RULING ON VOIR DIRE

HEBNER J.

[1] Mr. Manpreet Singh Dhatt (“Mr. Dhatt”) has been charged on a two-count indictment with the following:

Importing cocaine into Canada, contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c.19 (“CDSA”).
Possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to s. 5(2) of the CDSA.

[2] Both offences are alleged to have occurred on December 27, 2016. At the commencement of the trial, Mr. Dhatt admitted that he had cocaine in his vehicle when he tried to cross the border from the United States into Canada. Mr. Dhatt admitted that he knew the cocaine was in his vehicle and that it was to be trafficked by someone in Canada. Counsel for Mr. Dhatt advised that his defence was duress.

[3] Mr. Miller, on behalf of the accused, has objected to certain evidence called by the Crown and a voir dire was held on the issues. This is my ruling on the admissibility, or otherwise, of that evidence.

Background Facts

[4] For the purpose of dealing with the objections of defence counsel, I will briefly summarize the Crown’s evidence on those facts relevant to the issues.

[5] Mr. Dhatt became employed at a long-haul trucking company, State Express, in November 2016. State Express is based in Brampton, Ontario. Mr. Dhatt was employed as an owner-operator. He made two trips to California for State Express. On his first trip, Mr. Dhatt used his own truck. He drove to California with a load of goods in a refrigerated unit. He returned with a load of fresh produce. On his second trip, Mr. Dhatt used a truck owned by State Express. He was to take a load of peat moss to California and return with a load of oranges. It is Mr. Dhatt’s return to Canada on his second trip that resulted in the charges before the court.

[6] According to his driver’s daily log, Mr. Dhatt left Ontario on December 15 -16, 2016. He crossed the border into the United States at Detroit, Michigan. He drove to California and dropped off his load of peat moss. Mr. Dhatt was to pick up the load of oranges on December 21, 2016. It appears that he did so according to his daily log. He drove to Detroit, Michigan with his load of oranges.

[7] Mr. Dhatt tried to cross the Ambassador Bridge into Canada at approximately 3:30 a.m. on December 27, 2016. He entered a commercial lane manned by Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”) Officer Cunningham. Officer Cunningham found Mr. Dhatt to be agitated. After the preliminaries, Mr. Dhatt asked Officer Cunningham, “Can I tell you something?” He said, “I want to tell you about a guy I know. He brings stuff through the border and he’s pressuring me to do it too. He knows some bad people and I don’t want to be part of it.” Mr. Dhatt gave Officer Cunningham the man’s name and contact information. He said he wanted to be followed on his next trip so that everyone involved could be arrested.

[8] Mr. Dhatt was initially directed to the on-site secondary inspection station. He was then escorted to the off-site inspection station approximately 5 – 7 kilometres away, where he was to speak with an investigator. He arrived there at approximately 4:15 a.m. When the investigator, CBSA Officer Butler, arrived she asked that the trailer be searched. Mr. Dhatt was asked to back the trailer up to a loading dock and cut the seal so border services officers could enter the trailer and examine the interior. Officer Cunningham asked Mr. Dhatt if the officers would find anything. Mr. Dhatt said “No. Nothing. No problems. I will back it up.”

[9] Mr. Dhatt broke the seal on the trailer and CBSA Officer Cummings entered the trailer to search it. The oranges in the trailer were contained in boxes stacked on skids. Officer Cummings obtained a ladder and climbed the ladder to the top of the load. He “crawled the load” meaning he physically crawled on top of the stacks of boxes. The boxes were piled around six feet high. They were piled such that there were natural voids in between the load. Officer Cummings crawled onto the boxes in order to look into the voids. In the first void on the right side, Officer Cummings found an open duffel bag with packages wrapped in various materials. Some of the packages had spilled out of the duffel bag and were scattered around. He also found a purple cotton swab (or Q-tip) on top of the load and another one by the open duffel bag. The wrapped packages contained 30 bricks of cocaine, weighing a total of 30.199 kilograms.

