Doreen Lok Yin So

The appellant challenged over $1,700,000 in transfers made by his late mother to his sister, the respondent, arguing they were the product of undue influence or subject to a resulting trust.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the transfers were valid inter vivos gifts and that there was no undue influence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the application judge erred in his approach to the presumptions of undue influence and resulting trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge made no legal errors, properly considered the evidence of the mother's clear intention to make gifts, and correctly concluded that any presumption of undue influence was rebutted by findings that the mother acted freely and voluntarily.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal regarding the interpretation of s. 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the order appealed from was interlocutory because it did not decide the real matter in dispute, such as whether the electronic document should be validated, whether it was sent by the deceased, and whether the deceased had testamentary capacity.

The Court declined to reconstitute as the Divisional Court to consider leave to appeal.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence in an estate action.

The motion judge struck the pleading after finding the appellants deliberately breached a court order requiring them to produce passwords for business email accounts and prohibiting the deletion of emails.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the Falcon Lumber test and concluding that striking the defence was an appropriate sanction for the appellants' repeated and continuous failure to provide transparent disclosure of estate business documents.

The court addresses a motion by the estate trustees of Carmen Debono to hold certain siblings in contempt or, alternatively, to strike their pleadings for failure to comply with a court order requiring disclosure of business email credentials and documents.

The court finds repeated, deliberate non-compliance and strikes the pleadings of David Debono and Elizabeth Muscat, stays the wrongful dismissal action until pleadings are amended, and awards significant costs.

The court declines to proceed with contempt, emphasizing that such proceedings are a last resort in civil matters.

This costs decision follows a complex family law trial between Barbara Lang-Newlands and Ian Newlands.

The court reviews the parties’ conduct, settlement offers, and relative success on issues, ultimately awarding the applicant, Barbara, $2,800,000 in costs.

The decision details the application of the Family Law Rules regarding offers to settle, the reasonableness of the parties’ behaviour, and the principles guiding costs awards in family law litigation.

This decision concerns two related lawsuits between siblings over the estate of their late mother, Carmen Debono.

The first action is for wrongful dismissal and oppression by David Debono and Elizabeth Muscat against the estate, its trustees, and two corporations.

The second is a claim by the estate, through its trustees, against David Debono, Elizabeth Muscat, and Jennifer Nesci for recovery of debts and alleged misappropriation of funds.

The court addresses interim motions for distributions and legal fees, as well as document production and the effect of an in terrorem clause in the will.

Both motions are dismissed, with the court emphasizing the need for transparency and full disclosure, and declining to enforce the in terrorem clause or grant interim relief at this stage.

The parties separated after a 32-year marriage.

The applicant's father had established a highly successful business.

Before the marriage, the father settled a trust holding shares in the business for the applicant.

During the marriage, the applicant received the shares and later participated in an estate freeze, transferring the shares to a holding company in exchange for preferred shares, while a new trust (the NFT) acquired the common shares.

The applicant and her children were discretionary beneficiaries of the NFT.

The main issue was whether the applicant's interest in the NFT was property subject to equalization, and if so, whether it was excluded as a gift.

The court found the interest was property, but bound by the Court of Appeal's decision in Shinder v. Shinder, held it was an excluded gift.

The court also determined the valuation of various assets, dismissed the respondent's unjust enrichment claim to a cottage, and ordered the applicant to pay an equalization payment of $1.18M and needs-based spousal support of $25,649 per month.

The appellants, trustees of the Estate of Vincent Di Santo and the Vincent Di Santo 2003 Family Trust, appealed an order that permanently removed them and appointed CIBC Trust Corporation as replacement.

The original order also granted further interim funding to the respondent, Ottavio Di Santo.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's decision that permanent removal was sought and necessary.

The court upheld the motion judge's finding that the trustees' mindset had become intractable, they were in a position of conflict, acted unilaterally, or could not objectively exercise their discretion, thus meeting the high threshold of "clear necessity" for trustee removal.

The Court of Appeal heard three motions related to an ongoing appeal concerning the removal and replacement of estate and family trust trustees.

The Appellants (original trustees) sought a stay of the order removing them and appointing CIBC Trust Corporation.

The Respondent (Ottavio Di Santo) sought to lift a stay on a costs order and to quash or stay the Appellants' appeal.

The court granted the Appellants' stay motion, finding a serious issue, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience in their favour.

The Respondent's motions to lift the costs stay and to quash/stay the appeal were dismissed.

Costs were ordered payable from the Estate.

Following a successful appeal by the defendant, the trial judge determined the scale and quantum of the defendant's trial costs.

The court found that the plaintiff attempted to perpetrate a fraud on the court by presenting a forged will and misleading evidence.

Consequently, the court awarded the defendant trial costs on a full indemnity basis, fixed at $64,985.54, payable by the plaintiff or alternatively by the estate.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following a successful appeal where the respondent's action was dismissed.

The appellant sought full indemnity costs, arguing the respondent attempted to perpetrate a fraud at trial regarding a will's witnessing.

