Marcia A. Green

The applicant, Marguerite Landry, was substantially successful on a motion for interim costs and sought costs for the motion.

As a self-represented litigant, she claimed fees for time spent and disbursements.

The court found that she did not meet the requirements for a self-represented litigant to receive costs for time and effort, as she did not demonstrate an opportunity cost or that she performed work ordinarily done by a lawyer.

The court limited her recovery to reasonable disbursements, fixing costs at $500.

Following a successful motion by certain beneficiaries to remove estate counsel, the court determined the costs consequences.

Applying Rule 57 principles governing costs in estate litigation, the court held that costs should generally follow the event and be borne personally by litigants rather than the estate except in narrow circumstances.

The court found the moving parties were entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis but reduced the claimed fees and disbursements as excessive, including reducing photocopy disbursements.

Costs were fixed at reduced amounts and ordered payable personally by the estate trustees on a joint and several basis.

Certain beneficiaries of an estate brought a motion to remove the estate solicitor and his firm due to a conflict of interest in a contested passing of accounts.

The solicitor had previously acted for one of the estate trustees when she was the deceased's power of attorney for property, and had handled many of the transactions now in dispute.

The court found that the solicitor's extensive involvement in the deceased's affairs and the estate created a potential conflict situation.

The motion was granted and the solicitor's firm was removed as counsel for the estate.

In an estate dispute involving dependants’ relief and trust claims, the moving parties sought interim funding from the estate to retain counsel and also sought reimbursement for prior legal fees.

Applying the three-part test for interim costs from Okanagan Indian Band, the court found that one moving party had established impecuniosity, a prima facie case, and special circumstances arising from the conflict between the parties and her inability to advance legitimate claims effectively without counsel.

The court ordered a limited interim payment of $15,000 in trust to counsel for that moving party, restricted to specified steps in the litigation.

The claim for reimbursement of previously incurred legal fees was denied.

A non‑party brought a motion seeking to set aside or vary an order for directions in estate proceedings concerning the administration of a deceased’s estate.

The moving party asserted standing as an affected person and alternatively through a power of attorney granted by an existing party.

The court held that a power of attorney does not permit the attorney to advocate in court on behalf of the grantor without counsel and that a potential future successor to an estate beneficiary does not qualify as an “affected person” under Rule 37.14(1).

The court further concluded that the moving party had no financial interest in the estate and possessed none of the documents referenced in the order for directions.

The motion was dismissed for lack of standing and the responding party’s cross‑motion to strike the motion was granted, with costs awarded against the moving party.

Les appelants ont contesté en appel la conclusion selon laquelle leurs lettres de démission du conseil d’administration d’une fondation étaient valides, plaidant l’influence indue et un complot visant la prise de contrôle de l’organisme.

La Cour d’appel a conclu que le juge des requêtes disposait de tous les faits pertinents, avait examiné les allégations soulevées et n’avait commis aucune erreur manifeste et dominante dans son appréciation factuelle.

La cour a aussi rejeté la demande d’autorisation d’interjeter appel de l’ordonnance de dépens.

Les dépens de l’appel ont été accordés aux intimés sur une base d’indemnité partielle.

The respondents in the underlying proceeding brought a motion seeking recovery of $15,159.17 in costs allegedly incurred in a prior vendor–purchaser motion.

The court held that the relief sought fell outside the scope and jurisdiction of the files in which the motion was brought.

The evidence showed that the moving parties had resigned as directors of the foundation and therefore lacked authority to retain counsel or act on behalf of the foundation in the earlier proceeding.

Applying rule 57.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court declined to award costs to the moving parties and rejected their claim for recovery of those costs.

The motion was dismissed without costs.

Les requérants demandaient le recouvrement de dépens à la suite d’un litige relatif à la vente d’un bien‑fonds appartenant à une fondation.

Dans une requête antérieure, ils s’étaient opposés à la vente du bien-fonds et avaient été déboutés, la cour concluant qu’ils n’avaient pas respecté les obligations du vendeur prévues à la convention d’achat‑vente.

La cour a conclu que leur opposition infructueuse à la conclusion de la vente avait provoqué le litige et que leur conduite ne justifiait pas l’octroi de dépens en leur faveur.

Le recouvrement des dépens demandé par les requérants a donc été rejeté.