[10] CBSA Officer Gorman is a detector dog handler. In December 2016, Officer Gorman was working with a black Labrador Retriever by the name of Pumba. Pumba was, at the time, certified in the passive detection of marihuana, cocaine, heroin and their derivatives, methamphetamine, MDMA, and firearms. I say “was” because Pumba retired from service in March 2017. Pumba’s job was to search out odours and, when an odour was present, provide a “passive reflex” by immediately sitting and looking at the place where the odour was present.

[11] Officer Gorman attended at the off-site inspection location with Pumba at approximately 8:30 am. Officer Gorman was asked to have Pumba search the truck, trailer, and load of oranges for odours. In any search, the first step is for Officer Gorman to conduct a visual inspection of the area to ensure that there are no safety issues for Pumba. Pumba will then search the designated area for odours and, if an odour is found, indicate the odour as described above.

[12] By the time Officer Gorman attended at the off-site inspection location, the load of oranges had been removed from the trailer. The oranges were in boxes stacked on 19 skids. The bricks of cocaine, and all the other items found with the cocaine, were placed on a cart in an evidence room. Pumba initially searched all 76 facings of the skids. He made no indication. He then searched the evidence room and indicated at the cart containing the bricks of cocaine. Officer Gorman rewarded Pumba with voice, touch, and play.

[13] At 1:20 p.m., Officer Gorman obtained a key to the cab of the truck. He searched the area for hazards or distractions (such as open food containers). Any food containers were removed to the dashboard. He instructed Pumba to search. Pumba showed extended interest in a wheeled Johnny Walker brand black suitcase on a bunk situated behind the driver and passenger seats in the truck. Pumba’s interest was followed with an indication. Officer Gorman interpreted Pumba’s behaviour as an indication of a target odour on the suitcase. Pumba was praised. Officer Gorman lifted the suitcase to assess its weight. The suitcase was very light.

[14] Following his search of the cab, Pumba was returned to the kennel vehicle. Officer Gorman opened the black suitcase and noted there was no powder residue present. Officer Gorman retrieved an ion scan machine located just off the dock. Using the swab provided with the scan, Officer Gorman took a swab of the bottom interior of the suitcase. The swab tested positive for cocaine.

The Issues on the Voir Dire

[15] There were two evidentiary issues raised by counsel. They are:

A) Is the evidence of the dog admissible? If so, for what purpose?

B) Is the evidence of the ion scan admissible? If so, for what purpose?

[16] Mr. Marinier submitted that I ought to consider the admissibility of the ion scan evidence first, and the admissibility of the dog evidence second. His reasoning was that if the ion scan evidence is admitted then that would speak to the reliability of the dog evidence. Mr. Miller submitted that I ought to consider each piece of evidence independent from the other. In this case, the progression of the investigation ought to be considered. Pumba’s positive indication led to the use of the ion scan machine. I intend to consider the evidence in that order.

A) The dog evidence

[17] Officer Gorman, at the time of his evidence, had been a detector dog handler for 13 years. Pumba was his third dog. Officer Gorman had taken extensive training in which he learned to care for, train, and motivate a detector dog. He attended a two-day assessment process in May 2005 and became certified on detector dog handling. He received an annual recertification, with his last recertification being in January 2018.

[18] Officer Gorman described the training process for a detector dog. The dog is trained to sit when in proximity to a target odour. The dog receives a reward when it has successfully located a target odour. Officer Gorman was qualified as an expert so as to give independent opinion evidence on a detector dog’s functions and evidence as to Pumba’s work in this case.

[19] Pumba was qualified and certified in September 2012. He must be recertified annually, and Pumba was last recertified prior to the incident in January 2016. Pumba had received 460 hours of formal training and daily ongoing informal training.

[20] According to Officer Gorman, Pumba successfully detected the following:

• Marihuana in 118 cases

• Cocaine or crack cocaine in 27 cases

• Heroin in 3 cases

• MDMA in 4 cases

• Methamphetamine in 8 cases

• Firearms in 26 cases

• Other CDSA controlled substances (opioids) in 22 cases

• US bulk currency in 8 cases

[21] Pumba is not trained on US bulk currency and opioids, yet these odours are listed in his success statistics noted above. The success was measured by the presence of the other confirming evidence. Officer Gorman acknowledged that a false positive can take place. A dog can indicate when there is no odour. He said that there were no such problems with Pumba and described Pumba as a “very honest worker”.

