Court File and Parties
Ontario Court of Justice
Between:
His Majesty the King
— and —
Danielle Armaleo
Before: Justice S. G. Pratt
Heard on: 18 August 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on: 3 November 2025
Counsel:
- Mitchell Witteveen, for the Crown
- Laura Joy, for the Defendant
Judgment
Introduction
1The Applicant Danielle Armaleo seeks a remedy for what she says are violations of her rights as guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She says the warrants authorizing the search of her vehicle and home should not stand as they were based, at least in part, on information obtained in searches that violated her co-accused's Charter rights. She further argues she has her own reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone and phone number that were the focus of those impugned searches. The Crown argues she does not have standing to make that argument as she cannot argue another party's Charter rights and had no such reasonable expectation.
2This ruling will deal only with the standing issue. For the reasons that follow, I find the Applicant does not have standing to attack the issuance of the underlying warrants that came before the warrants for her vehicle and home.
Summary of the Investigation
3The following is a summary of the investigation and the allegations against the Applicant and her co-accused Xavien Williams.
4Project Jaguar was an investigation of suspected drug trafficking undertaken by the Windsor Police Service in May 2024. Xavien Williams was the target of the investigation. In the course of the operation, the police obtained a Transmission Data Recorder (TDR) warrant and a tracking warrant related to the cell phone number 519-817-9915. This number was identified as being used by Williams by multiple confidential sources.
5The location-based services data obtained through the tracking warrant told police where that cell phone was located. This permitted them to conduct physical surveillance, which they did on several days. In the course of that surveillance, Williams was seen on three occasions:
- (1) 2 May 2024: Williams was seen entering and exiting the residence at 10687 Atwater Crescent, Windsor;
- (2) 6 May 2024: Williams was seen driving a black Dodge Durango, license plate DBDN 355 and entering the Atwater residence; and
- (3) 8 May 2024: Williams was seen driving the Durango.
6On the basis of this information and the evidence obtained to that point in the overall investigation, the police sought and obtained search warrants for the Atwater residence and the Durango. The Applicant was a resident of the Atwater residence and the registered owner of the Durango. It is the searches of these locations that she claims were constitutionally deficient.
7The search of the Atwater residence revealed large quantities of multiple controlled substances, scales, ammunition, over-capacity magazines, a bulletproof vest, and currency.
8Williams has elected not to challenge the validity of the TDR or tracking warrants.
The Position of the Applicant
9Through counsel, the Applicant submits that she has standing to challenge the validity of the TDR and tracking warrants issued early in the investigation. Those warrants, she says, were invalid in that they did not provide sufficient evidence to support their issuance.
10As I see it, going by the Applicant's factum and submissions made in court, she makes two arguments. First, that she should have standing to argue the breach of Williams' s. 8 Charter rights because that breach went on to impact her own Charter rights. I take this argument from paragraph 54 of the Applicant's factum.
11Second, she argues that apart from Williams' rights, she had her own reasonable expectation of privacy in the information obtained through the TDR and tracking warrants. This should permit her to argue their validity.
12I will address each argument in turn.
Issue 1: Can the Applicant argue a breach of Williams' Charter rights?
13The question of whether a person can argue the breach of another's Charter rights has been around since the dawn of the Charter itself. In the trial decision of R. v. Rowbotham [1984] 13 W.C.B. 105 (H.C.J.), Justice Ewaschuk, then of the Ontario High Court, considered the issue:
[2] The accused George Kononow has moved for the exclusion of evidence of a large quantity of hashish seized from the trunk of a car apparently used by David Stone and Michele Burke, both of Montreal. Mr. Kononow had no possessory interest in the car, although both he and Robert Young had apparently intended to purchase the hashish found in the trunk of the car. At the time of seizure, neither Kononow nor Young had yet taken possession of the hashish.
[3] The question then to be decided is whether an accused has standing to challenge a search or seizure although his personal rights have not been violated. Mr. Kononow claims he has standing on the basis that the evidence may be admissible against him as part of the conspiracies charged should the jury find by his acts and declarations that he is a member of the alleged conspiracies.
[6] In R. v. Taylor et al., delivered January 26, 1984 (B.C.S.C.), Mr. Justice Toy decided that the wording of s. 24(1) dictates that Charter rights and freedoms are personal and accrue only to those persons whose rights and freedoms have been directly infringed and denied.
[7] Prior to the Charter, it was undoubted that an applicant to quash a search warrant lacked standing to do so unless he or she established ownership or possessory interest either in the things seized or in the premises searched: Model Power v. Regina (1981), 21 C.R. (3d) 195 (Ont. C.A.) and Beach v. A.G. Can. (1978), 1978 ALTASCAD 399 , 8 Alta. L.R. (2d) 379 (C.A.). Potential prejudice, in itself, was not sufficient to give the applicant standing to attack the seizures, in the event criminal proceedings were initiated and the evidence was tendered.