The court clarified the distinction between full and substantial indemnity costs, noting that conduct warranting sanction typically applies to trial proceedings.

However, the onerous task faced by the appellant on appeal due to the trial judge's acceptance of the respondent's evidence was considered.

The court also addressed the recovery of costs from the Estate, applying the "blended costs award" principle due to the testator's failure to properly execute his will, which caused the litigation.

The appellant, Brian Boese, appealed a trial judge's decision that his brother Bruce's will was formally valid under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The central issue was whether the respondent, Brenda Bayford, had proven the formal validity of a 2013 will (Version 2), which she claimed to have found after Bruce's death.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended expert handwriting evidence, which indicated that Bruce's signatures on two versions of the will (one unwitnessed, one witnessed) were identical copies, suggesting one was reproduced from the other.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error by misunderstanding the significance of the expert evidence and its implications for the appellant's theory of the case, particularly regarding the missing original unwitnessed will and inconsistencies in the respondent's testimony.

The court also rejected the respondent's motion to admit fresh evidence.

Following a trial in which the plaintiff successfully proved the validity of the deceased's 2013 will, the parties sought a determination on costs.

The plaintiff sought full or substantial indemnity costs, while the participating defendant argued for reduced partial indemnity costs due to the plaintiff's conduct.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs but reduced the amount payable by the defendant by 50% due to the plaintiff's lack of diligence in the discovery process.

The court also limited the plaintiff's indemnification from the estate, ordering her to personally bear the remaining costs resulting from her mismanagement of documents.

Appeal from a trial judge's costs order denying costs to the successful defendant in a will challenge.

The defendant's father left his entire estate to her.

The plaintiffs (her brothers) sued to set aside the will, alleging suspicious circumstances, lack of testamentary capacity, and undue influence.

The trial judge dismissed all claims as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and alternatively found the will valid based on established testamentary capacity and absence of undue influence.

Despite the defendant's complete success, the trial judge awarded no costs, citing the defendant's misleading evidence regarding conversations with her father's doctor.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by focusing almost exclusively on one aspect of misleading evidence while ignoring the defendant's complete success on all substantive issues and failing to consider relevant factors such as settlement offers and trial complexity.

The appellants, estate trustees of the testator's estate, appealed the trial judge's finding that the testator lacked testamentary capacity when executing two wills dated August 16, 2010 and September 8, 2010.

The trial judge found the testator was unaware of the nature and extent of his assets, did not remember persons he might be expected to benefit, and did not understand claims that could be made by excluded persons.

The appellants also sought leave to appeal the costs award, which required the estate trustees personally to pay costs rather than having them borne by the estate.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable errors of fact and upheld the trial judge's findings on capacity and costs.

The Superior Court of Justice issued a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an action challenging a will.

The defendant, Constance McCron, sought substantial indemnity costs from the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs argued for costs from the estate or that each party bear their own.

The court applied the modern approach to estate litigation costs, noting that while the plaintiffs had reasonable grounds to question the will's validity (suspicious circumstances, testator's susceptibility), their claim was ultimately statute-barred.

The defendant's request for costs was denied due to her misleading evidence regarding the testator's mental state.

Ultimately, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The plaintiffs challenged the validity of Constantin Birtzu's 2006 will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by his daughter, Constance McCron, who was the sole beneficiary.

They also sought a constructive trust over property and an accounting of assets.

The court found the action statute-barred due to the expiration of the limitation period.

Despite this, the court proceeded to address the merits, finding that the defendants successfully proved testamentary capacity and that the plaintiffs failed to prove undue influence.

The court upheld the 2006 will and dismissed the action.

This costs endorsement followed a judgment where two wills were declared invalid, resulting in an intestacy where the plaintiff, Star Sweetnam, inherited the entire estate.

Sweetnam sought substantial indemnity costs, while the defendant estate trustees, Dianne Lesage and Terry Dooley, sought their own costs from the estate.

The court applied the modern "loser pays" principle in estate litigation, finding that the estate trustees acted unreasonably by rejecting two settlement offers from Sweetnam, particularly an early, modest offer.

The court also found Lesage's conduct adversarial and her claimed costs excessive.

Sweetnam's costs were fixed at $311,679.56 (after a 20% reduction for time spent on moot issues).

The court ordered Lesage and Dooley to pay Sweetnam's costs jointly and severally and denied their claims for costs from the estate, preventing Sweetnam from effectively paying the unsuccessful parties' costs.

The plaintiff challenged the validity of two wills executed by her late father shortly after he was diagnosed with a terminal brain tumour.

The wills entirely disinherited the plaintiff and her children.

The court found that the testator lacked testamentary capacity when he executed both wills, as his cognitive functions were impaired by the tumour, poorly managed diabetes, and various medications, leading to insane delusions that affected his testamentary dispositions.

The wills were declared invalid.

The plaintiff's alternative claims for undue influence, proprietary estoppel, and dependant support under the Succession Law Reform Act were dismissed.