Leila Vanessa Mehkeri

The offender pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 for misappropriating $622,087.92 from her employer's law firm trust and general accounts over six years.

The court weighed the significant breach of trust, the quantum of the fraud, and the profound impact on the victim against the offender's guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior record, and underlying mental health and addiction issues.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for large-scale employee frauds, the court imposed a sentence of four years' imprisonment, along with a full restitution order and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The offender pleaded guilty to laundering the proceeds of crime contrary to s. 462.31(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, knowing that the funds were obtained as a result of fraud over $5,000.

The offender's role in a sophisticated international fraud scheme involving a fictitious company was to set up corporate profiles and bank accounts, and to handle the proceeds of crime.

Six overseas victims lost approximately US$238,000.

The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence with house arrest for the first four months, followed by a curfew for the next four months, and standard conditions for the remainder.

A restitution order was made in the amount of CDN$150,783.

The court declined to impose a fine in lieu of forfeiture despite the offender's prior fraud-like conviction, considering the significant restitution already made and the draconian consequences of default.

This decision addresses the admissibility of evidence and the applicability of solicitor-client privilege in the context of a Gardiner hearing at sentencing for fraud.

The accused, Stephenie Chevis, pleaded guilty to fraud involving misappropriation of funds from a law firm's trust and general accounts.

The court considered whether evidence relating to certain transactions involving other clients of the law firm, potentially protected by solicitor-client privilege, could be admitted.

The judge analyzed the scope of privilege, distinguishing between protected communications and public legal instruments such as wills and mortgages once acted upon.

The court also considered the "innocence at stake" exception to privilege but found no need to pierce privilege at this stage, as the accused was not seeking to elicit privileged communications.

The appellant, convicted of impaired driving (over 80 mg BAC), appealed his conviction and sentence.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's failure to ensure a fair trial due to late disclosure of crucial evidence (a second 911 call) by the Crown.

The appellant, self-represented, based his defence on the non-existence of this second call.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by not correcting the appellant's misunderstanding about the admissibility of late-disclosed evidence and by not granting an adjournment to allow the appellant to adjust his defence strategy.

This error compromised trial fairness, warranting a new trial.

The appellant's request for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay in sentencing was denied, as the net delay fell within the presumptive ceiling after accounting for delay caused by the appellant's other appeal.

The court heard four preliminary motions in a criminal case for attempted murder: one from the Crown and three from the defence.

The Crown sought permission for certain witnesses to testify via videoconference.

The defence sought disclosure of internal prosecution communications, a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter (Jordan), and exclusion of GPS data evidence under section 8 of the Charter.

The court partially granted the Crown's request for videoconference testimony, requiring Laval police officers to testify in person due to credibility concerns.

All three defence motions were dismissed, as the court found no abuse of process, no unreasonable delay under Jordan (considering the defence's lack of sustained effort to accelerate proceedings and the case's complexity), and no violation of privacy rights regarding the GPS data from the abandoned/stolen vehicle.

The appellant, Uche Uduma, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The appeal raised five grounds, including failure to consider alternative explanations for indicia of impairment, misapprehension of evidence regarding the odour of alcohol and pre-arrest compelled evidence, drawing a negative inference from the appellant's silence, failure to apply the R. v. W.(D.) test, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the totality of evidence test, did not misapprehend evidence, did not improperly use the appellant's silence, and correctly applied the principles of R. v. W.(D.).

The ground of reasonable apprehension of bias was abandoned.

The applicant, convicted of impaired driving, sought an order for the Crown to pay the cost of his trial transcript for his appeal, claiming financial inability.

The Superior Court of Justice, exercising its inherent jurisdiction, established a three-part test for such orders: financial inability, severe consequences or public interest, and arguable merit of the appeal.

While the applicant met the first two criteria (significant personal consequences due to conviction and public interest issues like systemic racial discrimination and Charter rights), the court found his appeal lacked arguable merit.

His claims of involuntary intoxication and Charter violations (right to French-speaking counsel) were deemed unlikely to succeed on appeal, as the trial judge's findings were based on credible evidence and proper legal analysis.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excessive blood alcohol, arguing that his Charter rights under sections 9 and 10(b) were infringed due to a delay in being informed of his right to counsel in French.

The trial judge admitted the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police acted in good faith and the breach had minimal impact on the appellant's rights.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's decision, deferring to the trial judge's application of the R. v. Grant analysis.

The court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of police conduct or the impact of the delay on the appellant's ability to exercise his rights, noting that breath samples are considered non-intrusive.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm offences after police found a loaded handgun in a gym bag at a construction site where he was working.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused had knowledge and control of the bag.

The court found the evidence fell short of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in possession of the bag, as it lacked distinctive markings when observed by police, was stored in an open area accessible to others, and contained no identifying evidence.

The accused was found not guilty on all charges.

Robert Quinn was arrested on outstanding warrants, and police seized and searched his duffel bag, finding a loaded handgun.

Quinn challenged the warrantless search as a violation of his s.8 Charter rights, seeking exclusion of the evidence.

The court found the search was a lawful search incident to arrest, justified by officer and public safety concerns, particularly given prior information about Quinn's potential possession of a firearm and violent history.

Even if a Charter breach occurred, the court determined the evidence would not be excluded under s.24(2) due to the low seriousness of the infringement, Quinn's low expectation of privacy, and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious firearms offences.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought an application under s. 276.2 of the Criminal Code seeking permission to cross-examine the complainant about prior interactions and alleged sexual activity between them.

The defence argued the evidence was relevant to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent and necessary to explain the accused’s state of mind.

The court held that certain prior interactions, including cuddling and holding, the complainant placing the accused’s hand on her breast, and the complainant sending a nude photograph, were admissible because they were relevant and their probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect under s. 276(2).

However, the accused was not permitted to cross-examine the complainant about her alleged statement that she had been raped by her ex-husband.

The application was therefore granted in part.