ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
STEPHENIE CHEVIS
Before Justice G. Jenner
Sentencing Submissions Heard and Reasons Delivered on March 6, 2026
Leila Mehkeri counsel for the Crown
Sharon Sabourin counsel for the defendant Stephenie Chevis
JENNER J.:
REASONS RE: SENTENCE
I. Introduction
1On December 2, 2024, Ms. Chevis pleaded guilty to one count of fraud over $5,000, contrary to s. 380(1) of the Criminal Code. Ms. Chevis agreed that while employed as a secretary with bookkeeping responsibilities at Brown and Fabris Law Office (BFLO), she fraudulently took funds from the law firm’s general and trust accounts, by issuing cheques to her benefit. She took at least $60,000. Over the course of a Gardiner hearing, the Crown sought to prove, as an aggravating factor, that Ms. Chevis was responsible for fraud totaling $774,757.85. I ultimately determined that the Crown had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. Chevis committed a total fraud of $622,087.92, comprising $609,530.93 in fraudulent trust‑account transactions and $12,556.99 in fraudulent general‑account transactions.
2I am now called on to determine the appropriate sentence.
3The Crown seeks a term of imprisonment of four years, a restitution order in the full amount of the fraud, and certain other ancillary orders. Ms. Chevis asks the court consider a sentence of two years less-a-day, and requests she be permitted to serve it in the community as part of a conditional sentence order (“CSO”). She does not take issue with a restitution order, but asks the court not to impose a corollary order for a fine in lieu of forfeiture.
II. Circumstances of the Offence
4As my findings were previously canvassed in my reasons on the Gardiner hearing, I will be brief here. Ms. Chevis committed a prolonged fraud committed over a period of approximately six years, while she was employed in a position of trust with bookkeeping and accounting responsibilities at BFLO. Through 88 proven fraudulent trust transactions, and a smaller number of proven fraudulent general‑account transactions, Ms. Chevis misappropriated a total of $622,087.92. The overwhelming majority of those funds were taken from client trust funds. The fraud involved repeated manipulation of accounting records to conceal improper withdrawals, and the funds were largely directed to Ms. Chevis herself or to third parties for her benefit.
III. Victim Impact
5I had the benefit of a victim impact statement from Mr. René Fabris, who was the owner and only practicing lawyer at BFLO during the offence period. I thank him for his participation. Mr. Fabris describes the offence as having profound and lasting emotional, physical, and financial impacts on his life and legal practice. He explains that the discovery of the fraud required him to work intensively for an extended period to reconstruct trust records, retain professional assistance, and deal with audits and regulatory scrutiny, causing extreme stress and anxiety. He reports serious health consequences, including heart attacks, and states that he postponed retirement as a result of the financial and professional fallout. Mr. Fabris also describes a lasting loss of trust in others and a sense of betrayal arising from the breach of trust.
IV. Circumstances of the Offender
6I had the benefit of a pre-sentence report. Ms. Chevis is a 48‑year‑old first‑time offender with no prior criminal record. The pre‑sentence report reflects that she was cooperative, forthcoming, and remorseful, and that she acknowledged both the seriousness of her actions and the harm they caused. She has an extensive employment history, including long‑term work in administrative roles, and is presently employed. She maintains supportive relationships with her partner and adult children, and collateral sources describe her offending behaviour as out of character.
7The pre‑sentence report also documents that Ms. Chevis was exposed to significant physical, emotional, and sexual abuse in childhood, experienced family instability and multiple traumatic losses, and has struggled with substance use as a coping mechanism. She has been formally diagnosed with several mental‑health conditions, including major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, post‑traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and alcohol‑use disorder. She is presently engaged in psychiatric care and treatment through Waypoint and is compliant with prescribed medication. While these factors do not diminish her moral culpability, they provide important context for her offending behaviour and are relevant to assessing her prospects for rehabilitation and the appropriate sentence.
V. Applicable Law
5.1 The general purpose and principles of sentencing
8Pursuant to s. 718 of the Criminal Code, the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and contribute to the respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe community by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) To denounce lawful conduct and the harm done to victims or the community;
(b) To deter the offender and others from committing offences;
(c) To separate offenders from society where necessary;
(d) To assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) To provide reparation for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) To promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledge the harm done to victims or the community.
