Dylan Cedar Finlay

The accused, Maninder Grewal, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and having a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) equal to or above 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

The trial focused on several Charter-based arguments, including the lawfulness of his arrest and breath demand, breaches of his right to counsel (informational component and premature termination of call), arbitrary detention, and unreasonable search and seizure related to being videotaped while urinating.

The court found breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel (false dichotomy of options and premature termination) and s. 9 right to not be arbitrarily detained.

The court dismissed the s. 8 and s. 9 arguments related to the ASD/mouth alcohol issue and the privacy issue while urinating.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence due to the seriousness and impact of the Charter breaches.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80.

The central issue was whether police officers' deliberate muting of body-worn cameras prior to an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand constituted a breach of section 7 of the Charter.

The court found that the deliberate muting was a serious breach of the accused's section 7 Charter rights, as it amounted to the deliberate suppression of important investigative information that should have been disclosed.

Applying the Grant and McColman framework, the court determined that the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Consequently, the breathalyzer results were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, leading to the acquittal of the accused on both counts.

This ruling addresses an application by the prosecution to prematurely end the cross-examination of a complainant (R.C.) in a youth criminal trial involving sexual offences.

R.C., a 19-year-old pregnant witness, experienced severe distress, including suicidal ideation and physical illness, after one hour of cross-examination.

The defence opposed, arguing for the importance of cross-examination to explore potential collusion among complainants.

Applying the Hart test, the court found R.C.'s inability to continue testifying to be a valid reason, accepting her claims of mental and physical distress and potential risk to her pregnancy.

The court determined that the prejudice to the defence's fair trial rights was minimal, given that the issue of collusion had been partially explored and could be further addressed through other witnesses and ameliorative actions.

The application to discontinue R.C.'s cross-examination was granted.

The Young Person, I.M.B., brought an application to sever one count of sexual assault from six other counts involving three stepsisters, arguing prejudice, lack of legal/factual nexus, and an intention to testify solely on the severed count.

The prosecution opposed, citing a legal and factual nexus and the viability of a cross-count similar fact application.

The court, applying the "interests of justice" criteria from R. v. Last, found that while general prejudice and tactical considerations slightly favored severance, the significant viability of a similar fact application and the truth-seeking function of the trial weighed against it.

The application for severance was dismissed.

The appellant, James Elliot Cornell, appealed his conviction for failing to provide a breath sample, arguing a breach of his s. 7 Charter rights due to delayed disclosure of a breath room video and reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The Crown had provided the video to previous counsel and offered viewing opportunities to the self-represented appellant, which he did not fully utilize.

The appeal court found no s. 7 Charter breach, concluding the delayed disclosure was due to the appellant's lack of diligence and did not affect the trial outcome or fairness, as the video clearly showed an unequivocal refusal.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias, noting the trial judge's comments were contextualized by the case's lengthy history and the appellant's conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Uche Uduma, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The appeal raised five grounds, including failure to consider alternative explanations for indicia of impairment, misapprehension of evidence regarding the odour of alcohol and pre-arrest compelled evidence, drawing a negative inference from the appellant's silence, failure to apply the R. v. W.(D.) test, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the totality of evidence test, did not misapprehend evidence, did not improperly use the appellant's silence, and correctly applied the principles of R. v. W.(D.).

The ground of reasonable apprehension of bias was abandoned.