[22] As previously indicated, Pumba is a black Labrador Retriever. Officer Gorman identified that breed as a breed that does well due to their enjoyment of play. Playtime is used as a reward for a positive indication. Detector dogs that are motivated by play generally do well at their jobs.

[23] A detector dog will not differentiate between target odours. Accordingly, one cannot know the particular odour that is present when a detector dog provides an indication. One can only know that the dog has smelled one of many target odours.

Analysis

[24] Officer Gorman was proffered as an expert in training and handling detector dogs. A Mohan analysis is, thus, necessary. However, before turning to the principles enunciated in Mohan, I find it helpful to consider the basic principle of evidence as articulated by LaForest J. in R. v. Corbett, 1988 CanLII 80 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at p. 714, (in dissent), aff’d in R. v. Seaboyer, 1991 CanLII 76 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at p. 693 (in dissent, on other grounds), where he said:

The organizing principles of the law of evidence may be simply stated. All relevant evidence is admissible, subject to a discretion to exclude matters that may unduly prejudice, mislead or confuse the trier of fact, take up too much time, or that should otherwise be excluded on clear grounds of law or policy.

[25] I turn then to the Mohan principles.

[26] A person qualified as an expert may express opinions on matters with respect to which the ordinary person is unlikely to appreciate due to their technical nature: see R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275. The purpose of expert evidence is to assist the trier of fact by providing special knowledge that the ordinary person would not know. Its purpose is not to substitute the expert for the trier-of-fact. “What is asked of the trier of fact is an act of informed judgment, not an act of faith”: see R. v. J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, at para. 56.

[27] The criteria on which the admission of expert evidence depends is set out in R. v. Mohan, 1994 CanLII 80 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, at p. 20, affirmed in White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 182, (“White Burgess”):

(a) The proposed opinion is logically relevant to a material issue;

(b) The opinion is necessary in assisting the trier-of-fact, and relates to a matter that is properly the subject of opinion evidence;

(d) The witness is qualified to give the opinion.

[28] Relevance at the threshold stage refers to logical relevance; that is, the requirement that the evidence as a matter of human experience and logic has a tendency to make the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue more or less likely: see Mohan, at p. 21.

[29] The pre-condition of necessity requires that the expert opinion is necessary in that it provides information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of the trier of fact. The opinion must be necessary to enable the trier-of-fact to appreciate the matter in issue: see Mohan, at p. 23.

[30] Once the four Mohan criteria are demonstrated, the trial judge fulfils a gatekeeper function by conducting a cost-benefit analysis. The trial judge must decide whether expert evidence that meets the criteria is sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to warrant its admission. The second step involves an exercise of judicial discretion: see White Burgess, at paras. 19 -20.

[31] Justice Cromwell, at para. 24 of White Burgess, adopted the following statement from the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624, 97 O.R. (3d) 330, at para. 76:

The trial judge must decide whether expert evidence that meets the preconditions to admissibility is sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to warrant its admission despite the potential harm to the trial process that may flow from the admission of the expert evidence.

[32] The task then is to apply these principles to the dog evidence in this case.

[33] There are authorities dealing with tracker dogs. The earliest authority dealing with the admission of dog evidence appears to be R. v. Haas, 1962 CanLII 418, 35 D.L.R. (2d) 172 (B.C. C.A.). That case dealt with an RCMP tracking dog. The evidence of the handler was inadmissible at trial. The trial decision was overturned and a new trial was ordered on appeal. The considerations for admission of such evidence appears in the decision of Davey J.A. at p. 174 [cited to D.L.R.]:

One point has troubled me, namely, the Crown’s failure to tender any evidence of the propensities of the breed of dog used here – a German Shepherd dog – and the nature and extent of its training and its skill in tracking. The evidence tendered should not be admitted unless the Crown first establishes the qualifications of the dog and its trainer. It is the dog’s propensities and skills that make the evidence of what the dog did admissible, just as it is a witness’s qualifications and training that establishes him as an expert and makes his opinion admissible. The qualifications of the dog, like those of an expert, must be proved.

