Reasons for Costs Decision

Court File No.: FS-19-13520
Date: 2025-05-05
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
Barbara Lang-Newlands, Applicant
and
Ian Newlands, Respondent

Applicant Counsel: Martha McCarthy, Brigitte Barsalou, Ian Hull, Doreen Lok Yin So
Respondent Counsel: Harold Niman, Daryl Gelgoot, Timothy Youdan, Andrew Carlson
Heard: In Writing

Justice M. Sharma

Introduction

[1] On November 15, 2024, I released judgment following a 30-day trial heard between November 27, 2023, and May 17, 2024, reported at Lang-Newlands v. Newlands, 2024 ONSC 6285. Two further attendances on September 27, 2024, and October 16, 2024, were convened to address questions I raised. This is my costs decision.

[2] Written costs submissions were received on December 16, 2024. Responding submissions from both parties were received on February 10, 2025. As I did in my Judgment, I refer to the Applicant as Barb and the Respondent as Ian.

[3] Because I must consider the reasonableness of the parties’ behaviour from the time the issues arose (r. 24(8)(a) Family Law Rules), I summarize pre-trial and mid-trial settlements achieved. I then list the issues determined at trial and the relative success of each party, the parties’ positions on costs, a description of factors I considered, and then determine costs that are payable.

A. Overview

Pre-trial & Mid-Trial Settlements

a. Financial Support Since Separation

[4] Barb advanced to Ian two $1 million uncharacterized payments after this application was commenced in 2019 and before trial. One was paid on January 24, 2020 and the second on May 3, 2021. Due to these advances and other factors, Ian was not permitted to bring a spousal support motion.

[5] Ian continued to reside exclusively at the matrimonial home on Valleyanna Drive, Toronto (“Valleyanna”) from separation (July 2019) until its sale in September 2022. Barb paid the carrying costs of Valleyanna during this period.

b. “Property Swap” – March 2022

[6] On March 29, 2022, O’Brien J. made an Order, on consent, that settled significant property issues. It was described as the “property swap” at trial. It resolved ownership of a Florida home, a chalet in Ellicottville, ownership of the Lower Cottage, retirement of a BMO Line of Credit, and resulted in Barb paying Ian $5.18 million.

c. Sale of Matrimonial Home (Valleyanna)

[7] Valleyanna was sold in September 2022. Its sale proceeds were divided.

d. Date of Separation – Mid-Trial Settlement

[8] The parties’ date of separation was a live issue throughout Barb’s presentation of her case. After her case was closed, and after Ian’s testimony concluded, Ian withdrew his position on the date of separation. This was after 22 days of trial. Four of Barb’s witnesses and Ian gave evidence on this issue.

e. Litigation re: Upper Cottage – Mid-trial Settlement

[9] Ian made a claim against Barb and her brother, Stuart Lang, with respect to a cottage property that Stuart owned, referred to as the Upper Cottage. That claim settled mid-trial.

Expert Reports

[10] The cost of experts was significant. 33 expert reports were prepared and made lettered exhibits at trial. 11 were relied upon by Barb; 22 by Ian. The reports are listed as Appendix A.

[11] Of the 33 reports, Barb’s valuation expert, Ms. Paula White, prepared eight. Ian’s valuation expert, Mr. Steve Ranot, prepared 20. While the valuation experts largely agreed on global values, they differed in their treatment of certain variables, such as the capital gains inclusion rate; the minority/illiquidity/brokerage discount; and whether Barb’s interest in the most significant asset, the Newlands Family Trust (“NFT”) was included or excluded in Barb’s net family property statement. Mr. Ranot also prepared further reports mid-trial.

Issues & Relative Success of the Parties

[12] There were many issues determined at trial. To give context to the cost decision, I list the principal issues and set out the relative success of each party.

