Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences, including possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl and cocaine, and was sentenced to a global term of nine years.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was excessive and seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence of lockdown conditions and triple bunking.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's reasons, noting the aggravating factors such as the nature and quantity of the drugs and the appellant's criminal record.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but declined to reduce the sentence, concluding it remained fit.

The appellant appealed his sentence of seven years and seven months for firearms and drug offences, arguing the trial judge erred by treating him as a recidivist based on his youth record and by failing to grant a further sentence reduction for harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the appellant's continuous criminal record, including a youth conviction for first-degree murder using a firearm, to assess moral culpability.

The Court also held that the trial judge appropriately factored the harsh pre-trial conditions into the global sentence without requiring a mathematical deduction.

The self-represented appellant appealed a verdict of not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault and mischief charges.

The Crown conceded that the appellant was not advised of his right to request a trial in French pursuant to s. 530(3) of the Criminal Code at his first appearance.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had expressed a choice for a French trial and never waived it in a free and informed manner.

The Crown failed to prove that the breach of language rights did not cause prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the NCR verdict was quashed, and a new trial in French was ordered.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order that permanently stayed their action against a law firm (A&B) on the basis that it constituted an abuse of process for not having been added to an existing 'Main Action' involving the same factual circumstances.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in concluding that commencing a separate action was an abuse of process, as it is not always abusive to start a new action instead of amending an existing one, especially when distinct claims or privilege concerns are involved.

However, the Court upheld the procedural direction that the claims should proceed in a single action.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the permanent stay and replacing it with a temporary stay, allowing the appellants to bring a motion to add A&B as a defendant to the Main Action, with the ultimate determination of a permanent stay to be made by the motion judge hearing that application.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, sought leave to appeal his three-year custodial sentence.

The appeal raised two grounds: that the trial judge erred in relying on R. v. A.J.K. as mandating a minimum three-year sentence for penetration, and that she failed to consider relevant R. v. Friesen factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not apply a minimum sentence but rather a fit range, and appropriately considered all relevant sentencing factors, including the seriousness of digital penetration.

T.J.W. appealed his sentence of five years for two counts of sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to identify his advanced age (76 at sentencing) as a mitigating factor and by giving insufficient weight to other mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was aware of the appellant's age and considered it, and that defence counsel did not present evidence of health conditions or specific impacts of incarceration due to age.

The court concluded that the trial judge gave due weight to all relevant factors, including family support and community contributions, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant, Landi Hanna, appealed a 4-year sentence for two counts of robbery (one causing wounds) and one count of failure to comply with an undertaking.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by not respecting the "jump" principle and by imposing a disproportionate sentence that relegated rehabilitation to a secondary role.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, affirming that the sentencing judge correctly identified denunciation and deterrence as paramount objectives for robbery, properly considered aggravating factors including the appellant's criminal record and re-offending while on release, and appropriately applied the "jump" principle given the appellant's pattern of committing serious robberies shortly after being granted bail.

The court also found that the sentencing judge reasonably concluded the appellant's rehabilitative potential was low due to his repeated criminal history and lack of serious engagement in addressing his drug addiction.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for four firearms-related charges, arguing that the trial judge improperly used judicial notice regarding drug subculture and the operational nature of firearms, and denied procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were well-anchored in the evidence and that any comments about the drug industry were peripheral to the core reasoning, not constituting improper judicial notice or procedural unfairness.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The central issue was whether the appellant's violent conduct was intractable and untreatable.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by ignoring a gap in his criminal record and by failing to consider his circumstances and the potential for intensive treatment in the federal penitentiary system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered all evidence, including the appellant's history of violence, treatment resistance, and lack of motivation, and reasonably concluded that there was no realistic prospect of controlling his risk to the public through less onerous means.

The appellant, Cedric Agard, appealed a global sentence of eight-and-a-half years imposed for multiple drug and firearm offences.

He argued the sentence was harsh and excessive, specifically contending that the sentencing judge did not grant sufficient credit for time spent in harsh jail conditions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the sentencing judge had carefully considered all relevant factors, including the appellant's personal circumstances and the harsh jail conditions, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range and not demonstrably unfit or based on an error in principle.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Carolyn Burden, appealed her conviction for fraud over $5,000 and her five-year sentence, which included restitution and forfeiture orders.

She argued her guilty plea was uninformed and the sentence unduly harsh, particularly regarding the imposition of both a forfeiture order and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding her plea informed and voluntary.

However, it granted leave to appeal sentence, setting aside the forfeiture order and reducing the fine in lieu of forfeiture to account for prior restitution payments, clarifying that only one such order (forfeiture or fine in lieu) can be imposed and that restitution should reduce the fine.