[34] In R. v. Morin, 1991 CarswellOnt 5969 (WL Can), Donnelly J. quoted the above passage and said, at para. 564:

Upon the authority of Haas, dog tracking or scenting evidence is not automatically admissible. There must be the usual pre-screening of the qualifications of the expert and the qualifications of the dog must be proved.

[35] At para. 586, Donnelly J. said:

[The jurors] must be instructed that dog scenting evidence must be received with caution and must not be given undue weight. The evidence is not, in itself, evidence that the accused committed the crime. It may be an indication that Christine Jessop had been at the Honda car before the arrival of Ryder.

[36] In R. v. Klymchuk, [2000] O.J. No. 4435, Wein J. of this court dealt with the issue of tracker dog evidence introduced by the Crown. She quoted with approval an excerpt from a text entitled “Expert Evidence” by Freckelton & Selby, at para. 30:

...there is now a relatively uniform position internationally with respect to the circumstances [in which] tracker dog evidence can be admitted against an accused person. There must be detailed basis evidence about the reliability of the dog breed, and about the skills and reliability of the particular dog as a tracker, before evidence can properly be adduced from a dog-handler about the particular tracking of a scent by a specific dog. The court needs to be informed about the dog’s training…about its success rates and its susceptibility to distraction, such as by irrelevant scents, cats, or other dogs. The handler needs to be in a position to give detailed evidence about the process, sequence and outcome of the tracking, preferably supported by contemporaneously or near contemporaneously compiled notes. The trial judge needs to administer to a jury a warning that such evidence should be evaluated in terms of the facts of the particular case and that it falls into the category of evidence in respect of which special care needs to be exercised because the source of the evidence, the dog, is not able to be made subject to the usual check and balance of the court system – cross examination.

[37] The Crown suggests that a more lenient test ought to be applied to a detector dog as opposed to a tracker dog because a tracker dog often operates outside in an uncontrolled environment, whereas a detected dog typically operates in a more controlled environment. I reject that argument. If anything, a more stringent test ought to be applied to a detector dog. The distinction is in the task the dog is being asked to perform. In the case of a tracker dog, the dog is tracking one scent. In the case of a detector dog, the dog may indicate the presence of any one of a number of scents, it being impossible to determine the scent that the dog actually detected.

[38] Mr. Miller suggests that the evidence is not sufficiently reliable as there was no evidence on the percentage of Pumba’s successful detection, taking into account the total number of search events. In my view, the lack of that evidence is not fatal to its admission. Significant evidence was called on Pumba’s abilities and Officer Gorman’s training in handling the dog.

[39] Turning to the criteria in Mohan, the evidence is relevant to the issue of whether there was cocaine residue in the cab of the truck. The evidence is necessary to assist the trier of fact in determining that issue. There is no exclusionary rule active, and Officer Gorman is a fully qualified expert. Mr. Miller conceded, on behalf of the accused, that there was no issue as to Officer Gorman’s impartiality. It seems to me that the real question, when considering the dog evidence in this case, is whether the evidence is sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to warrant its admission despite the potential harm to the trial process that may flow from it.

[40] Taken at its best, the evidence can only show that there was a substance that Pumba was trained to detect in the suitcase at some point in time. Based on Pumba’s abilities, that substance could have been marihuana, heroin, MDMA, methamphetamine, a firearm, opioids, US bulk currency, or cocaine. Whatever the substance was, it could have been in the suitcase at any time prior to Pumba’s encounter with it. In my view, the use of a detector dog is valuable for investigation purposes. As an example, the use of a detector dog may provide reasonable grounds for search. However, in this case, Pumba’s evidence is not being offered to support grounds for search. Pumba’s evidence is being offered as proof that cocaine was, at one point, in that suitcase. Given the frailties of that evidence, particularly the fact that Pumba cannot be cross-examined, I am not prepared to admit the evidence for the purpose for which it was intended. Instead, it seems to me that the evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of being part of the narrative to explain the decision to use the ion scan.

B) The ion scan

[41] Officer Gorman was not qualified, nor proffered, to give expert evidence on the workings of an ion scan machine. His evidence was limited to his use of the machine.

[42] Officer Gorman had been using ion scan machines for approximately 20 years at the time of his involvement in this case. The machine apparently has the capacity to analyze samples for narcotics and explosives. Officer Gorman completed training for use of the ion scanner in 2002 and 2004. He has used an ion scan machine thousands of times since.

