Nancy Roberts

Following a default judgment in favour of the plaintiffs, the court issued a supplementary endorsement addressing HST, pre-judgment interest, and costs.

The court clarified the application of HST to specific damage amounts and awarded pre-judgment interest at the contractual rate of 3% over prime for disposal and restoration costs, as these fell under the definition of 'Additional Rent' in the lease.

The plaintiffs were awarded costs of $31,385.41 on a substantial indemnity basis pursuant to the lease agreement.

The plaintiffs, commercial landlords, sought default judgment against the defendant tenant for breach of a commercial lease due to unpaid rent.

The defendant was noted in default.

The court granted partial damages for rental arrears, past and future lost rent for a re-let portion of the premises, and costs for property removal and leasehold improvements.

However, the court declined to award future lost rent for the un-relet portion of the premises, finding insufficient evidence regarding actual rental value and reasonable mitigation efforts.

The balance of the claim for future damages was directed to a separate assessment trial.

The plaintiffs, owners of a downtown Toronto office tower, sued the defendants, operators of the building's parking garage, for unpaid fixed monthly fees from April 2020 to April 2021.

The defendants ceased full payments due to the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on revenue, arguing a binding oral agreement to reduce fees, the application of a force majeure clause, and contract frustration.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding no valid amendment to the contract due to a "no oral modification" clause and lack of consideration, no detrimental reliance for promissory estoppel, and that neither the force majeure clause nor the doctrine of frustration applied as the contract merely became unprofitable, not impossible to perform.

Winterland Airfield Holdings Ltd. appealed a Superior Court judgment that granted Collingwood Aviation Partners Ltd. (CAPL) declarations of unimpeded access to airport lands and exemption from user fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's interpretation of an Operating Agreement and finding of an implied easement for unimpeded access.

The court also upheld the finding that Winterland could not charge user fees for this access and that Winterland failed to prove CAPL was underinsured.

The applicant was successful on the merits of its application and sought costs on a full indemnity basis, relying on an indemnity clause in the operating agreement.

The court held that the contractual phrase 'all costs' does not necessarily dictate the scale of costs, which remains discretionary under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, calculating the amount using the 61% ratio presented by the respondent's own costs outline, resulting in an all-inclusive award of $311,228.77.

The appellant, Microsoft Canada Inc., appealed a trial decision that awarded the respondent, a former employee, unvested stock awards after his termination without cause.

The trial judge had found the termination provisions in the Stock Award Agreement unenforceable because they were "harsh and oppressive" and not brought to the respondent's attention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding the respondent received no notice, as the respondent had expressly agreed to the terms for 16 years by clicking an acceptance box, despite consciously choosing not to read the agreement.

Collingwood Aviation Partners Ltd. (CAPL) applied for a declaration that it had a common law easement and contractual rights to full access to the adjacent airport lands owned by Winterland Airfield Holdings Ltd. (WAH).

WAH had erected fences restricting CAPL's access, citing safety concerns, and sought to impose user fees and increased insurance requirements.

The court found that CAPL had both contractual and common law easement rights to unimpeded access, as the properties had a symbiotic historical relationship.

The court ordered the removal of the restrictive fencing, declared that WAH could not charge user fees for access, and dismissed WAH's application regarding insurance.

The applicant landlord sought an order declaring that the respondent tenant failed to validly exercise an option to release a portion of its leased premises.

The lease required the tenant to provide written confirmation from the federal government of a loss of expected funding by a specific date to exercise the option.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government delayed its budget and the tenant could not provide the required confirmation by the deadline.

The court held that the tenant's purported exercise of the option was invalid, as the lease allocated the risk of funding uncertainty to the tenant.

The court also rejected the tenant's arguments of frustration and relief from forfeiture, ordering the tenant to pay substantial indemnity costs.

The applicants sought to enforce an arbitral award against the respondent.

The respondent agreed to pay the full amount owing under the award, though the parties differed slightly on the precise calculation.

The court ordered the continuation of a Mareva injunction until the final amount is resolved and paid into court, and scheduled a further case conference to address the final calculations and costs.

The applicants sought to extend an interim Mareva injunction restraining the United Republic of Tanzania from removing a newly purchased aircraft from Ontario, pending an application to recognize and enforce an international arbitral award.

Tanzania opposed the extension, arguing sovereign immunity, lack of full disclosure, and failure to meet the Mareva test.

The court rejected Tanzania's arguments, finding that by signing a Bilateral Investment Treaty and agreeing to UNCITRAL rules, Tanzania consented to interim measures.

The court extended the injunction, holding that the applicants had a strong prima facie case and the balance of convenience favoured them.

Imperial Oil sought summary judgment against Worsley Rusholme Limited, arguing that a broad release clause in their agreement of purchase and sale precluded claims related to environmental contamination, including remigration of contaminants after closing.

Worsley contended that a subsequent Comfort Letter modified this release to allow such claims.

The court found the release provisions in the agreement to be comprehensive and unambiguous, explicitly covering post-closing remigration.

It determined that the Comfort Letter did not carve out Worsley's claim, as its wording focused on contamination outside the property boundaries and explicitly stated it did not limit liability assumption for post-closing migration onto the property.

The court granted partial summary judgment, dismissing Worsley's claim against Imperial Oil, finding no genuine issue for trial and that the partial summary judgment was appropriate given the distinct nature of the claims against Imperial Oil and the co-defendant AMEC Foster Wheeler Americas Limited.