[8] In the United States, standing to challenge infringements of constitutional rights is also based on the concept that constitutional rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted. Thus in respect of Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure, it is the particular defendant's right to "a reasonable expectation of privacy" which must be infringed and not that of some other person: Rakas et al. v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128 (S.C.). Merely to be prejudiced by the use of the evidence is not sufficient to grant standing to an applicant seeking to exclude that evidence.
[9] I agree with Mr. Justice Toy's conclusion in R. v. Taylor et al., supra, that Charter rights and freedoms, save for declarations of legislative invalidity, are personal rights. Having regard, however, to the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in Hunter et al. v. Southam, (released September 17, 1984), I would extend the grounds for standing. In addition to the invasion of a person's proprietary and possessory interests, I would add that a person has standing to apply for a remedy where "his reasonable expectation of privacy has been invaded".
14That a Charter right can only be argued by the person claiming the violation was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 at paragraphs 34 and 45.
15It is clear, then, that the Applicant cannot assert the breach of Williams' Charter right.
Issue 2: Did the Applicant have her own reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone?
16The alternative position of the Applicant is that she had her own reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) in the cell phone. If she did, she would have standing to argue against the authorization that allowed it to be tracked.
17In Edwards, Justice Cory referred with approval to Justice McKinlay's majority decision from the Court of Appeal for Ontario. Justice McKinlay stated that Edwards had to show his personal right to privacy had been infringed when police searched the apartment belonging to his girlfriend.
18Justice Cory also cited Justice Dickson (as he then was), speaking for the Supreme Court of Canada in Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, who said there was no need to show a property interest in the thing searched. A claimant need only show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object of the search. This follows the Court's logic that section 8 protects people, not places. It protects the privacy interests of the person, regardless of their legal relationship to the thing searched.
19Has the Applicant shown a REP in the cell phone and number? As that question must be answered by considering the totality of the circumstances, I will assess her connection to the objects of the TDR and tracking warrants.
20As part of their investigation, police were told by multiple confidential informants that the phone number 519-817-9915 was being used by Williams. Police confirmed this was at the time an active cell phone number administered by Rogers Communications. Based on this information, police obtained TDR and tracking warrants for the number and the phone itself.
21At this point in the investigation, the Applicant's name had not yet come up in any context.
22The tracking data allowed police to undertake visual surveillance of Williams on the dates noted above. This led police to seek and obtain a tracking warrant for the vehicle he was using, which was the Dodge Durango. A query with the Ministry of Transportation revealed the Applicant was the registered owner of that vehicle. To that point, the Applicant's name had not appeared in any of the authorization applications. Notably, she was not mentioned in the TDR or tracking warrant applications.
23To help show a REP in the phone, the Applicant cites the case of R. v. MacInnis [2007] O.J. No. 2937 (S.C.J.). In that case, MacInnis sought standing to challenge the admissibility of his common-law partner Clark's cell phone records. Ultimately, Justice Ferguson found a REP existed and allowed MacInnis to challenge the evidence.
24That case, however, was clearly different from the one before me.
25At paragraph 9, Justice Ferguson alludes to a period of time where the Crown alleges joint use of Clark's cell phone. There is no allegation or evidence that the Applicant ever used the phone connected to Williams.
26At paragraph 14, Justice Ferguson stated:
There is evidence that Clark was a subscriber for a cell phone. The phone records obtained as the result of the search warrant show a pattern of use during the period of the alleged offences which the Crown contends supports an inference that MacInnis was using it in the course of the offences. In fact, the Crown contends that the Clark cell records in combination with other police information indicate that MacInnis was using her cell phone on the first day it was activated.
27There is no evidence of joint use of the phone, or that the Applicant was in actuality the main user, before me.
28Finally, at paragraph 17:
The statement from McMullin indicates that on a number of occasions Knight [a co-defendant] would call McMullin on Clark's cell and then later Knight and MacInnis would meet McMullin… The evidence does establish that MacInnis in fact controlled Clark's cell phone on those occasions.
29In the present case, there is no evidence the Applicant ever had any dealings with the phone in question, save for one possibly important exception. Over the course of eight days, the TDR data shows 63 contacts between the Applicant and the phone. On this basis, the Applicant argues the phone was effectively shared property between her and Williams. This, she says, gives her a REP in the phone and its data.