9Several other general principles apply:
Proportionality: A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: s. 718.1.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: A sentence should be increased or decreased to account for relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances, including but not limited to those statutory factors set out in s. 718.2(a).
Parity: A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances: s. 718.2(b).
Restraint: An offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate: s. 718.2(d). All available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders: s. 718.2(e).
10I must also consider whether the offence had a significant impact on the victims, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation: s. 718.2(a)(iii.1).
5.2 Specific statutory considerations for this offence
11The maximum sentence for fraud over $5,000 is 14 years’ imprisonment. As the value of the fraud in this case did not exceed $1,000,000, there is no minimum penalty.
12In R. v. Fletcher, 2015 ONSC 4800 at para. 20, Campbell J. summarized the applicability of s. 380.1 of the Criminal Code, in sentencing an offender convicted of fraud as follows:
… s. 380.1(1) of the Criminal Code provides that, without limiting the generality of section 718.2, a court sentencing an offender for fraud must consider the following as aggravating circumstances: (a) the magnitude, complexity, duration or degree of planning of the fraud committed was significant; (b) the offence adversely affected, or had the potential to adversely affect, the stability of the Canadian economy or financial system or any financial market in Canada or investor confidence in such a financial market; (c) the offence involved a large number of victims; (c.1) the offence had a significant impact on the victims given their personal circumstances including their age, health and financial situation; (d) in committing the offence, the offender took advantage of the high regard in which the offender was held in the community; (e) the offender did not comply with a licensing requirement, or professional standard, that is normally applicable to the activity or conduct that forms the subject-matter of the offence; and (f) the offender concealed or destroyed records related to the fraud or to the disbursement of the proceeds of the fraud. Further, s. 380.1(2) of the Code provides that, in such cases, the sentencing court shall not consider as mitigating circumstances the offender’s employment, employment skills or status or reputation in the community if those circumstances were relevant to, contributed to, or were used in the commission of the offence. Finally, according to s. 380(3) of the Code, the sentencing court “shall cause to be stated in the record the aggravating and mitigating circumstances it took into account when determining the sentence.”
13The fact that the offender abused a position of trust is also statutory aggravating factor: s. 718.2(a)(iii).
14Section 380.2 (1) of the Code provides that when an offender is convicted of an offence under s. 380(1), the court may additionally make an order, subject to the conditions or exemptions that the court directs, “prohibiting the offender from seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, or becoming or being a volunteer in any capacity, that involves having authority over the real property, money or valuable security of another person.”
15I will address the applicable law relating to restitution orders at a later stage in these reasons.
5.3 The availability of conditional sentences
16Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code permits me to order an offender to serve a sentence of less than two years’ imprisonment in the community under the conditions of a CSO in certain circumstances. Fraud over is not a specifically excluded offence under ss. 742.1(b)-(d), so the operative question is whether I can be satisfied that permitting Ms. Chevis to serve a sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing.
VI. Analysis
The appropriate term and form of custody
17Denunciation and deterrence are central sentencing principles for large-scale frauds such as this: R. v. Atwal, 2016 ONSC 3668, at para. 43; R. v. Drabinsky and Gottlieb, 2011 ONCA 582, at paras. 160 and 173. In R. v. Gray, 1995 18, the Court of Appeal for Ontario observed as follows, at p. 22:
[T]here are few crimes where the aspect of deterrence is more significant. It is not a crime of impulse and is of a type that is normally committed by a person who is knowledgeable and should be aware of the circumstances. That awareness comes from sentences given to others.
18The Court of Appeal for Ontario has also consistently and repeatedly endorsed penitentiary sentences in the range of three to five years for large scale frauds, with even higher sentences for frauds at especially high quantums: see R. v. Dobis, 2002 328165 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Scholz, 2021 ONCA 506; R. v. Davatgar-Jafarpour, 2019 ONCA 353; R. v. Reeve, 2020 ONCA 381; R. v. Plange, 2019 ONCA 646; R. v. Burden, 2024 ONCA 880; R. v. Wagar, 2018 ONCA 931. Courts have also observed that these ranges were first established before Parliament amended the sentencing provisions for fraud over $5,000 to increase the maximum penalty from 10 years to 14 years, and to impose a minimum sentence for frauds over $1,000,000. R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, instructs, at paras. 96-97, that maximum sentences signal the objective gravity of offences, and increases to maximum sentences signal Parliament’s intention that the distribution of proportionate sentences for an offence should shift upward. See R. v. Reeve, 2020 ONCA 381, at para. 39, for recognition of this in the large-scale fraud context.