• (a) What was the value of the Barb’s interest in the Barbara Joan Lang Trust (“BJL Trust”) on the date of marriage?
  Barb was largely successful, with a result consistent with the evidence of her expert, Ms. White, resulting in a 50% minority discount applied. Ian was successful on a modest issue regarding mortality risk discount, based on the evidence of his expert, Mr. Ranot.

• (b) Is Barb’s interest in the Newlands Family Trust (“NFT”) “property” under s. 4 of the Family Law Act (“FLA”), and as such, subject to equalization?
  Ian was successful. I found Barb’s interest in the NFT was “property”.

• (c) Is Barb’s interest in the NFT excluded from her Net Family Property (“NFP”) because it is a gift, under s. 4(2)1 FLA?
  Barb was successful on this issue because I concluded I was bound by Shinder v. Shinder, 2018 ONCA 717. I found it was a gift, and therefore excluded.

• (d) If Barb’s interest in the NFT is not excluded, what is its value on the date of separation?
  Barb was successful in having the value discounted to 20% (because she was one of five beneficiaries) and further discounted by 50% (due to a minority discount). I rejected Ian’s position that the full value of the NFT should be ascribed to Barb.

• (e) Should Barb’s 205 preferred shares in a holding company (“4MK”) be discounted for contingent disposition costs?
  Barb was successful. A discount was applied. Ian opposed a discount.

• (f) Should Barb’s 33,333 fifth preferred shares in a holding company (“SHL”) be discounted for contingent disposition costs?
  Barb was successful. A discount was applied. Ian opposed a discount.

• (g) How to treat Barb’s interest in Domsam Holdings and the Lang New Trust?
  Barb was successful in having her interest in Domsam Holdings excluded because it was bequeathed to her. I accepted Ian’s valuation of Barb’s interest in the Lang New Trust; however, I found it was excluded because it was inherited.

• (h) Cottage Properties. What is the value of the Main Cottage? Does Ian have an unjust enrichment / constructive trust claim to the Main Cottage? Is Barb entitled to deduct costs of disposition of the Main Cottage and Lower Cottage?
  There was divided success in valuing the Main Cottage.
  Ian was not successful in his unjust enrichment / constructive trust claim to the Main Cottage.
  Barb was successful in deducting disposition costs from the value of the Main Cottage and Lower Cottage of 50%.

• (i) Does Ian have a 50% beneficial interest in a Florida condo?
  Barb was successful.

• (j) Who owns, and what is the value of, various disputed items of property?
  There was divided success, although on many of the significant items, Barb was successful.

• (k) Should Ian be permitted to attend the Main Cottage to collect personal items?
  Ian was not successful.

• (l) What post-separation credits should be made?
  There was divided success, although Barb was more successful on items of significant value (i.e., entitled to a credit for $2M post-separation advances).

• (m) Should the Court make an order for unequal division under s. 5(6) of the FLA, and if so, to what amount?
  Barb was successful. An Order for unequal division was made. However, the equalization payment (if Shinder is not binding) was not reduced to $10M as sought by Barb. Instead, it was reduced from $26M to $18M.

[13] While I found Barb’s interest in the NFT was a gift and excluded from her NFP (issue 12 (c) above) because of Shinder, I nonetheless analyzed whether it was a gift and its value. I did so because significant time and expense were incurred at trial on whether it was a gift and its value. One decision was reached, but an alternative analysis was provided for appellate purposes if Shinder is not binding.