[43] Officer Gorman explained the use of the machine. The machine is equipped with a small tin of swabs. One must use a clean, unused swab (approximately 1.5” x 1” type of paper) and place it in the ion scan machine in order to ensure that the swab is clear. Then one uses the swab on the target item and puts it in the machine. Officer Gorman ensured that he had a clean, fresh pair of gloves, and then followed this procedure when he completed the ion scan. He said the first sample was clear, as expected. The second sample was positive for cocaine. The positive result is displayed in a 2” x 2” colour screen. The machine appeared to be functioning normally.

[44] There was no cocaine residue visible in the suitcase. Officer Gorman confirmed that the scan cannot tell one when cocaine was in the suitcase, or who put cocaine in the case. He can only confirm the presence of trace particles of cocaine in the suitcase. The suitcase was not sent for any further testing.

[45] Officer Gorman frankly admitted that the ion scanning machine is not infallible. Some substances, such as Lamisil a certain antifungal agent, will result in a false positive.

Analysis

[46] The evidence of Officer Gorman’s ion scan test is relevant to the issue of whether cocaine was in the suitcase located in the cab of the truck. The question is whether or not it ought to be excluded as unduly prejudicial or misleading.

[47] An ion scan machine is a common instrument used by investigators to detect the presence of controlled substances. The machine is a specialized instrument that provides information. It is not unlike a radar machine used by traffic officers.

[48] The admissibility of evidence provided by specialized instruments that provide information was dealt with by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Redmond (1990), 1990 CanLII 10971 (ON CA), 54 C.C.C. (3d) 273 (Ont. C.A.). In that case, the accused appealed from her conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm. After the collision, the accused was taken to a hospital where the physician directed that samples of her blood be taken for blood-alcohol content using a machine identified as a TDX REAF enzyme method machine. Subsequently, the police obtained a warrant to take samples of the accused’s blood. While in the custody of the police, the samples were mistakenly destroyed before the accused could obtain a sample for independent analysis as required under s. 258(4) of the Criminal Code. The Crown was thus denied the benefit of simply relying on the certificate of the analyst to prove the blood-alcohol content. Instead, the Crown had to rely on the result of the prior test performed in the hospital at the request of the physician, namely the TDX REAF machine.

[49] The Court of Appeal found that the evidence of the analysis was properly admitted. The court made reference to radar machines used by officers to determine the speed of vehicles on the highway. The court rejected the argument that evidence must be provided to explain precisely how the machine operated or to prove its capability and accuracy. The court said, at p. 281:

It is sufficient if the expert operating the machine establishes that the machine is capable of making required measurements or producing the required data, that the machine was in good working order at the relevant time, and that it was properly used. If these conditions are met, the evidence is admissible and the only question left to the trier of fact is the weight to be given to such evidence.

[50] A similar approach was taken by Langdon J. of the predecessor to this court in R. v. Pierre, [1996] O.J. No. 4641. That case did involve an ion scanner used at an airport to scan the accused’s purse. A voir dire took place on the issue of whether the results of the scan were admissible. At paras. 3–5, Langdon J. said:

The purpose of the voir dire was to [determine] if the results of the ion scanner test were admissible, (a) perhaps on the issue of reasonable and probable grounds, but (b) more importantly on the issue of whether or not that evidence could be admitted for the purpose of demonstrating the presence of traces of cocaine, that evidence being relevant to the issue of knowledge.

In my respectful opinion, the issue in this case has been decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Bland, (1974), 60 O.R. (2d) 54, Arnup J.A. That case was a case where a policeman was attempting to put in evidence in a speeding trial the reading that he read off the speedometer in the police car. The objection made to it was that it was hearsay[.]

The court there decided that there is a presumption at common law that a device or machine, which is designed to do a specific task, does it correctly. That is a rebuttable presumption, and of course is subject to weight and any evidence which may affect weight. In my opinion, this device is indistinguishable in principle from the speedometer.

[51] The Crown urges me to apply the same reasoning to the ion scan machine in this case.