19While no range is fixed—sentencing remains a highly individualized process—these cases provide critical instructive guidance.
20I will turn now to the mitigating and aggravating features of this case.
21Ms. Chevis’s guilty plea has mitigating effect. She acknowledged a portion of the fraud that she was found guilty of and acknowledged certain facts that saved judicial and prosecutorial resources. She has accepted the wrongfulness of her actions. It is not aggravating that Ms. Chevis put the Crown to its onus on the balance of the fraud, but nor is this akin to a case where the offender, in pleading guilty, accepted responsibility for the whole of their crime. I note as well that this case does not present with the mitigating factor of making, pre-sentencing, partial restitution.
22Ms. Chevis has expressed remorse, which I accept as genuine. Her counsel submitted that, following the comprehensive Gardiner hearing, Ms. Chevis accepts full responsibility for the offence. Ms. Chevis herself acknowledged her crime’s its magnitude and the profound breach of trust involved, without offering excuses. She explained that nearly ten years have passed since the conduct, during which she has had significant time for reflection and has come to understand that her actions constituted not only a financial crime but also caused serious stress, loss, and disappointment to others. Ms. Chevis described meaningful personal change, including sobriety and sustained efforts at personal growth through extensive counselling, behavioural therapy, skills training, and ongoing psychiatric care. She stated that this treatment has improved her emotional regulation, accountability, and coping strategies, allowing her to pause before reacting and to make decisions with an appreciation of long‑term consequences. She emphasized the importance of structured accountability, steady employment, and a renewed commitment to integrity guiding every aspect of her life. I pause here to commend Ms. Chevis for this progress, and to convey to her that whatever the sentence imposed, she appears to have developed skills and strategies to succeed when she fully regains her liberty.
23Ms. Chevis has no criminal record. I must remain mindful that I am sentencing a first-time offender. I must consider her circumstances. She experienced a challenging childhood, has suffered substance misuse and addiction, and has several mental health diagnoses. Despite these challenges, she is presently employed, has supportive family ties, and as noted has strong prospects for rehabilitation.
24I must place weight on the fact that Ms. Chevis’s crime is in part explained, though certainly not excused, by her mental health conditions, her gambling addiction, and her substance abuse. She is distinguishable from the offender who is motivated purely by greed or financial gain, and who has amassed sustained wealth on the backs of her victims. This distinction does not in any way negate her responsibility for a serious and prolonged breach of trust.
25There are, additionally, many significant aggravating factors present:
The quantum of the fraud, $622,087.92, is significant.
Ms. Chevis was in a position of trust with respect to BFLO as well as the firm’s clients. She breached that trust in committing these offences.
Her crime placed the funds of multiple victims at risk.
She committed the crimes over a long period, six years.
Her crime was iterated. There were 88 separate fraudulent trust transactions. Ms. Chevis had many opportunities to reflect on the wrongfulness of her actions and did not stop. Indeed, the crime ended only because Ms. Chevis was terminated from her employment.
Her crime was sophisticated in the sense it required planning and the execution of multiple steps.
Her crime involved concealment through manipulation of the firm’s accounting records.
The proper administration of trust accounts is critical to public confidence in the legal profession and its role in the administration of justice: R. v. Booker, 2024 ONCA 181, at para. 46. Ms. Chevis’s crime erodes that confidence.
While Mr. Fabris’s professional obligations, combined with insurance coverage, resulted in there being no actual loss to BFLO’s clients, the impact of Ms. Chevis’s crimes on Mr. Fabris was enormous, and had both financial and emotional dimensions. He was subjected to audits of his regulator and the Canada Revenue Agency, incurred costs to hire professionals to assist in the investigation and remedy of the trust shortfall, had to pay personally to make up for the trust shortfall, (albeit with recovery through professional insurance). He considered closing his practice and reports that his health and personal relationships have suffered.