Final Orders Made

[14] The following Final Order was made:

1. Barb shall file an Affidavit for Divorce, which shall be determined on an uncontested basis.
2. Barb shall pay Ian an equalization payment of $1,183,495.01.
3. Ian shall pay Barb $2,240,544.56 on account of post-separation adjustments.
4. Barb shall pay Ian monthly spousal support, effective August 1, 2019, of indefinite duration, in the amount of $25,649 per month. This amount shall be taxable to Ian and tax-deductible to Barb.
5. Spousal support shall be indexed annually every January 1, commencing January 1, 2026, pursuant to s. 34(5) and (6) of the FLA.
6. A support deduction order shall issue.
7. Barb is the owner of the 1989 Fiberglass Century Coronado and 2007 22’ Mastercraft X15. Ian shall forthwith deliver possession of these boats to Barb. The remaining jointly owned watercrafts and snowmobiles shall be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties.
8. Barb shall forthwith deliver to Ian the ATV and trailer.
9. Within 10 days:
   • a. Barb shall pay Ian $7,878 representing half of the duplication costs of family photos;
   • b. Ian shall deliver to Barb (i) the original photo albums that the Applicant created during the marriage; (ii) the original scrap book that the Applicant created during the marriage; and (iii) the original baby pictures in frames that hung between the parties’ children’s rooms at the matrimonial home.
10. All other claims made by the parties are dismissed.
11. The Order bears pre-judgment interest as of August 1, 2019, and post-judgment interest as of January 1, 2025, based on rates prescribed in the Courts of Justice Act.

Alternative Analysis

[15] If Shinder is not binding, I concluded that the value of Barb’s interest in the NFT would not be a gift, and therefore, it would be included in Barb’s NFP. Under this analysis, the following different orders would have been made:

• (a) Rather than pay $1,183,495.01 in an equalization payment, Barb would pay $18,000,000 in an equalization payment and payable over time pursuant to a schedule as ordered.
• (b) Rather than receive $25,649 per month in spousal support effective August 1, 2019, Ian would not be entitled to spousal support.

[16] After accounting for post-separation adjustments, the net result of the Order and alternative analysis was / would be:

	Order made	Alternative Analysis
Equalization Payment less post-separation adjustment	Ian pays Barb $1,057,049.55	Barb pays Ian $15,759,455.40
Spousal Support [1]	Barb pays monthly support of $25,649. [Were a lump sum payment to be made, it would result in a midpoint lump sum payment of $2,289,508]	Barb pays monthly support of $25,649 from August 1, 2019 to February 2025 (date of first EP payment). No spousal support payable thereafter. [Were a lump sum payment to be made, it would result in a midpoint payment of $754,211 (5 years and 6 months)]
Total Liability for Barb (assuming spousal lump sum payment)	$1,232,458.45	$16,513,666.40

[17] I also ordered that pre- and post-judgment interest be paid. These amounts are not factored into the above chart. According to Ian’s submissions, under the alternative analysis, he states Barb would owe him $19,774,993 which includes $2.03 million in pre- and post-judgment interest. He did not provide a calculation of pre- and post-judgment interest based on the Order made.

B. Parties' Positions on Costs

Barb’s Position

[18] Barb’s Bill of Costs totals $3,344,722. She seeks a costs order of $3,000,000. Her principal arguments are:

a. She received an outcome more favourable than every global offer she made throughout the litigation, including as early as December 22, 2021.

b. Ian did not make a comprehensive offer to settle in this 2019 application until September 7, 2023, slightly more than two months before trial. He made four subsequent offers during the trial. Even if Barb’s interest in the NFT had been equalized based on amounts as I determined, Barb would still have received a result more favourable than Ian’s “best” offer made on January 25, 2024, during the trial.

c. Barb behaved reasonably throughout the litigation. Ian did not.

d. Barb’s legal and expert fees were reasonable. Her counsel engaged in a cost-effective approach. Ian did not.

[19] Part of the requested cost order relates to three interim hearings where costs were reserved to the trial judge. On November 3, 2020, and May 21, 2021, at case conferences before Czutrin J., and following a motion determined by Shore J. on October 16, 2023. Barb identifies costs from these attendances to be $6,554, $28,419, and $11,247.45, respectively.

[20] The next chart summarizes Barb’s Bill of Costs.

