COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Parimoo v. Amin, 2026 ONCA 574

DATE: 20260810

DOCKET: COA-25-CV-1435

van Rensburg, Miller and Coroza JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Sabina Parimoo, Sabina Parimoo Medicine Professional Corporation c/o/b as Cherrycrest Medical Centre and Tariq Kantroo

Plaintiffs/Moving Parties (Respondents)

and

Abu Ubaida Amin*, Ayesha Amin, 1245532-3 Canada Inc. provincially registered as 3273859 Ontario Inc. c/o/b as King Vape’s Incorporated, 786 Ummah Investments Corp. c/o/b as Stop N Go Convenience

Defendants/Responding Parties (Appellant*)

Abu Ubaida Amin, acting in person

Peter Leigh, for the respondents

Heard: in writing

On appeal from the order of Justice Renu J. Mandhane of the Superior Court of Justice, dated June 5, 2025.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] This is an appeal from an order declaring the appellant, Abu Ubaida Amin, a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”). At the request of the appellant, the panel heard the appeal in writing. For the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed.

I. Overview

[2] The appellant and the respondents own neighbouring units in a commercial complex. The dispute between the appellant and the respondents began when Dr. Parimoo refused to accept the appellant’s wife as a patient in her medical practice. This has since spawned several legal proceedings, described further below.

[3] The underlying proceeding in this appeal was an action for defamation brought against the appellant by the respondents. In the context of that action, the respondents brought a motion to declare the appellant a vexatious litigant and to bar him and his corporations from instituting or continuing any legal proceedings without leave of the court. The appellant was granted leave to represent both himself and his corporations on the motion.

[4] The motion was brought on the basis that the appellant and his corporations have instituted vexatious proceedings and conducted these proceedings against the respondents in a vexatious manner. The appellant’s responding materials on the vexatious litigant motion alone exceeded 2500 pages.

[5] The motion judge declared the appellant a vexatious litigant. After citing the factors described in Lang Michener et al. v. Fabian et al. (1987), 1987 CanLII 172 (ON HCJ), 59 O.R. (2d) 353 (H.C.), the motion judge found that “[a]n individual with [the appellant]’s track record before the courts is, by definition, a vexatious litigant”, and that the appellant’s “disproportionate use of the civil justice system is a barrier to access to justice for parties who have legitimate claims.”

[6] Prior to the scheduled hearing date for this appeal, the appellant requested that the appeal be heard in writing. The respondents opposed this request. The respondents’ position was that the appellant prefers to litigate in writing because it allows him to “launch attacks from the safety of his keyboard” and he “does not want to be confronted with his behaviour in a face-to-face forum”.

[7] We acknowledge the respondents’ position. However, in our view, there was no prejudice to either party in dealing with this appeal in writing: see, e.g., The University of Western Ontario v. Simpson, 2020 ONCA 416. The materials that were filed in this appeal are comprehensive and we see nothing that oral argument would add to the issues that are relevant to this appeal. Accordingly, the panel granted the appellant’s request and permitted the appellant to file a reply factum.

II. Issues

[8] The appellant raises five issues on appeal: i) the motion judge erred by failing to abide by the statutory scheme in s. 140 of the CJA; ii) the motion judge erred by misapprehending the evidence; iii) the motion hearing was procedurally unfair; iv) the motion judge erred by characterizing defensive litigation conduct as abusive; and v) the impugned process and order violated the appellant’s rights under ss. 2(b), 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

[9] The appellant was also granted leave to file a motion to adduce fresh evidence on appeal. As is the practice of the court, we have reviewed the fresh evidence before determining whether it is admissible.

[10] The respondents contend that the motion judge applied the correct test and made the correct ruling in declaring the appellant a vexatious litigant.

III. Analysis

[11] We see no basis for this court to interfere with the order of the motion judge. As this court has recently noted, a vexatious litigant order is discretionary and fact-specific. We owe deference to the motion judge unless the appellant can persuade us that she made an extricable and material legal error or a palpable and overriding error of fact, or failed to exercise her discretion judicially: UM Financial Inc. v. Central 1 Credit Union, 2026 ONCA 475, at para. 31.

[12] Turning to the appellant’s first ground of appeal, we reject the appellant’s submission that the motion judge erred by failing to abide by the statutory scheme in s. 140 of the CJA.

[13] The motion judge recognized that declaring a person a vexatious litigant is significant, and the court’s power to do so must be exercised sparingly and with great care. At the outset of her reasons, the motion judge noted that she could only make an order pursuant to s.140 if she was satisfied that the appellant had “persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings in any court or conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner”. The motion judge then concisely and faithfully applied the correct test as set out in the jurisprudence. We see no error in her analysis.

[14] Second, we do not agree that the motion judge erred by misapprehending the evidence. The appellant appears to argue that the motion judge erred in relying on unfounded allegations of criminal behaviour and misleading materials as if they were adjudicated facts. We see no basis for this claim.

[15] A fair reading of the motion judge’s decision discloses that she thoroughly reviewed the 2500-page record filed by the appellant below and made appropriate findings about his litigation track record and history of complaints against counsel, parties, the judiciary and regulatory bodies. Many of these findings were based on the appellant’s own filings and electronic correspondence with lawyers, court staff and judges.

[16] The motion judge noted that the appellant admitted to filing 21 other court proceedings in the Divisional Court, the Superior Court of Justice and the Small Claims Court, none of which have proceeded to a hearing on the merits.

