Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant, found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR), appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his continued detention.

The appellant argued the Board erred in assessing his risk of harm, in not ordering a conditional discharge as the least onerous disposition, and in its application of Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the Board's conclusions regarding the appellant's significant risk due to treatment-resistant psychosis and substance use, the lack of suitable community supports for a conditional discharge, and that Gladue principles were appropriately considered by the Board in its analysis, even if they did not lead to a different disposition.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising three grounds related to the trial judge's assessment of consent.

The first ground argued the judge erred in finding no consent to pre-intercourse activity, which the Court of Appeal clarified was a misunderstanding of the trial judge's reasons, noting the judge understood prior activity was consensual but highlighted the lack of explicit consent.

The second ground contended the judge erred in disbelieving the appellant's claim of seeking explicit verbal consent for more invasive activity, which the Court dismissed, affirming the judge's right to assess credibility holistically.

The third ground alleged the judge relied on ungrounded assumptions regarding consent to unprotected sex due to a past chlamydia diagnosis; the Court found this discussion was not central to the rejection of the appellant's evidence and was a permissible factor in assessing consent likelihood.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, J.P., appealed convictions for three counts of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment of the appellant, particularly regarding inconsistencies in testimony, and the assessment of the complainant's reliability, including the relevance of her failure to call for assistance during the incidents.

The Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant's elaborations were deliberate embellishments and that the complainant's failure to call for help was irrelevant to her credibility in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, uttering threats, and failing to comply with a release order.

The appeal raised two grounds: an alleged s. 10(b) Charter violation regarding the right to counsel, and an alleged error in refusing an election for a preliminary inquiry under s. 536 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant's right to counsel was respected and that an election for trial by judge alone had already been made.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for aggravated sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his mens rea analysis by requiring evidence of the complainant's communication of non-consent, which was irrelevant given that no defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent was raised.

This legal error materially impacted the acquittal.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, entered a conviction for aggravated sexual assault, and remitted the matter for sentencing before a different judge.

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to eight years in jail.

He appealed the conviction, raising three grounds: the trial judge erred by not applying Vetrovec principles to a witness's evidence and failing to provide sufficient reasons for relying on it, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a Vetrovec caution is not mandatory in judge-alone trials and the trial judge was aware of the witness's credibility issues, relying only on corroborated aspects of his testimony.

The court also found the verdict reasonable, as the circumstantial evidence, viewed holistically, amply supported the conclusion that the appellant knowingly possessed the package.

The appellant, Rashawn Salmon, appealed his convictions for various drug and firearms offences, arguing that the reviewing judge erred in dismissing his pre-trial Charter motion.

Specifically, he challenged the lawfulness of search warrants for his condo unit and vehicle, alleging s. 8 breaches regarding CCTV footage and the sufficiency of grounds for the warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the reviewing judge's conclusions that the police obtained information from authorized persons, that there were reasonable grounds for the search warrants, and that the vehicle seizure was lawful.

The court reiterated that a piecemeal approach to warrant review is inappropriate and that property management can consent to police access to common areas.

The appellant, Canada Forgings Inc., appealed the dismissal of its procurement law claim against Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL).

The trial judge had found the claim statute-barred by the two-year limitation period and rejected the procurement law arguments, concluding no "Contract A" was formed.

The trial judge also ruled a Deloitte Report inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding the reasons sufficient, the limitations analysis correct, the procurement law findings sound (no duty of fairness without Contract A), and the Deloitte Report properly excluded due to prior rulings and privilege.

The appeal was dismissed, and the costs award from the trial was upheld.

The appellants sought a declaration that their insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify them in an underlying action for misrepresentation related to a property sale.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no duty to defend.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in relying on an "entire agreement" clause to deny coverage for negligent misrepresentation claims.

However, the Court upheld the dismissal on an alternative ground: the appellants' failure to provide prompt notice of the claim to the insurer, which constituted a breach of the policy and was not eligible for relief against forfeiture.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for past offences, appealed a disposition by the Ontario Review Board that ordered his detention at a forensic mental health facility with community privileges, rather than granting his request for a conditional discharge.

The Board denied the conditional discharge due to public safety concerns, emphasizing the need for swift intervention in case of mental state decompensation, despite the appellant's recent stability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable.

The court deferred to the Board's expert opinion, supported by the appellant's psychiatrist, that a detention order was necessary to ensure public protection by allowing intervention before the criteria for involuntary admission under the Mental Health Act were met, which conditional discharge mechanisms might not adequately provide.

The appellants were convicted of procuring, receiving a material benefit from sexual services, and advertising sexual services.

