Frank Miller

The accused was charged with assault and uttering threats arising from an altercation with his former common-law spouse on his property.

The complainant attended the accused's residence without permission and became upset.

The accused applied force to prevent her from re-entering the house after she allegedly threatened to burn it down.

The trial judge found the accused not guilty of both charges, determining that the complainant was a trespasser and that the accused's use of force was justified under the defence of property provisions of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault under s. 266 of the Criminal Code arising from a domestic dispute in which he grabbed a tape recorder from the complainant’s hand.

The trial judge had concluded that the act of grabbing the object constituted a non-consensual touching and therefore an assault.

On appeal, the court considered whether taking an object from another person’s hand necessarily constitutes the application of force required for assault and also addressed allegations of judicial bias arising from comments made by the trial judge during the proceedings.

The court held that although the trial judge’s comments were unnecessary, they did not meet the high threshold for a finding of reasonable apprehension of bias.

However, the court found that the trial judge erred in law by concluding that grabbing the recorder constituted an assault in the absence of evidence of force applied to the complainant.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

A young person pleaded guilty to a historical sexual assault committed at age 17 against a very young child.

The sentencing court was required to determine whether the offender should receive a youth or adult sentence under s. 72 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Applying the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and considering the seriousness of the offence, the offender’s age at the time, and intervening circumstances, the court held that a youth sentence could adequately hold the offender accountable.

The court also found the offence constituted a violent offence under the YCJA because psychological harm could be inferred from the degrading nature of the conduct against a child.

A custodial youth sentence was imposed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting breath test results obtained after a breach of the appellant’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The arresting officers failed to clarify the appellant’s ambiguous response “not yet” when asked whether he wished to contact a lawyer and did not advise him of the police obligation to hold off obtaining evidence until he had a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel.

The appellate court held that the trial judge unreasonably characterized the police conduct as merely inadvertent and at the low end of seriousness.

The failures of multiple officers to address the ambiguous response and to implement the right to counsel constituted at least negligent Charter‑infringing conduct.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed summary conviction offences for impaired operation and having care or control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The appellant had been found asleep in the driver’s seat of his parked truck and argued he intended only to sleep and drive later after sobering up, thereby rebutting the statutory presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Relying on Supreme Court of Canada authority interpreting the requirement of a realistic risk of danger, the court held that a stated intention to drive later does not automatically rebut the presumption.

Even without a contemporaneous intention to drive, a realistic risk of danger may arise where an intoxicated person remains in a position to set the vehicle in motion.

The court concluded the presumption was not rebutted and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider defence evidence that could have raised a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the issue and properly accepted the appellant's admissions to the police, which formed the core of the Crown's case.

The Court held that the trial judge's treatment of the evidence was adequate and there was no need to explicitly subject a minor part of the testimony to a separate W.(D.) analysis.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving a three‑year‑old child in a campground washroom.

The Crown relied primarily on the child’s out‑of‑court statements alleging touching of the penis and buttocks.

The accused admitted touching the child’s buttocks briefly but denied touching the penis or acting for a sexual purpose, asserting he had intended to help the child with his pyjamas.

Applying the credibility analysis in R. v. W. (D.), the court found significant risk that the child’s statements were influenced by parental reactions and concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching was sexual in nature or for a sexual purpose.

The accused was acquitted of sexual assault and sexual interference but convicted of the included offence of common assault for the non‑consensual touching.

A trucking company sued for unpaid transport invoices relating to produce shipments from U.S. airports to Ontario.

The produce wholesaler counterclaimed alleging that a delayed pickup of a pepper shipment caused spoilage and significant loss in value.

The court found the carrier liable for breach of contract because it failed to pick up the perishable shipment within the agreed timeframe, making the resulting spoilage foreseeable.

However, the wholesaler failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate its losses after the delay became apparent.

Liability for the losses was therefore apportioned equally between the parties, resulting in a net judgment in favour of the wholesaler after set‑off against the unpaid invoices.

The applicant sought leave to appeal under s. 839(1)(a) of the Criminal Code from a summary conviction appeal court decision dismissing his appeal from an assault conviction.

The sole issue raised was whether the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, applying the test from R. v. R.(R.), finding that the proposed grounds of appeal lacked significance to the general administration of justice and the merits of the appeal were not very strong.