[17] The motion judge also noted that the appellant has filed several regulatory and human rights complaints. He has filed four complaints against the respondents and other defendants in his various civil actions before the Human Rights Tribunal. He has made regulatory complaints about counsel, parties, and potential witnesses to the Law Society of Ontario, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, the College of Nurses of Ontario, the Office of the Independent Police Review Director, and the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board. The appellant also threatened a case management judge with a complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council after a ruling on an interim motion. All complaints filed by the appellant were dismissed.

[18] During the litigation between the appellant and the respondents, the appellant sent hundreds of emails to the respondents’ counsel and court staff, using what the motion judge described as “foul, derogatory, and dehumanizing language”. In some of these emails, the appellant attached unissued statements of claim, presumably as a financial threat. The appellant sent these messages despite repeated orders by the Regional Senior Justices of the Superior Court of Justice to refrain from inappropriate communications with counsel and court staff.

[19] In sum, the motion judge had ample evidence before her to make the findings she made.

[20] Third, we see no merit to the appellant’s assertion that the motion hearing was procedurally unfair because the motion judge determined she could deal with the matter in writing. Courts have a broad discretion to control their processes and prevent vexatious litigation: Aurora (Town) v. Lepp, 2020 ONCA 528, 5 M.P.L.R. (6th) 8, at para. 11. The fact that the appellant himself specifically requested that the motion proceed in writing belies the appellant’s submission that this was procedurally unfair.

[21] Fourth, the appellant’s claim that the motion judge erred by characterizing “defensive litigation conduct” as abusive is also without merit. As noted above, the motion judge proceeded cautiously. She understood that a vexatious litigant order should only be made in the clearest of cases. However, after examining the appellant’s litigation history and conduct in the proceedings, the motion judge found that the appellant is clearly a vexatious litigant. As the motion judge noted:

An individual with Mr. Amin’s track record before the courts is, by definition, a vexatious litigant. This case is a good example. Solely because of Mr. Amin’s conduct, a discrete dispute over Dr. Parimoo’s decision not to roster his wife as a patient has ballooned into multiple claims and complaints against the doctor, her staff, her husband, her lawyer, the condominium corporation, and various professional regulatory bodies. Mr. Amin has filed claims before this court, the Small Claims Court, and the Divisional Court. He has complained to the LSO, CPSO, HPARB, and HRTO. None of his claims have been successful. Mr. Amin’s dismal record speaks to a litigant who is engaged in nuisance litigation without any regard to the cost. Mr. Amin’s disproportionate use of the civil justice system is a barrier to access to justice for parties who have legitimate claims.

We see no error in the motion judge’s analysis.

[22] Fifth, the appellant’s contention that the process and order violated the appellant’s rights under ss. 2(b), 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is also without merit.

[23] The appellant claims that the order has violated his Charter rights because he has been forced to sell his matrimonial home, is a disabled litigant and has been denied the ability to seek redress from the court. The appellant misconstrues the order of the motion judge. The purpose of a vexatious litigant order is aptly described in McLean v. Connell, 2025 ONCA 495, at para. 17:

Vexatious litigant orders prevent litigants from harassing others and forcing them to incur unnecessary legal costs, and protect the interests of society as a whole by limiting the needless diversion of finite court resources to private vendettas that do not give rise to any genuine cause of action.

This order does not deprive the appellant of access to justice; rather, it gives the court the ability to ensure that no party to the litigation is prejudiced through disorderly conduct in litigation.

[24] Finally, turning to the proposed fresh evidence, this evidence is not admissible on appeal.

[25] The appellant’s fresh evidence consists of settlement documentation and a transcript from a proceeding before Richetti R.S.J. (as he then was) on October 6, 2023. The appellant submits that the settlement documentation is relevant because the motion judge stated that the appellant “claims to have settled four Toronto matters between 2016 and 2022, but says he cannot provide further details.” According to the appellant’s affidavit, the motion judge made this finding because this settlement documentation was not before her in its “complete and organized form”. The appellant submits that the transcript is relevant because it undermines the claim from counsel for the respondents that the appellant left a threatening voicemail.

[26] In our view, the fresh evidence motion must be dismissed because it does not meet the test established in R. v. Palmer, [1980] S.C.R. 759, at p. 775:

(i) the evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at the proceeding below;

(ii) the evidence must be relevant in the sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue in the proceeding below;

(iii) the evidence must be credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief; and

(iv) the evidence must be such that, if believed, it could reasonably be expected to have affected the result when taken together with the other evidence adduced in the court below.

[27] Even assuming that there is an explanation for why the evidence could not have been adduced before the motion judge, this evidence could not have affected the result. As noted above, the motion judge exhaustively examined the appellant’s litigation history and made findings about the appellant’s conduct throughout the various proceedings. Those findings are unaffected by the proposed fresh evidence. Accordingly, we decline to admit the proposed fresh evidence.

IV. Disposition

[28] For these reasons, the motion to admit fresh evidence and the appeal are dismissed.

[29] If the parties cannot agree on the disposition of the costs of the appeal, the fresh evidence motion and the motion before Monahan J.A.[1], they may serve and file brief written submissions of no more than five pages, plus a costs outline, within 14 days of the release of these reasons.

“K. van Rensburg J.A.”

“B.W. Miller J.A.”

“S. Coroza J.A.”

1Monahan J.A. dismissed a motion brought by Mr. Amin seeking interim relief. The issue of costs was reserved to the panel hearing this appeal.