La motion incidente et toute compensation des dépens ont également été rejetées, sans ordonnance de dépens en faveur des intimés.

The court was asked to determine the amount of debts owed by a religious foundation to various individuals who allegedly advanced funds used to purchase a church property and whether those debts should be paid from the proceeds of the property’s sale held in trust.

The moving parties asserted numerous loans, while the opposing faction disputed several claims and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence.

Applying principles relating to burden of proof, credibility in undocumented loan transactions, and adverse inferences for missing evidence, the court reviewed each claimed advance individually.

The court accepted certain claims supported by documentary evidence, including mortgage-related advances and payments made to satisfy obligations to a vendor mortgagee.

Other claims were rejected where evidence was inconsistent, unsupported, or contradicted by banking records.

The court ordered payment of specific sums from the sale proceeds to certain creditors, including the Kabelu parties and two additional lenders.

Parties disputed the debts owed by a foundation in connection with funds held from the sale of a building.

The court determined the specific creditors and amounts owing, including debts related to a second mortgage, institutional loans, and private advances.

The court directed that the purchaser of the property could appear within seven days to show cause why the identified debts should not be paid immediately from trust funds held by a law firm or the court registrar.

Absent such notice, the trustee or registrar was ordered to distribute the specified amounts to the named creditors, with any remaining balance payable to the foundation.

Following earlier interlocutory proceedings involving an injunction and Anton Piller order in a dispute concerning confidential engineering information and alleged misuse of intellectual property, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The responding party sought costs for obtaining the ex parte injunction and Anton Piller order and for successfully resisting a motion to set them aside.

Applying the factors in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including success, complexity, proportionality, and reasonable expectations of the losing party, the court found the hourly rates and claimed time generally reasonable.

Although the moving parties achieved limited success in varying certain terms of the Anton Piller order, the injunction and order were maintained.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the responding party for the initial ex parte motion and the motion to set aside, with costs of a later motion left in the cause.

Following a successful application determining that the respondents could not unilaterally revoke their resignations as directors of a charitable foundation, the applicants sought costs.

The court found the respondents' conduct in attempting to retake control of the foundation and removing its property to be unreasonable.

The court awarded costs to the applicants on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $65,000 plus HST and $7,000 in disbursements.

Former employees and a competing corporation moved to set aside or vary an interim injunction and Anton Piller order obtained ex parte by their former employer.

The employer alleged the employees copied large volumes of confidential engineering files relating to proprietary sonar technology before leaving to establish a competing business.

The court found strong prima facie evidence of copying confidential files in breach of confidentiality agreements, a risk of serious commercial harm, and a real possibility that electronic evidence could be destroyed.

The balance of convenience favoured maintaining the injunction and preservation measures.

The injunction remained in effect and the Anton Piller order was varied largely on consent while preserving seized materials under the supervision of an independent supervising solicitor.

The applicants sought declarations regarding the corporate governance of a non-share capital charitable corporation after two directors, who were also pastors, resigned and later attempted to revoke their resignations.

The court held that under the Canada Corporations Act and the corporation's by-laws, a director's resignation becomes effective when irrevocably sent to the corporation.

The court further held that a director cannot unilaterally revoke a resignation once it has been received and accepted by the board.

Consequently, the respondents were no longer directors and had no authority to act on behalf of the corporation.

The appellant, a secured creditor, appealed an order approving a receiver's proposed purchase agreement and technology license agreement for the assets of the respondent companies.

The appellant argued that the proposal was identical to one previously rejected by another judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the new proposal differed significantly and that the motion judge appropriately applied the Soundair principles in approving the transaction, given the changed circumstances and the need to sell the subsidiary as a going concern.

The plaintiffs, former federal public servants, sued the Attorney General of Canada (AGC) for negligent misrepresentation after resigning to join a private company, Loba, and transferring their pensions to the Loba Plan, which was later revoked by the CRA.

The trial judge found the AGC liable for failing to disclose known risks about the Loba Plan and apportioned liability 80% to the AGC and 20% to the Loba Parties (third parties).

The AGC appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of duty of care, misrepresentation, and causation against the AGC.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding apportionment, finding the trial judge erred in her fiduciary analysis of the Loba Parties.

The Court adjusted the apportionment of liability to 60% for the AGC and 40% for the Loba Parties.

A separate appeal by one plaintiff regarding the calculation of his damages was dismissed.