26Balancing these the sentencing principles, mindful of the range consistently reinforced at the appellate level, and considering the unique array of mitigating and aggravating factors in this case, I am of the view that a sentence in the range of four to five years is appropriate. A lower sentence risks, in my view, communicating to members of the public that crime pays; that the cost of getting caught is acceptable in pursuit of significant financial gain.
27I am not persuaded that this is an appropriate case to depart downwards from the appellate-established range. This is not a case where Ms. Chevis has played a minor role. She was the sole perpetrator of a prolonged, iterated, fraud. Recognizing her personal health challenges, she is not an offender who presents with acute health concerns which would render a custodial sentence, or a lengthy custodial sentence, impractical or cruel. Nor does Ms. Chevis come before the court having made significant restitution prior to sentence. She has made none. I am not treating that as an aggravating factor, but as the absence of a mitigating factor which might strongly influence the court’s willingness to impose an exceptional sentence.
28Counsel for Ms. Chevis argues that the significant passage of time between the offence and sentencing, and Ms. Chevis’s progress in the interim, form a compelling basis to impose a sentence below the range. I disagree. Evidence respecting the causes of all delay was not before me, but I note Ms. Chevis was charged in late 2022 and was not placed on onerous conditions. And, while I commend Ms. Chevis for her progress, she is not an offender for whom custody will undo rehabilitative gains. I give the passage of time little weight in this case.
29While I have concluded that a sentence beyond the range available for a CSO is required, I will nonetheless comment that a CSO would be inconsistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. This was a serious breach‑of‑trust fraud, committed repeatedly over a prolonged period and involving a substantial quantum. The gravity of the offence and Ms. Chevis’s degree of responsibility require a sentence that meaningfully reflects denunciation and general deterrence. Permitting the custodial component of the sentence to be served in the community would not adequately acknowledge the harm caused or promote respect for the law, and would be disproportionate to the seriousness of the offence.
30While I have the discretion to depart upwards from the Crown position (see R. v. Blake-Samuels, 2021 ONCA 77), mindful of the principle of restraint I will impose the custodial sentence recommended by the Crown, four years, which represents the lower end of my determined range.
Restitution / fine in lieu of forfeiture
31Section 738 of the Criminal Code provides that I may order restitution to a victim for property lost as a result of the commission of an offence. The evolution of law I must consider was summarized as follows, in R. v. Cady, 2021 ONCJ 720, at paras. 56-58:
The imposition of a s. 738 restitution order is discretionary. To avoid breaching the totality principle, it must be considered as part of an overall sentencing disposition so that it does not become a mere “mechanical afterthought” and must always be made with “restraint and caution”.
Again, in Williams [2007 13949], Hill J. noted that a fundamental principle of sentencing is reparation of harm done. Restitution, a discretionary order, forms a part of this consideration when the amount of loss, as here, is clearly calculable. While not determinative, a sentencing court is entitled to consider “an assessment of the means of the offender to meet the obligations of court-ordered restitution”. In R v Taylor [2003] OJ No 5129 (CA)], a case where the offender committed a $4 million fraud against his employer over 13 years to feed his gambling addiction, had substantively rehabilitated himself, there was little to no chance of re-offending, was teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, and was sentenced to two years, our Court of Appeal set aside the imposed full restitution order noting that “[i]t should only be made with restraint and caution and not only in order to avoid putting the victim through the extra legal expense of going to the civil courts or as a substitute for civil procedure.” Further, the court outlined the factors to be considered in making such an order:
The relevant factors and objectives to the imposition of a restitution order have been discussed by this court in R. v. Devgan (1999), 1999 2412 (ON CA), 136 C.C.C. (3d) 238 and R. v. Biegus (1999), 1999 3815 (ON CA), 141 C.C.C. (3d) 245. An order for restitution must also bear some reality to the circumstances of the appellant and must be directly associated with the sentence imposed as the public reprobation of the offence. In the circumstances of this case, the overriding factor is the means of the appellant. There is no ability, as noted by the trial judge, to pay even the most minute part of this staggering amount, with no expiry date. It would kill all hope for the appellant for the future and it would likely impair his chances of rehabilitation. The order is clearly excessive and futile and the trial judge erred in that regard.
