous order was not for the payment of money and therefore did not attract an automatic stay pending appeal under Rule 63.01.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, distinguishing prior case law on the basis that the holder of the funds was not an independent third party and there was a dispute concerning the debt.
The Court concluded the order practically required the payment of money between the parties and directed that the order be stayed pending appeal.
Appeal from dismissal of negligence action for horseback riding injuries dismissed; causation not established.
The appellant was catastrophically injured in a horseback riding accident while participating in a national youth volunteer program in Alberta.
She sued the program operators, the group leader, and the federal Crown in Ontario.
The trial judge found the defendants breached their duty of care but dismissed the action on the basis that the negligence did not cause the injury.
The trial judge also held that she would have exercised her discretion to extend the applicable Alberta limitation period, which had expired.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
The majority upheld the trial judge's findings on causation, concluding there was no palpable and overriding error.
In a concurring opinion, Laskin J.A. found the trial judge's causation analysis unsatisfactory but agreed the action should be dismissed because it was statute-barred under Alberta law, and the court had no discretion to extend the limitation period following the Supreme Court's decision in Tolofson.
Mitigation findings and future rent assessment upheld on appeal.
In this commercial lease damages appeal, the appellants challenged findings that the respondent had reasonably mitigated its losses after replacement tenants vacated two units and that future rent losses were properly assessed.
The Court of Appeal held that the mitigation findings were factual determinations entitled to deference and that the appellants failed to adduce evidence showing the respondent's efforts were unreasonable.
The court also rejected the argument framed as remoteness respecting one unit, holding the real issue was mitigation.
The trial judge's use of a 50 percent reduction factor for uncertainty in future rent recovery was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Good faith under the Factors Act requires honesty, not due diligence.
The appellant inventory financier appealed a conversion judgment arising from the seizure and sale of a boat delivered to a dealer for resale.
Assuming without deciding that the dealer held the boat on consignment and lacked title, the court held that the financier could rely on s. 2(1) of the Factors Act because it took its chattel mortgage in good faith and without notice of any lack of authority.
The court rejected the trial judge's conclusion that good faith under s. 2(1) includes a due diligence requirement, holding instead that good faith means honesty, even if conduct is negligent.
The action was dismissed and the appellant received trial and appeal costs.