The applicant's sentence of a conditional discharge and probation did not constitute a significant deprivation of liberty warranting an exception.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for breach of fiduciary duty and dismissing his counterclaim.

The appellant argued he was not a fiduciary, that any such relationship had terminated, that the respondent had unclean hands, and that his counterclaim should have succeeded because no defence was filed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that a trust relationship existed and continued, that the unclean hands doctrine did not apply, and that the appellant still bore the burden of proving his counterclaim despite the lack of a defence.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of a video-recorded police statement made by a young person accused of sexual assault, sexual interference, sexual invitation, and forcible confinement.

The Crown sought to use the statement for cross-examination purposes.

The court considered two issues: (1) whether the procedural requirements under section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act were followed, and (2) whether the statement was voluntarily given.

The court found that the officer failed to take sufficient steps to ensure the young person understood his rights under section 146, particularly given several red flags indicating comprehension difficulties.

The court also found the statement was not given in oppressive circumstances.

The statement was ruled inadmissible.

The appellant appealed a conviction and sentence for sexual assault following a summary conviction trial.

The trial judge had found a reasonable doubt about the complainant’s lack of consent but concluded that any consent was legally vitiated by abuse of a position of trust or authority under ss. 265(3) and 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code and by public policy considerations.

The appeal court held that the statutory provisions require proof of both the existence of the position and evidence that the complainant’s free will was overborne by the abuse of that position.

While a trust relationship between the parties could be found, there was no evidence establishing the subjective impact of that relationship on the complainant’s consent.

The court also held that civil law doctrines such as unconscionability and fairness cannot independently vitiate consent in criminal law where Parliament has already addressed the issue in statute.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving after being stopped at a border crossing by border services officers (BSOs).

The BSOs noticed signs of impairment and directed the appellant to exit his vehicle, at which point they made further observations of his insobriety and arrested him.

The appellant appealed, arguing that designated BSOs lack the authority to gather evidence of insobriety and that the direction to exit the vehicle constituted an illegal, compelled sobriety test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that designated BSOs possess the ancillary powers necessary to take reasonable steps to investigate suspected impaired driving, and that the observations made upon the appellant exiting the vehicle were not conscriptive evidence.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of driving over 80.

The trial judge had dismissed the charge after misapprehending the qualified technician's evidence, erroneously concluding the Crown could not rely on the presumption of identity.

The summary conviction appeal judge allowed the Crown's appeal but remitted the matter to the trial judge for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal court lacked jurisdiction to remit the matter for reconsideration.

Finding that the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence amounted to an error of law and that a conviction would have necessarily followed but for the error, the Court of Appeal entered a conviction and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly used his failure to testify to bolster the Crown's case, contrary to R. v. Noble.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not use the failure to testify as evidence to strengthen the case, but merely noted there was no other explanation for an otherwise overwhelming case.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that had overturned the respondent's conviction.

The summary conviction appeal judge had excluded observations made by the police officer as the respondent exited his vehicle, treating them as compelled direct participation in roadside sobriety tests.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that observations made as a driver exits a vehicle, even in response to an officer's direction, do not constitute compelled direct participation under the Milne and Orbanski framework.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction.

The central issue was whether the trial judge's finding that the complainant was in fear was reasonable based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal court correctly determined the finding was not unreasonable and that the reasons were adequate.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application for certiorari to quash a committal for trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found no basis in the evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the appellant knew death was a likely consequence of the bodily harm inflicted.

The committal for second degree murder was quashed and a committal for manslaughter was substituted on consent.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order surrendering him to the United States to face charges for distributing crack cocaine.

The applicant argued that the Minister failed to give adequate reasons, erred in the Cotroni assessment regarding his section 6 Charter rights, and that the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in the US breached section 7 of the Charter and section 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister's reasons adequate, the Cotroni assessment reasonable, and that the mandatory minimum sentence did not shock the conscience.

The appellant applied for a review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order, arguing that the Minister should have sought a formal assurance that the death penalty would not be imposed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no basis upon which the death penalty could be imposed, as the appellant was not charged with a capital offence, New Jersey had a moratorium on the death penalty, and the prosecutor confirmed the appellant was ineligible for the death penalty.

The Minister's refusal to insist on a formal assurance did not violate the appellant's Charter rights.