This appeal concerned the effect of two gratuitous transfers of property into joint tenancy.

Nigel Jackson transferred his home into joint tenancy with Lori Rosenberg, intending to gift only a right of survivorship to avoid probate fees, while retaining control during his lifetime.

Later, he severed the joint tenancy.

The application judge found a partial resulting trust, concluding that only the right of survivorship was gifted and that Jackson retained the right to sever.

Rosenberg appealed, arguing for a full beneficial interest and that the severance was ineffective.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Rosenberg's appeal, affirming that a gift of a right of survivorship can exist without immediate beneficial rights and that the donor retains the unilateral right to sever the joint tenancy, thereby ending the right of survivorship.

The court also clarified that no right of survivorship could subsist after severance.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping, assault, assault with a weapon, uttering death threats, and a human trafficking offence.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge improperly used s. 276 of the Criminal Code to disregard all of the complainant’s evidence regarding her work as a sex worker and made errors in assessing her credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by effectively excluding a broad area of evidence related to the complainant's sex trade involvement without providing notice or an opportunity for submissions, which constituted a significant breach of procedural fairness and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

This is an application for bail pending appeal by an applicant convicted of six serious sexual offences against two younger cousins, for which he received a 12-year global sentence.

The applicant sought bail under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, arguing his appeal was not frivolous and his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal found the first ground of appeal (lack of accredited interpreter) frivolous due to insufficient evidence.

The second ground (jurisdiction to amend indictment for charges spanning youth and adult periods) was deemed weak, with the court finding no material prejudice from the amendment.

Given the seriousness of the offences and the diminished strength of the appeal grounds, the court concluded that the applicant failed to establish that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, representative plaintiffs in a certified class proceeding concerning universal life insurance policies, appealed the dismissal of their motion to amend their statement of claim and add a new common issue regarding an 'Investment Spread Claim'.

The motion judge refused the amendments on the basis that the claim was a new cause of action that was discoverable in 2016 and therefore statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the claim was not captured by existing pleadings, was discoverable based on a 2016 repricing report, and did not engage a rolling limitation period as it involved discrete decisions rather than periodic breaches.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal concerning an international commercial arbitration award.

The application judge had set aside the award due to a reasonable apprehension of bias by the arbitrator, who had accepted a second, unrelated arbitration engagement from the appellants' counsel without disclosure to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred by applying a subjective test for disclosure and bias, rather than the objective test mandated by the UNCITRAL Model Law.

The Court found no breach of the arbitrator's legal duty to disclose and no reasonable apprehension of bias, as the second arbitration involved no common parties or overlapping issues, and the arbitrator was not aware of the parties' subjective disclosure expectations.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court to address other grounds for attacking the award.

The appellant, D.S., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence of two years less a day.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's admission of evidence regarding a prior incident of unwanted sexual contact with the complainant, which occurred when the appellant was a youth.

The appellant argued this evidence was highly prejudicial and had low probative value, and that the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) principles should have factored into its admissibility.

The sentence appeal argued for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect for the prior incident evidence, noting its relevance to the appellant's state of mind regarding consent.

The court also found that YCJA principles did not impede the admissibility of such evidence in this context.

The sentence was upheld as proportionate, despite mitigating factors, due to significant aggravating features.

The appellant, Oleksandr Ostashkov, appealed his conviction and sentence after pleading guilty to breaking and entering and possession of stolen property.

He sought to strike his guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary due to parental pressure.

He also appealed his sentence, claiming it was unduly harsh, particularly the restitution order.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's finding that the plea was voluntary, noting that while parental pressure was a factor, it did not negate his volitional decision, which was also influenced by new incriminating evidence.

The court also found no error in the sentence imposed, determining it was neither demonstrably unfit nor based on an error in principle, and upheld the restitution order.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

C.P. was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to a conditional sentence.

C.P. appealed the conviction, and the Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence, arguing for incarceration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment or fact-finding.

While the Court found the conditional sentence demonstrably unfit for a serious sexual assault, it dismissed the Crown's sentence appeal, concluding that re-incarceration was not in the interests of justice given the time already served on the conditional sentence and the appellant's compliance and rehabilitation prospects.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for serious sexual assault and assault charges, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition continuing his detention order.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge, arguing it was the least onerous and restrictive option given his recent progress in managing his mental disorder and substance use.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable and supported by evidence, particularly the psychiatrist's view that a detention order was necessary for rapid intervention in case of relapse, given the appellant's history of substance abuse and associated violence.

The court emphasized the Board's obligation to protect public safety and the high standard for overturning Board decisions.