Description of Cost	Amount	Running Total
Interim Hearings on Nov 3/20; May 21/21; Oct 16/23	$46,220.95	$46,220.95
Questioning & responding to disclosure requests	$211,033.16	$257,254.11
Preparation and trial attendance (family counsel)	$1,517,818.72	$1,775,072.83
Preparation and trial attendance (trust counsel)	$937,568.91	$2,712,641.74
Expert Valuator (Paula White)	$284,300.95	$2,996,942.69
Trust Expert (David Steele)	$165,840.46	$3,162,783.15
Trust Expert (Paul Gibney)	$172,474.73	$3,335,257.88

Ian’s Position

[21] Ian states that the Judgment has been appealed. His position is that (a) costs should be reserved until the Court of Appeal has rendered its decision, following which the issue of costs should be returned before me; or (b) in the alternative, costs should be fixed but not payable until the Court of Appeal has rendered its decision.

[22] Ian makes the following arguments:

a. He made three pre-trial offers and at least six offers after the trial commenced. His offers remained open for acceptance, while Barb’s offers expired.

b. Ian was successful in obtaining a ruling that Barb’s interest in the NFT was “property”.

c. It was not until October 2023 or November 2023, just before trial, that Barb took the position that her interest in the NFT was only 20% and that a 50% minority/illiquidity discount should apply.

d. Barb’s refusal to acknowledge Ian’s entitlement to spousal support was unreasonable.

e. Ian’s position at trial was not unreasonable because I found that critical analysis in Shinder was missing in that decision. But for Shinder, Ian would have secured a more favourable payment.

[23] The chart below summarizes Ian’s Bill of Costs.

Description of costs	Amount	Running Total
Pre-trial legal fees and disbursements	$1,047,123.75	$1,047,123.75
Expert Valuator fees (Steve Ranot, PWC LLP and Colliers)	$709,223.76	$1,756,347.51
Trial prep and trial legal fees	$1,960,640.31	$3,716,987.82
Expert Valuator fees (Steve Ranot, PWC LLP and Colliers) during trial prep and at trial	$577,759.46	$4,294,747.28

C. Legal Principles

[24] Costs orders are at the discretion of the Court: s. 131(1) Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43.

[25] The modern rules respecting costs aim to foster the following four fundamental purposes: (a) to partially indemnify successful litigants for the cost of litigation; (b) to encourage settlement; (c) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants; and (d) to ensure that cases are dealt with justly in accordance with the primary objective of the FLR set out in Rule 2(2). See: Ryan v. McGregor, at p. 216; British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71; Fong v. Chan; Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 395; and Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867.

[26] When fixing costs, “the costs award should reflect what the court views as a fair and reasonable amount that should be paid by the unsuccessful parties rather than any exact measure of the actual costs to the successful party.” See Zesta Engineering Ltd. v. Cloutier, 2022 ONCA 25577 at para 4, cited with approval in Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario at para 24.

[27] The Family Law Rules (“FLR”) were amended on January 21, 2025, after the parties’ initial cost submissions were received but before their responding submissions. Rules 18 and 24, which deal with costs, were amended. Under the new FLR, the cost consequences of failing to accept a reasonable offer moved from r. 18(14) to r. 24(12), although the rule has not changed in substance. For the purposes of this decision, I refer to former r. 18 for consistency when discussing cost consequences of not accepting a reasonable offer.

[28] In addition, r. 24 (in the amended FLR) sets out factors the Court may consider when making a cost order, including whether parties behaved unreasonably, regardless of their success (r. 24(7) and (8)); whether a party acted in bad faith (r. 24(10)); and the failure to accept an offer to settle that meets certain requirements (r. 24(12)). When setting the amount of costs, the Court may consider each party’s behaviour; time spent by each party; written offers to settle, including those that do not meet the requirements of r. 24(12); legal fees and rates; expert witness fees; and any other relevant matter (r. 24(14)).

[29] R. 24(1) requires the Court to determine costs in a summary manner, promptly after dealing with a step in a case.