[52] In R. v. Allwood, 2005 CarswellOnt 9911, a CBSA officer at Pearson International Airport conducted an ion scan of the accused’s luggage at a secondary inspection station. The accused was detained. A strip search was conducted and the accused was taken to the washroom for bedpan watch. Eventually, the accused excreted pellets containing 1,357 grams of cocaine and 21 grams of cannabis. The defence brought an application to exclude the evidence of the cocaine and cannabis and the results of the ion scan. The application was dismissed. At para. 15, Sproat J. said:

In this case the ion scan is not used as proof of guilt or innocence, but as part of the investigative process and as a component of the reasonable grounds to search. The evidence indicates that the data from the ion scan is limited. Essentially the ion scan either provides a positive or negative result and the information on the screen is essentially limited to the fact that there is a positive result, the nature of the drug, the intensity reading. An accurate note of what is on the screen would be every bit as helpful to a trier of fact as the print-out.

[53] Justice Sproat found that there was no basis upon which to exclude the ion scan evidence. Of course, the use of the ion scan evidence in that case (i.e. to prove reasonable grounds for a search) is different than the case at hand.

[54] In R. v. Singh, 2014 ONSC 5483, a decision of Pomerance J. of this court, Mr. Singh drove his tractor-trailer into Canada over the Ambassador Bridge containing a load of oranges. The load also contained 69 kilograms of cocaine discovered by CBSA officers during a dog training exercise. In addition to seizing the 69 kilograms of cocaine from the trailer, CBSA officials seized three suitcases from the cab of the truck. An ion scan analysis was conducted on the suitcases. At para. 44, Pomerance J. said:

The Crown introduced evidence of an Ion scan analysis, which detected trace amounts of cocaine in each of the suitcases. I attach very little weight to the Ion scan evidence. First, the test may yield a false positive. Secondly, the device cannot tell the authorities when traces of drug were deposited. There is nothing to link the result of the test to the events underlying the charge. Third, the evidence failed to establish that the device used in this case was subject to regular maintenance checks. I am not persuaded that it is safe to rely on the results as disclosing the presence of cocaine.

[55] The facts in this case are almost indistinguishable from the evidence before Pomerance J. As in the case before Pomerance J., the ion scanner can yield a false positive. The ion scanner does not tell authorities when, or how, traces of the drug were deposited. Although there was no evidence before me as to whether the device used was subject to regular maintenance checks, I do not find that fact to detract from its usefulness. I agree with Langdon J. that there is a rebuttable presumption that the machine was operating properly and there was evidence from Officer Gorman on his testing of the machine before its use. Rather, in my view, the limitations of the ion scanner evidence lie in its ability to tell us how, when, by whom, or under what circumstances was the drug placed in the suitcase.

[56] I return to the question at hand, namely whether the probative value of the ion scan evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. The probative value is limited, for the reasons identified by Pomerance J. and outlined above. The prejudicial effect, of course, is the possibility of a false positive. In my view, the prejudicial effect is not as great as in the case of the detector dog evidence. The ion scanner identified trace amounts of cocaine, whereby the detector dog can only identify the presence of one of many target odours it is trained to identify.

[57] In the result, I find that the evidence of the positive ion scan is admissible. However, like Pomerance J. in R v. Singh, and for the reasons she expressed and the reasons I set out herein, I attach very little weight to the evidence.

Disposition

[58] For the foregoing reasons, the evidence of the detector dog is admissible only for the limited purpose of narrative and explanation as to the reason the ion scan was conducted of the interior of the suitcase.

[59] The evidence of the ion scan result is admissible, however will be given very little weight.

“original signed and released by Hebner J.”

Pamela L. Hebner

Justice

Released Orally: June 20, 2018

COURT FILE NO.: CR-17-3990

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

Manpreet Singh Dhatt

RULING ON VOIR DIRE

Hebner J.

Released Orally: June 20, 2018

R. v. Dhatt, 2018 ONSC 3761

Case Summary

RULING ON VOIR DIRE

Background Facts

The Issues on the Voir Dire

A) The dog evidence

Analysis

B) The ion scan

Analysis

Disposition

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Expert Witnesses

Issues

Statutory Provisions 2

Legal Tests 2

Legislation 2