Stephen Proudlove

The accused applied for an order permitting him to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his upcoming trial.

The Crown opposed the application, citing the accused's lengthy criminal record and past courtroom outbursts, though acknowledging he was not an escape risk.

The court granted the application, preferring the line of authority that locating an accused outside the prisoner's dock better reflects the presumption of innocence.

The court ordered that the accused be permitted to sit at counsel table, subject to discreet security measures.

Several accused brought Garofoli applications seeking exclusion of evidence obtained through multiple Part VI wiretap authorizations in a large drug trafficking investigation.

They argued the affidavits failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds and improperly named them as known parties under s. 185(1)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that one authorization related to a homicide investigation lacked sufficient grounds on the edited record and therefore violated s. 8 of the Charter; intercepted room‑probe communications from a residence were excluded under s. 24(2).

However, the court found that the principal drug trafficking wiretap authorizations were supported by reasonable grounds based on confidential informant information, surveillance, phone records, and associations among targets.

Applications to exclude evidence obtained under those authorizations were dismissed.

The applicants brought a preliminary motion in advance of a Garofoli application seeking excision of all references to a vehicle stop and resulting seizures that had previously been found to violate Charter rights.

The impugned events were relied upon in affidavits supporting Part VI wiretap authorizations, a production order for subscriber records, and search warrants for cellular phone contents.

The Crown argued that the applicants lacked standing to seek excision of evidence obtained in violation of third parties’ Charter rights.

The court held that where illegally obtained evidence forms part of the grounds for authorizations affecting the applicants’ privacy interests, the applicants are entitled to challenge the legality of that evidence and seek its removal from the supporting materials.

All references to the unlawful vehicle stop, arrests, and seizures were ordered excised from the affidavits and informations to obtain.

The applicants, charged with drug-related offences, brought a Section 8 Charter application to exclude evidence obtained from Dialled Number Recorder and tracking warrants.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) was deficient due to unconfirmed confidential informant tips, tainted informant pools from police misconduct, and material non-disclosure by the affiant.

The court strongly condemned the egregious conduct of one officer and the sloppiness of the affiant in failing to disclose relevant police reports.

However, after excising inaccuracies and reading in omissions, the court found the remaining reliable information still provided reasonable grounds to suspect the applicant was trafficking drugs.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery and related offences based primarily on recognition evidence from a former romantic partner who identified him from a wanted poster.

The trial judge accepted this evidence while dismissing conflicting eyewitness descriptions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to critically analyze the problematic aspects of the recognition evidence and by ignoring exculpatory eyewitness testimony.

The Court concluded the verdicts were unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered acquittals on all counts.

Following a jury conviction for manslaughter by reason of failing to provide the necessaries of life, the court sentenced both parents for the death of their young child.

The sentencing judge found the respondents equally culpable because they ignored medical advice and obvious warning signs over an extended period, resulting in chronic malnutrition that materially contributed to death alongside an asthma attack.

Applying the sentencing fact-finding framework for jury verdict cases, the court distinguished more egregious child-death authorities involving deliberate abandonment or overt deprivation, but held that denunciation and deterrence had to predominate under the Criminal Code because the offence was committed against a vulnerable child.

A fit sentence was 30 months for each offender, subject to presentence and bail credit, with probation imposed on one respondent and ancillary DNA and weapons prohibition orders made.

The Crown prosecuted an attempted murder charge arising from a shooting after abandoning a conspiracy count on a directed verdict.

The case turned on whether the complainant's prior testimony from a preliminary inquiry and another trial could be admitted substantively after the witness professed extensive memory loss and resisted meaningful examination at trial.

Applying the principled hearsay approach under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act and the threshold reliability framework, the court admitted the prior evidence by a narrow margin but held that its ultimate reliability was too frail to support conviction.

The court concluded that the Crown's theory of a set-up to kill the complainant was not the only rational inference available on the record and entered an acquittal on the attempted murder count.

A media applicant sought to vary a publication ban imposed during a criminal trial so that the offenders' and victim's names could be published while continuing to protect the identities of surviving children.

Applying the Dagenais-Mentuck framework, the court held that a broader ban shielding the adult offenders' identities was not necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice or the relevant public interest in protecting vulnerable children.

The court distinguished authority concerning anonymity for child cyberbullying victims and emphasized the significant deleterious impact on the open court principle of withholding the names of adult offenders in a homicide case.

The publication ban was varied to prohibit only publication of the names of surviving children of the offenders.

Following convictions for manslaughter by failing to provide the necessaries of life to a child, a publication ban had been imposed under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code protecting the identities of surviving siblings and information that could identify them.

A media organization sought to narrow or vary the ban, while counsel for the convicted parents requested the appointment of amicus curiae to advance the interests of the affected children.

The Crown ultimately supported narrowing the ban but took no position on the appointment of amicus.

The court considered competing interests between freedom of expression and the protection of vulnerable children.

The court appointed a child advocacy legal clinic as amicus curiae to assist in determining the proper scope of the publication ban before sentencing.

The accused was charged with breach of recognizance, multiple counts of assault, and sexual assault arising from a turbulent domestic relationship.

The complainant alleged repeated physical assaults and non‑consensual sexual activity over a two‑year period.

The court accepted the complainant’s evidence regarding physical violence, finding it corroborated by witness observations of injuries and admissions contained in the accused’s letters and statements to a friend.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding the sexual assault allegation due to the timing of disclosure and credibility concerns.

The accused was convicted of breach of recognizance and several assault counts but acquitted of sexual assault.

The offender was sentenced for four counts of aggravated sexual assault, one count of forcible confinement, and one count of assault.

The offender, who knew he was HIV positive, engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse with multiple women without disclosing his status.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender infected one of the complainants with HIV.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of 10.5 years, reduced to 5 years and 4 months after applying a 1.5-to-1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with aggravated sexual assault for failing to disclose his HIV-positive status to two intimate partners before engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse.

He was also charged with assault and forcible confinement of one of the partners.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he had disclosed his status, finding it fabricated and inconsistent with his medical records and statements to public health nurses.

The court accepted the partners' evidence that they would not have consented to unprotected sex had they known of his HIV status.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with perjury for making false statements during a bail hearing on April 5, 2013.

The accused testified that his twin brother and a friend, rather than himself, had been operating his motor vehicle on four separate dates in 2012 when he was under a driving suspension.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the person operating the vehicle on all four dates through consistent and credible police officer testimony.

The court found that the accused knew the statements were false and intended them to mislead the court regarding his credibility and willingness to comply with court orders.

The accused was convicted of perjury.

The accused was charged with perjury and breach of probation after testifying at a co-accused's trial.

The Crown alleged that the accused falsely confirmed under oath that an agreed statement of facts from his own prior guilty plea was completely true and correct.

The court reviewed the trial transcripts and found that the accused had actually recanted or refused to adopt portions of the prior statement, rather than confirming it in its entirety as alleged in the charge.

Because the accused did not utter the specific falsehood forming the actus reus of the charge, he was found not guilty of perjury and the related breach of probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing he was denied a fair trial because he was unrepresented and the trial judge failed to adequately assist him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had chosen to proceed without counsel rather than delay the trial further, and that the trial judge's assistance was adequate and did not result in an unfair trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge's reasons reflected a 2-for-1 credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in a global sentence of 19 months, which the Crown acknowledged was outside the appropriate range.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to time served (13 months).