D. Offers to Settle

Barb’s Offers to Settle

[30] Barb delivered three offers to settle before trial.

[31] On December 22, 2021, she made her first Offer to Settle. It was severable, although certain terms were linked, and parts of it included options for Ian to select. This offer dealt with Valleyanna (sale or buy-out by Ian with BMO Line of Credit to be resolved at trial), Lower Cottage (sale, or buy-out by Barb), Ellicotville Chalet (sale or buy-out by Ian), Main Cottage (buy-out by Barb), and would have permitted parties to rent out the Lower Cottage in 2022. Except for the Main Cottage, these issues were subsequently settled by the “property swap” and sale of the Matrimonial Home.

[32] Regarding equalization, spousal support and other benefits to Ian in this December 22, 2021, offer, Barb proposed:

• Rather than sell or buy-out the Lower Cottage, it would be placed in a trust in which Ian would have a life interest and unfettered use of this property. Their children would be the sole equal beneficiaries. Ian would pay the line of credit on the property and on-going maintenance costs [“Lower Cottage Property Trust”].
• Barb would waive her credit of $2 million for advances she made to Ian.
• Barb would pay an equalization payment of $10 million, plus, or less amounts owing from one party to the other should the parties buy out the other from the properties noted above.
• No spousal support would be payable.
• Offer was open for acceptance until January 4, 2022, without costs, or with partial indemnity costs after this date.

[33] Barb’s November 15, 2023, Offer to Settle was made after the parties sold Valleyanna and engaged in the “property swap”. Relevant terms of this offer were:

• $10 million equalization payment to Ian.
• $1 million annual payment to Ian until his death, which will not be periodic payments or spousal support. They are property payments and not deducted by Barb or included in Ian’s income.
• Barb will waive her $2 million credit for advances she gave to Ian.
• Ian’s claim for an interest in the Main Cottage shall be dismissed.
• No spousal support shall be paid.
• Cottage contents and boat ownership was addressed.
• Offer was severable, except general terms had to be accepted with acceptance of any part of the offer. No costs would be payable if the Offer were accepted before November 17, 2023, or partial indemnity costs if accepted after this date.
• Offer remained open until one minute after trial.

[34] Barb’s November 24, 2023, offer had the same terms as her November 15, 2023, offer, plus the following additional terms:

• Barb would establish a new property trust in the amount of $3 million, with Ian as the sole beneficiary until his death, with the parties’ children being the contingent beneficiaries upon Ian’s death. The funds would be used solely to purchase a home for Ian within the GTA for his personal use. [“Property Trust”].
• Barb will permit Ian to have exclusive use of the Lower Cottage from September 2024 until 2030, and he would be responsible for operating costs. He would not be permitted to rent it.
• No costs were payable if the Offer was accepted by 5:00 pm on November 26, 2023, and it was capable of acceptance until that date.

[35] The trial started on November 27, 2023.

[36] While the trial continued, on December 15, 2023, January 13, 2024, January 22, 2024, and January 29, 2024, Barb made four further offers. They typically remained open for acceptance for one day. The key terms of these offers may be summarized as follows:

• $10 million equalization (Dec 15 and Jan 13 offers), or $12 million equalization (Jan 22 and Jan 29 offers);
• $2 million lump sum spousal support (Dec. 15 offer only). It appears that spousal support vanished in subsequent offers because higher equalization payments or other income or benefits were being offered to Ian (i.e. Income Trust / Property Trust);
• Income Trust valued at $10 million, with Ian earning all investment income during his lifetime, and the children being beneficiaries upon Ian’s death (Jan 13 offer); increased to $11 million in Jan. 22 offer; increased to $13 million and permitted Ian to withdraw $500,000 annually in Jan. 29 offer;
• Property Trust valued at $10 million - $9 million for the purchase of a GTA property and a second residential property within Canada or the USA for Ian’s sole use, and the remaining $1 million for property carrying costs. The children will be the contingent beneficiaries on Ian’s death (Dec. 15 offer); value of Property Trust was reduced to $8 million in offers made Jan. 15 and Jan. 22, and further reduced to $7 million in offer made on Jan. 29); and
• Barb waived $2 million advances given to Ian. (all offers)

