James B. Tausendfreund

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement arising from a dispute over a boat that the defendant had taken possession of after the parties’ relationship ended.

Through email exchanges, the defendant accepted the plaintiff’s offer to settle the action for $20,000 inclusive of costs and later requested an extension of time to pay.

The defendant later argued that no binding agreement existed because no settlement agreement or release had been signed.

The court held that the email correspondence clearly demonstrated agreement on all essential terms and that a signed document was not required for a binding settlement.

Finding no genuine issue regarding the parties’ intention to be bound and no policy reason to refuse enforcement, the court enforced the settlement.

A third party defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of negligence allegations in a third party claim arising from a water main failure involving high density polyethylene pipe.

The court applied the framework for summary judgment articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin and considered whether the evidentiary record demonstrated a genuine issue requiring a trial.

Several negligence allegations relating to manufacturing defects, inspection failures, and product design were dismissed on partial summary judgment.

However, claims alleging that the pipe may have been damaged while in the moving party’s care, custody, or control were allowed to proceed because causation remained unresolved among multiple parties who handled the pipe.

The court concluded that determining which party caused the fracture required a full evidentiary record and credibility findings best addressed at trial.

The appellants challenged an order dismissing their claim for delay, arguing that the respondent's consent to a June 2012 order requiring the action to be set down for trial by a specified date implicitly represented trial readiness and engaged Rule 48 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court rejected that submission, holding that the respondent had merely agreed to a scheduling requirement directed at the appellants' longstanding delay and made no representation about its own readiness for trial or the fairness of a future trial.

The court also held that consent to the scheduling order did not waive the respondent's right to later rely on prejudice arising from delay predating the order.

The appeal was dismissed with fixed appeal costs to the respondent.

The applicant, who has multiple disabilities, alleged that the respondent condominium builder discriminated against him by failing to allocate a parking spot in front of his building.

The Tribunal found that while the applicant had disabilities, he failed to make his disability-related needs known to the respondent's sales staff when purchasing the unit, thereby failing to trigger the respondent's duty to accommodate.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist.

His insurer denied uninsured automobile coverage because the plaintiff was driving with a suspended licence.

The Minister of Finance, administering the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, brought a cross-claim on behalf of the uninsured defendant seeking a declaration of coverage.

The insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim and cross-claim, arguing the cross-claim was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal held that the statutory condition regarding authorized driving did not apply to uninsured automobile coverage unless explicitly provided in the policy, which it was not.

While the cross-claim was out of time under the Limitations Act, the court stayed the limitation defence in the interest of judicial economy.

The plaintiffs moved to strike portions of the defendant's affidavit filed in support of a summary judgment motion, arguing the paragraphs disclosed without prejudice settlement communications.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the communications were simply an accounting reconciliation of agreed and disputed invoices, rather than privileged settlement negotiations involving a compromise of positions.