5 total
LAT decision denying catastrophic impairment benefits quashed due to unreasonable findings on whole person impairment.
The appellant, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident, appealed and sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying her catastrophic impairment benefits.
The Divisional Court found that while there was no breach of procedural fairness, the Adjudicator's findings regarding the appellant's whole person impairment under Criterion 6 of the AMA Guides were unreasonable.
Specifically, the Adjudicator unreasonably dismissed evidence of double vision, peripheral neuropathy, and medication side effects.
The court quashed the decision and remitted the matter to the LAT for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.
Request for reconsideration of catastrophic impairment determination dismissed; no breach of procedural fairness or material errors found.
The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision which found she was not catastrophically impaired and denied her claims for attendant care, treatment plans, housekeeping, and costs.
The applicant argued the Tribunal breached procedural fairness and made errors of fact and law in assessing various Whole Person Impairment (WPI) ratings, including those for upper extremity, mental status, diplopia, medications, and social functioning.
The Adjudicator dismissed the request, finding no material breach of procedural fairness as the applicant had ample opportunity to present her case during the 11-day hearing.
Furthermore, the Adjudicator concluded that no errors of fact or law were made that would have resulted in a different outcome.
Application for judicial review dismissed; Director's Delegate reasonably found arbitrator's reasons denying accident benefits inadequate.
The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate, which allowed the insured's appeal from an arbitrator's denial of statutory accident benefits.
The Director's Delegate found that the arbitrator erred in law by failing to provide adequate reasons for denying income replacement and medical benefits.
Applying the Vavilov framework, the Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness.
The Court concluded that the Director's Delegate reasonably found the arbitrator's reasons inadequate, as they failed to address the principal evidence or explain the reasoning process.
The application for judicial review was dismissed.
Applicant entitled to IRBs for first 104 weeks and medical benefits for chronic pain and physiotherapy.
The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, including ongoing income replacement benefits (IRBs) and medical benefits for a chronic pain assessment and physiotherapy.
The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the applicant was substantially unable to perform the essential tasks of her pre-accident 'heavy' employment for the first 104 weeks due to chronic pain and psychological issues, entitling her to IRBs for that period.
However, she failed to prove a complete inability to engage in any suitable employment after 104 weeks.
The Tribunal also found the proposed chronic pain assessment and physiotherapy treatment plans to be reasonable and necessary, ordering them payable if incurred, along with interest on overdue benefits.
Applicant designated catastrophically impaired; Schedule does not require 24-month waiting period for ASIA scale permanent grade.
The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought a determination of catastrophic impairment under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule based on a spinal cord injury.
The respondent denied the designation, arguing that the applicant's ASIA Impairment Scale grade was not yet "permanent" because the injury had the potential to improve over the initial 18-24 months.
The adjudicator found that the applicant met the definition of catastrophic impairment, noting that her ASIA Impairment Scale score of "D" satisfied the criteria and there was no evidence she would improve to a normal "E" score.
The adjudicator rejected the respondent's argument that a 24-month waiting period was required, as paragraph 1 of section 3.1(1) contains no such temporal requirement.