Ian’s Offers to Settle

[37] Ian made three severable offers before trial:

a. On September 7, 2023, the relevant terms were:

• $80 million equalization payment, paid in two installments, with full payment within 60 days.
• Barb to pay Ian $3,450,000 for his interest in Main Cottage, and she would be responsible for a lien of $231,518.
• Barb would not be entitled to credit for $2 million advances.
• Pre-judgment interest is waived.
• Expired on September 20, 2023.

b. On November 7, 2023, the terms were largely the same as the September 7th offer, except that:

• $56 million (rather than $80 million) equalization payment, paid in three instalments with full payment within one year. Interest payable on outstanding balance.
• Expired on November 13, 2023

c. On November 13, 2023, the terms were largely the same as the November 7th offer, except that the expiry was November 17, 2023.

[38] During trial, Ian made four offers on December 12, 2023, December 13, 2023, January 10, 2024, and January 25, 2024. Each offer was open for acceptance for one day. The terms varied, but may be summarized as follows:

• Equalization and Spousal Support:

  • Dec 12 offer: $40 million payable in 180 days. Alternatively, $20 million payable in 30 days and $30 million paid in $2.5 million annual installments unless Ian dies;
  • Dec 13 offer: $18,450,000 payable in 90 days, plus $1.5 million per year until Ian dies, plus a Property Trust of $6 million with Ian as sole beneficiary until he dies, with children being contingent beneficiaries. Alternatively, $20 million paid in 90 days, plus $200,000 per month fixed non-variable support, and a $5 million Property Trust.
  • Jan 10 offer: $17.5 million paid within 90 days, plus $1.5 million per year until Ian’s death, plus Property Trust of $6 million. Alternatively, $19.5 million within 30 days, plus $200,000 as tax deductible monthly spousal support, plus Property Trust of $5 million.
  • Jan 25 offer: $15 million paid in two instalments, plus Income Trust of $15 million with Ian sole beneficiary of investment income during his lifetime, plus Property Trust of $10 million with Ian sole beneficiary of 2 properties not exceeding $8 million, with $2 million remaining used for carrying costs. Ian can make capital improvements, and profit shall remain in Property Trust for purpose of purchasing replacement property.

• Recreational Property: In his Dec. 13 offer, Barb would pay Ian $250,000 per year to Ian so he can rent a cottage. This term was not included in other offers.

• Main Cottage: Each offer would dismiss Ian’s claim to the Main Cottage, with Barb responsible for $231,518 lien.

E. Analysis

[39] I decline to reserve my decision on costs pending the outcome of the appeal. R. 24(1) states the court shall deal with costs promptly after dealing with a “step” in a case. R. 24(1)(b) permits the Court to reserve a decision on costs for determination at a later “step” in the case, but “step” is not defined in the FLR. I do not interpret “step” to refer to an appeal of a Judgment. The references to “step” elsewhere in the FLR suggest it means conferences, motions, trials, or enforcement proceedings of the Court of first instance. Therefore, I do not interpret r. 24(1) as conferring authority to reserve a cost decision pending appeal.

[40] After considering all the issues determined at trial, I find that Barb was the more successful party and is presumptively entitled to costs: r. 24(3) FLR.

[41] In assessing the parties’ Offers to Settle, I compare them to the orders made, not the alternative analysis I conducted. R. 24(12)5 (former r. 18(14)5) of the FLR requires the Court to compare them to the order made. I am reluctant to embark upon an alternative analysis of costs, which may be a wasted exercise depending on the issues raised on appeal and their outcome. However, I do note parenthetically how the offers compare to my alternative analysis, to the extent they are capable of comparison. Some of the benefits set out in each party’s offers I am not able to quantify.

