K. Eberhard

The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm following a trial on a charge of attempted murder.

The Crown initially sought a dangerous offender designation but abandoned this application following the Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Hason, which raised concerns about the reliability of expert psychiatric evidence.

The court accepted a joint submission sentencing the accused to an additional three years in the penitentiary (for a total of 9.75 years) and imposed a long-term supervision order for eight years.

The sentence was imposed to allow the accused to access treatment while in custody and to protect the public given the accused's extensive history of violent offences.

Two accused were tried jointly on charges arising from their involvement with two 15-year-old girls who engaged in prostitution at a Peterborough motel.

The Crown alleged that the accused knowingly permitted the girls to use a hotel room for prohibited sexual activity, and that one accused exercised influence over the girls' movements.

The trial judge found both accused guilty of knowingly permitting minors to engage in prohibited sexual activity under s. 171 of the Criminal Code.

However, the trial judge acquitted one accused of exercising influence over the girls' movements, finding insufficient evidence of exploitation or coercion.

The other accused was convicted of receiving money derived from illegal sexual services and possession of cocaine.

The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing the victim approximately 30 times.

The jury recommended a 10-year parole ineligibility period, while the Crown sought 14 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the attack, the defendant's extensive criminal record, and victim impact statements.

The court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 13 years, along with ancillary weapons, DNA, and non-communication orders.

The accused was tried on charges of assaulting his former spouse on October 16, 2014, and causing unnecessary pain to a family dog by punching and kicking it on October 25, 2014.

The Crown relied on the testimony of the complainant and her mother, while the accused testified in his own defence and denied both allegations.

The court applied the credibility assessment framework from R. v. W.(D.) and found that the accused's evidence, while not necessarily believed, raised a reasonable doubt regarding both charges.

The court considered the timing of the police complaint, which occurred shortly after the accused retained counsel to assert his rights in a custody and access dispute, and noted the lack of impartiality of the complainant's mother, who had been involved in drafting a separation agreement favourable to the complainant.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of her vehicle, which was stuck in a snowbank at the end of a residential driveway.

She had called for a tow truck and was waiting inside the vehicle with the engine running for warmth.

The trial judge found that the accused rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing that her occupancy of the driver's seat began for the purpose of awaiting the tow truck, not for setting the vehicle in motion.

The court further found no realistic risk of danger to the public, as the vehicle was immobilized and incapable of being set in motion.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of her vehicle, which was stuck in a snowbank at the end of a residential driveway.

She had called for a tow truck and was waiting for its arrival when discovered.

The Crown conceded that the accused was impaired and over the legal limit but argued she was in care or control of the vehicle.

The trial judge found that the accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing that her occupancy of the driver's seat began for the purpose of awaiting the tow truck, not for setting the vehicle in motion.

The court further found no realistic risk of danger to the public, as the vehicle was immobilized in a snowbank and incapable of being set in motion.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with two offences arising from a fraud scheme: (1) defrauding a victim of $10,000 contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and (2) possessing currency knowing it was obtained by the commission of an offence.

The victim was defrauded through a lottery scam and $10,000 was transferred to the accused's bank account.

The accused withdrew approximately $8,000 in cash and handed it to an unknown individual.

The court found the accused guilty on count 2 based on wilful blindness to the illegal source of the funds, but acquitted her on count 1, finding insufficient evidence of intent to aid in the specific fraud scheme.

The accused was charged with two offences arising from a fraudulent scheme: (1) defrauding a victim of $10,000 contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and (2) possessing currency knowing it was obtained by the commission of an offence.

The victim was defrauded through a Publisher's Clearinghouse sweepstakes scam.

The accused received $10,000 of the fraudulently obtained funds into her bank account at the direction of a family friend, withdrew approximately $8,000 in cash, and handed it to an unknown individual.

The court found the accused guilty on count 2 (possession of stolen property) based on wilful blindness to the illegal source of the funds, but acquitted her on count 1 (fraud) as the Crown failed to prove she had subjective knowledge of the fraudulent scheme specifically.

Following sentencing for multiple sexual offences, the court initially imposed an incorrect Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order of 20 years.

Because the offender had been convicted of more than one designated offence, the Criminal Code required a mandatory lifetime SOIRA order.

The Crown brought an application to correct the error after sentencing.

The court held that although s. 490.012(4) of the Criminal Code did not apply, the court possessed inherent jurisdiction to correct a patent error relating to a statutorily mandated ancillary order.

The court issued a fresh lifetime SOIRA order and awarded the offender $200 in costs for compelled additional court attendances caused by the prosecutorial and judicial error.

The offender was convicted following trial of sexual exploitation of a young person in a position of trust and of mischief for interfering with a motor vehicle.

The sexual relationship began when the complainant was 15 and continued for approximately two years, involving numerous acts of intercourse and a significant age disparity.

The court considered aggravating factors including prolonged abuse of trust, repeated sexual acts, lack of insight or remorse, and the lasting psychological harm described in victim impact statements.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of prior criminal record, stable employment history, and a psychiatric assessment indicating a low risk of reoffending.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed a custodial sentence.

The accused was tried on a ten-count indictment alleging multiple assaults and sexual offences occurring between 1987 and 1992 against two complainants, including a child who lived with the accused while he was in a parental role.

The court assessed credibility in the context of historic allegations, applying principles from leading authorities on reasonable doubt, delayed disclosure, and evidence of adult witnesses recalling childhood events.

The court accepted the child complainant’s testimony regarding repeated sexual acts occurring during shared showers and found corroboration in surrounding circumstances and other witness evidence.

The court rejected several allegations involving the adult complainant due to inconsistencies and credibility concerns, applying a Vetrovec-type caution.

Convictions were entered on multiple counts relating to assault and sexual offences against the child complainant, while the remaining counts were dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual exploitation, sexual assault, uttering threats, sexual assault against a second complainant, and mischief.

The evidence established that the accused engaged in sexual activity with a teenage complainant who resided in the household of his common-law partner and whom he treated as a father figure.

The court found that the accused occupied a position of trust or authority within the meaning of s. 153 of the Criminal Code and was therefore guilty of sexual exploitation despite the complainant being legally capable of consenting at the time.

The Crown failed to prove lack of consent for the sexual assault charge and failed to establish the alleged threats or a sexual assault against the second complainant.

The accused was also found guilty of mischief for intentionally pulling a vehicle’s parking brake while a teenager was driving.

The accused applied for judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code while charged with first degree murder arising from a fatal stabbing.

The proposed release plan involved multiple sureties, including family members and a friend, and strict conditions of residence, curfew, employment, and non-contact with witnesses.

The Crown opposed release, citing a history of breaching court orders, absconding from jurisdiction for extended periods, substance abuse, violent conduct, and the strength of the Crown’s case.

The court found the accused posed a significant flight risk and raised concerns regarding witness safety and potential interference with the administration of justice.

Detention was ordered on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.