30The difficulty with this argument, as I suggested to counsel during submissions, is that if calling a particular number was enough to give the caller a REP in the receiving phone, anyone who might have called the phone in the relevant time period could conceivably argue Charter standing. While calling the phone is certainly some evidence that the Applicant was aware of the phone and wanted to communicate with the person in control of it, those contacts are not sufficient to show the phone number or the phone itself were shared property. An example illustrates why that is. If, during a period of stock market volatility, a client calls her broker repeatedly over the course of a week, does the broker's phone become shared property? Surely not.
31A distinction must also be made regarding what exactly was gained by the TDR and tracking warrants. At no time did police obtain substantive information about what may have been said or written in any calls or messages made or received by the target phone. This is an important distinction. Had we been discussing the admissibility of the substance of messages exchanged by the Applicant and Williams, for example, there would likely have been a REP in the messages even if they were on the target phone. Instead, we are only dealing with the numbers to and from which contact was made, and physical locations obtained by tracking the phone. Cases such as R. v. Marakah 2017 SCC 59, which considered REP in a "text message conversation" (see paragraph 5) are therefore distinguishable.
32As to the use police put the TDR and tracking data to, counsel argued those warrants brought the Applicant to police attention. I respectfully disagree. It was not the warrants that ultimately brought the Applicant to police attention. It was the actions of Williams. All the warrants did was allow police to view the traffic on the phone and track its location. When they tracked that location, they saw Williams in the Applicant's vehicle and coming and going from her residence. The acquisition of the Applicant's identity did not come from the warrants but from what they saw Williams doing.
33In conclusion on this issue, I return to the Edwards decision. At paragraph 45, subparagraph 6 Justice Cory provided a list of seven factors to be considered when examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a REP exists. That list was trimmed down to four factors in R. v. Spencer 2014 SCC 43. At paragraph 18 of that decision, Justice Cromwell stated:
The wide variety and number of factors that may be considered in assessing the reasonable expectation of privacy can be grouped under four main headings for analytical convenience: (1) the subject matter of the alleged search; (2) the claimant's interest in the subject matter; (3) the claimant's subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter; and (4) whether this subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, having regard to the totality of the circumstances: Tessling, at para. 32; R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579, at para. 27; R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, at para. 40. However, this is not a purely factual inquiry. The reasonable expectation of privacy standard is normative rather than simply descriptive: Tessling, at para. 42. Thus, while the analysis is sensitive to the factual context, it is inevitably "laden with value judgments which are made from the independent perspective of the reasonable and informed person who is concerned about the long-term consequences of government action for the protection of privacy": Patrick, at para. 14; see also R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211, at para. 34, and Ward, at paras. 81-85.
34Using His Honour's four factors, I note the following.
35The subject matter of the search is the TDR and tracking data. It is not personal information like internet service provider subscriber data or the content of text messages. It is information focused on a cell phone linked to someone other than the Applicant.
36Aside from the agreement that there were 63 contacts between the Applicant's phone and the target phone over an eight-day period, I have heard no evidence of the Applicant's interest in the TDR or tracking data. She was not named or directly implicated in any of Williams' alleged misconduct. Given that it was conceded in argument that Williams and the Applicant were in an intimate relationship at the time, the number of contacts is not objectively remarkable in any event.
37I see no evidence of the Applicant's subjective expectation of privacy in the traffic on the target phone or its physical location. She has not demonstrated any sort of connection to the phone other than by calling it. She has not shown a subjective expectation of privacy.
38Finally, had there been a subjective expectation of privacy, or if I am wrong in finding there was none, it could not be said to be objectively reasonable in all the circumstances. A reasonable person, conversant in the importance of an individual's privacy in the face of government intrusion, would not extend a REP to information as disconnected from the Applicant as someone else's TDR data and phone locations.
Result
39To show standing to attack the TDR or tracking warrants, the Applicant must establish on a balance of probabilities that she has a personal Charter right that is affected by their issuance. She cannot argue the Charter rights of another person. The right she says is jeopardized must be her own. She must establish her own reasonable expectation of privacy in the information in question.
40Taking all the circumstances into account, I find she has not met this onus. The Applicant has not established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information obtained through the warrants. She is therefore precluded from attacking their validity.
41Given the result, it is unnecessary for me to consider the question of excision.
42Finally, and to be clear, nothing in this ruling should be taken as limiting the Applicant's ability to challenge the search warrants for the Durango or the Atwater residence. As they were her vehicle and her residence, she is well within her rights to challenge those authorizations. The effect of this ruling is that any such challenges cannot include attacks based on the alleged invalidity of the TDR or tracking warrants.
Released: 3 November 2025
Signed: Justice S. G. Pratt