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F. Conclusion

[84] Having considered all of the above, I order Ian to pay costs of this Application fixed in the amount of $2,800,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable within 60 days.

Justice M. Sharma
Released: May 05, 2025

Appendix A – Expert Reports Filed

Applicant

• Paula White
  • Valuation Report, dated January 18, 2022
  • Valuation Report, dated August 30, 2022
  • Trust Distributions Report, dated March 8, 2023
  • Limited Critique Report, dated March 8, 2023
  • Income Report, dated December 15, 2021
  • Limited Critique Report, dated May 1, 2023
  • Valuation Report, dated October 15, 2020
  • Valuation Report, dated December 20, 2021
• Paul Gibney & David Steele
  • Letter of Opinion re: Estate Freeze, dated February 28, 2023
• Brent Ferguson
  • Appraisal Report, as at July 31, 2019
  • Appraisal Report, as at July 30, 2022

Respondent

• Steve Ranot
  • Tracing of Applicant’s Date of Marriage Interests to NFT, dated October 25, 2022
  • Letter of Mr. Ranot, dated April 21, 2021
  • Calculation of Ms. Lang’s 2015 – 2020 Distributions from NFT, dated October 21, 2022
  • Calculation of Value of Ms. Lang’s Net Interests in BJL Trust and GSL Trust, as at August 21, 1987 (assumes 50% Capital Gains Inclusion)
  • Calculation of Value of Ms. Lang’s Net Interests in BJL Trust and GSL Trust, as at August 21, 1987 (assumes 75% Capital Gains Inclusion)
  • Calculation of Value of Ms. Lang’s Net Interests in BJL Trust and GSL Trust, as at August 21, 1987 (assumes 50% Capital Gains Inclusion, and 5% minority discount)
  • Calculation of Value of Ms. Lang’s Net Interests in BJL Trust and GSL Trust, as at August 21, 1987 (assumes 75% Capital Gains Inclusion, and 5% minority discount)
  • Calculation of Value of Ms. Lang’s net interests as at July 31, 2019
  • Letter dated October 3, 2022
  • Limited Critique of Ms. White August 30, 2023 Valuation Report, dated November 9, 2023
  • Letter dated January 3, 2024, amendment assuming 5% discount
  • Calculation of Value of Ms. Lang’s Net Interests as at July 31, 2019 (assuming 5% minority discount)
  • Letter dated January 3, 2024, correcting omission
  • Estimate of Blockage Discount on CCL Industries Class A & B Shares, as at July 31, 2019
  • Estimate of Blockage Discount on Wescast Industries Inc Class B Shares as at October 27, 2003
  • Calculation of Ms. Lang’s Income (2016 – 2021) (assuming NFT is excluded property), dated January 31, 2021
  • Calculation of Ms. Lang’s Income (2016-2021) (assuming NFT is included property), dated January 31, 2023
  • Calculation of Ms. Lang’s Income (2016-2021) (assuming no family control and NFT is excluded property), dated January 31, 2023
  • Calculation of Net Value of Castle Harbour Investments Inc. as at August 27, 2018 and July 31, 2019
  • Calculation of Ms. Lang’s Income (2016-2021) (assuming no family control and NFT is included property), dated January 31, 2023
• Bruce Harris
  • Expert Report re: Lang-Newlands Estate Freeze, dated October 20, 2022
• Samuel Linds
  • Appraisal Report, Main Cottage, as at August 27, 2018, July 31, 2019 and September 7, 2022

[1] I have used lump sum spousal support amounts to assess the net outcome of the Orders made, as these amounts would be taxable to Ian and tax deductible to Barb had the payments been made. These amounts were determined from the figures used in the DivorceMate calculations attached to my Judgment.