At trial, the judge applied section 276 of the Criminal Code to restrict the appellants from cross-examining the complainant about her prior work in the sex trade.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that section 276 does not apply categorically to sexual services and human trafficking offences, and that the trial judge erred in applying it to restrict relevant cross-examination.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeals in respect of the sexual services offences, and ordered a new trial.

An appeal against a conviction for trafficking MDMA was dismissed.

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act, 2021, arguing it was ultra vires Ontario and infringed their rights to free expression and equality under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Act, finding its dominant purpose was to affirm and commemorate the Tamil-Ontarian community's experience, which falls within Ontario's power over local matters under s. 92(16) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court also dismissed the Charter claims, concluding the Act does not suppress expression or draw a discriminatory distinction against Sinhala-Buddhists.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for attempted murder, appealed a conditional discharge from the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's reasoning for determining a 'significant threat to public safety' insufficient, particularly regarding the appellant's medication compliance and post-discharge support.

The court set aside the Board's disposition and ordered a re-hearing before a new panel.

The Crown brought a motion for a stay and temporary publication ban pending a proposed application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion concerned two prior decisions of the Court of Appeal: one setting aside sexual assault convictions and ordering a new trial, and another declining a discretionary publication ban.

The Crown sought a partial stay of the publication ban decision, allowing a temporarily redacted version of the substantive judgment (with verbatim sexualized text messages removed) to be publicly released.

Applying the three-part test for a stay (serious issue, irreparable harm, balance of convenience), the court found that the Crown met the criteria, particularly given the public interest in protecting complainants and the arguable merit of the Crown's appeal regarding the scope of discretionary publication bans.

The motion was granted, ordering a partial stay and redaction of specific paragraphs, a temporary publication ban on certain information, and the sealing of the Crown's motion record.

The appellant, Geoffrey Le Feuvre, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), arguing the Board's finding of significant public threat was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found the appeal moot because a subsequent urgent hearing resulted in a new disposition transferring the appellant to a different facility with community living privileges.

The court declined to hear the appeal on its merits due to the material change in circumstances and ordered an expedited new hearing by the Board to assess the significant threat issue based on the appellant's current situation.

This Crown appeal addresses the timeframe within which an initial refusal to provide a roadside breath sample (ASD demand) can be retracted before constituting a criminal offence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reconciled the "same transaction" principle from R. v. Domik with the "immediately" requirement of the Criminal Code s. 320.27(1)(b).

The court held that Domik applies to ASD demands, but the "same transaction" window is limited by the time police can lawfully obtain a sample "immediately" considering operational time and unusual circumstances, as interpreted by R. v. Breault.

The trial and summary conviction appeal judges erred in law by not properly applying these constraints.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in a dangerous driving causing bodily harm case.

The trial judge had excluded Event Data Recorder (EDR) evidence, finding an unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8 Charter violation) and police bad faith.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by concluding that police lacked reasonable grounds to seize the vehicle under s. 489(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in EDR data after lawful seizure, and in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis.

The Court held that EDR data, being objective and impersonal, does not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy post-lawful seizure.

It also found police acted in good faith given conflicting caselaw.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered with the EDR evidence admitted.

The appellant, Nicholas Johnson, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, challenging the trial judge's refusal to qualify a proposed expert mid-trial.

The expert was intended to recover access to the appellant's Google account via his cell phone to obtain location services data.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decision, noting the lack of a proper application and insufficient evidence regarding the expert's qualifications or the admissibility of the potential data.

The applicant sought a review of a motion judge’s decision to deny an extension of time for leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The Divisional Court had dismissed the applicant's request to set aside or vary a previous decision as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere, agreeing that the proposed leave application lacked merit and that an allegation of conflict of interest could not be grafted onto the original mandamus application.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of Ontario's Statutory Accident Benefits Schedules regarding attendant care benefits (ACBs) for a catastrophically injured individual.

The key issues were whether an applicant for ACBs must demonstrate "urgency, impossibility, or impracticability" to claim retroactive benefits under s. 42(5) of the 2010 Schedule, and whether the definition of "incurred" from s. 3(7)(e) of the 2010 Schedule applies to claims arising from accidents predating its enactment (specifically, the 1996 Schedule).

The Court of Appeal found that s. 42(5) relates to the timing of payment, not eligibility, and does not impose a "urgency" test for retroactive claims.

It further held that the definition of "incurred" in the 2010 Schedule does not apply to claims governed by the 1996 Schedule, based on a careful reading of the transitional provisions.

The appeal was allowed, entitling the applicant to retroactive ACBs without substantiation under the 2010 Schedule's "incurred" definition.