The debate over the significance to be placed upon an offender’s inability to pay has been substantively muted by the 2015 amendment to the Criminal Code, s. 739.1, instructing that “the offender’s financial means or ability to pay does not prevent the court from making an order under section 738 or 739.” Post this amendment, our Court of Appeal noted in R v Wagar [2018 ONCA 931, at para. 19] that in cases where a breach of trust fraud has occurred, as here, the “paramount consideration is the claims of the victim” and “the ability to pay should not be a predominate factor … restitution orders can be made even where there does not appear to be a likelihood that the appellant will pay.”
[Citations added for clarity].
32As noted, Ms. Chevis does not oppose a restitution order in this case. I agree it is appropriate. While I share the parties’ pragmatic view that Ms. Chevis will find making full restitution very challenging, the circumstances of the offence, and in particular the breach of trust, persuade me that reparations for the harm done to the victim should be given priority. I make a stand-alone restitution order in the full amount of the fraud. Per the agreement of counsel, and following the Crown’s consultation with Mr. Fabris’s insurer, that restitution order shall be to the benefit of Mr. Fabris in trust.
33The Crown further applies for an order under s. 467.37(3) of the Code. Section 467.37(3) permits a sentencing judge to order an offender to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiting the proceeds of crime where (i) an order of forfeiture should be made in respect of an offender’s property; but (ii) the property or any part or interest of the offender in it cannot be made subject to an order of forfeiture. I agree that the prerequisites of this section have been met. I am satisfied that Ms. Chevis obtained $622,087.92 as the result of the commission of the offence. It is not contested that she has now diverted or spent those funds such that they cannot be subjected to a forfeiture order. She may not have had control of the funds for long, but she meets the test of possession or control of the property at some point: R. v. Dwyer, 2013 ONCA 34, at paras. 21 and 24.
34The prerequisites being met, I have only limited discretion to decline to impose the order: R. v. Angelis, 2016 ONCA 675 at para. 37; R. v. Lavigne, 2006 SCC 10, at para. 27. In this case, the order would serve the objective of the provision. That Ms. Chevis will be significantly challenged to meet the terms of the order, and that this challenge might interfere with her rehabilitative prospects, do not, following Angelis, provide a sufficiently compelling basis to forego an order: see paras. 45-59. I will make the order. In recognition of the challenges in satisfying the order, I will grant Ms. Chevis 10 years to pay the fine.
Other ancillary orders
35The Crown seeks a communication prohibition with Mr. Fabris while Ms. Chevis is serving her custodial sentence pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code. This is not contested and is entirely reasonable. There will be exception made for indirect communication through counsel in the event of any future related civil litigation.
36The Crown seeks a s. 380.2 prohibition that would prevent Ms. Chevis from obtaining any employment or becoming a volunteer in any capacity that involves having authority over the real property, money or valuable security of another person for a period of 10 years. Ms. Chevis’s agrees such an order is appropriate, and the order is so made.
37Both parties agree that a DNA order on the secondary designated offence of fraud over $5,000 is appropriate. I make that order.
VII. Conclusion
38Ms. Chevis is sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.
39I order, pursuant to s. 743.21, that Ms. Chevis shall not contact René Fabris during her period of incarceration, subject to the exception noted.
40I order, pursuant to s. 487.051, that Ms. Chevis shall provide a sample of her DNA to the Ontario Provincial Police.
41I order, pursuant to s.738(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, that Ms. Chevis shall make restitution to René Fabris, in trust, in the amount of $622,087.92. The restitution order is of immediate effect.
42I order, pursuant to s. 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code, that Ms. Chevis shall pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $622,087.92, payable within 10 years. Any payments made pursuant to the fine in lieu of forfeiture will be credited towards the restitution order. The consequences set out in s. 462.37(4) will attach, employing the minimum term of three years.
43I order, pursuant to s. 380.2(1) of the Criminal Code, that Ms. Chevis is prohibited from obtaining any employment or becoming a volunteer in any capacity that involves having authority over the real property, money or valuable security of another person for a period of 10 years, commencing immediately.
44Given the term of custody I have ordered, I will waive the victim fine surcharge.
Released March 6, 2026
Signed: Justice G. Jenner