Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR 22-10000188 Date: 2025-09-09 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: His Majesty the King – and – Amir Samoodi

Counsel:

• Leila Mehkeri, for the Crown
• Alan Gold, for Amir Samoodi

Heard: May 13 and December 12, 2024; February 28, March 7, and June 26, 2025

Before: R.F. Goldstein J.

Reasons for Sentence

[1] Introduction

Amir Samoodi pleaded guilty to one count of laundering the proceeds of crime contrary to s. 462.31(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, knowing that the funds were obtained as a result of the offence of fraud over $5,000. On July 28, 2025, I sentenced him to a 12-month conditional sentence and a restitution order in the amount of $150,783, with reasons to follow. What follows are my reasons for sentence.

Facts

[2] In 2017 and 2018 calls were made from Canada to members of the public in various countries. The callers indicated that they had a contract to sell shares in "Eco Plant Corporation". Eco Plant was a fictitious company, and the investment was a fraud. Mr. Samoodi's role was to set up a corporate profile and corporate bank accounts, and then bring his co-accused in. He instructed his co-accused to set up accounts and profiles. Six overseas victims of the fraud were identified and there was a total loss to the victims of $238,000.00 in U.S. funds. Mr. Samoodi was aware of the fraud, but his role was not to specifically induce victims to invest, but to take care of what might best be described as some of the logistics. His role included dealing with funds generated as a result of the fraud.

Impact on the Victims

[3] Six victims filed victim impact statements. As is typical for victims of fraud, they have suffered sleepless nights, lack of trust, emotional scarring, and, of course, financial loss. Victims of fraud are often embarrassed and frequently blame themselves when, of course, it is the perpetrators and fraudsters who are completely to blame. Those feelings of shame and embarrassment often last for years and lead to significant mental health issues.

[4] Christopher Kuhl lost US$78,000.00 over two years. He was indebted to family members who had financed his involvement. It has affected his self-confidence and mental health, and he has required therapy. Manfred Bredl lost US$362,000.00 in retirement savings. That significant loss affected his mental health and his ability to trust people. Dereck Ollsson lost US$60,997.98 in the fraudulent scheme. The impact has been traumatic. The fraud has impacted his ability to save for retirement, affected his family, and led to sleepless nights and emotional difficulties. Reggis Rego lost $59,402.62. He described various health problems he developed after the fraud, including diabetes. The fraud affected his retirement savings and other plans. Stuart Miller was defrauded of US$19,452.65. This amount represented his entire investment fund. The loss caused him considerable stress and emotion. Alexander Lang wrote in his victim impact statement something that resonates, as it is a common feeling for most victims of fraud: "My feelings went alternatively from denial to embarrassment at being so stupid and greedy to fall for the scam." Of course, and it must be stressed again, while these feelings are common the blame does not fall on the victims but on the perpetrators who are skilled at manipulation. Mr. Lang described great stress and was forced to take out a substantial mortgage to cover the loss.

Background of Mr. Samoodi

[5] Mr. Samoodi is 53 years old. He grew up in Iran. As he put it in the short biography prepared for the court, he grew up in a loving home. His father was a pharmacist, and his mother was a teacher. His parents came to Canada as refugees, and he followed as a refugee in 1990 at the age of 19. Mr. Samoodi worked in a pizza shop and eventually owned his own pizza shop for several years until he sold it in 2010. He has since worked in construction and in real estate. His wife earns a good living as a social worker. They have two young children.

[6] Mr. Samoodi's plan is eventually to move to Florida where his wife has an opportunity to earn more money as a social worker.

[7] Mr. Samoodi has a criminal record. In 2014 he was convicted of one count of making a false statement in an application, report, or other document contrary to s. 16(1)(a) of the Canada Small Business Financing Act. He received a suspended sentence and probation for 12 months and was ordered to pay $215,637.26 in restitution. While I do not have any details about this offence, the preamble to the Canada Small Business Financing Act states that it is:

An Act to increase the availability of financing for the establishment, expansion, modernization and improvement of small businesses.

[8] A brief review of this Act indicates that it sets out a scheme to support small business financing by having the government guarantee eligible loans. The offence obviously has a fraud-like component.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

[9] There are several aggravating factors here. The nature of the offence is aggravating. Although the agreed facts do not disclose that Mr. Samoodi was the main driving force behind the fraud, he was clearly integral. Any pecuniary crime involving a relatively sophisticated operation needs someone to do logistics and handle the proceeds, and Mr. Samoodi was that someone. He understood that he was dealing with proceeds of crime, specifically a fraud. It is not mitigating that he wasn't the main driving force, it is simply not as aggravating as it otherwise would be.

[10] It is also aggravating that Mr. Samoodi has a criminal record for a fraud-like offence. It may not have been the most serious offence, and it is notable that he received a suspended sentence and probation, but he was also required to pay restitution in a similar amount to the loss to the victims in this case.

[11] Section 380.1(1) of the Criminal Code sets out the aggravating factors that a sentencing court must consider in a fraud case (again, acknowledging that this is not a fraud case but rather a money laundering case where the proceeds of a fraud were dealt with):

380.1 (1) Without limiting the generality of section 718.2, where a court imposes a sentence for an offence referred to in section 380, 382, 382.1 or 400, it shall consider the following as aggravating circumstances:

(a) the magnitude, complexity, duration or degree of planning of the fraud committed was significant;

(b) the offence adversely affected, or had the potential to adversely affect, the stability of the Canadian economy or financial system or any financial market in Canada or investor confidence in such a financial market;

(c) the offence involved a large number of victims;

(c.1) the offence had a significant impact on the victims given their personal circumstances including their age, health and financial situation;

(d) in committing the offence, the offender took advantage of the high regard in which the offender was held in the community;

(e) the offender did not comply with a licensing requirement, or professional standard, that is normally applicable to the activity or conduct that forms the subject-matter of the offence; and

(f) the offender concealed or destroyed records related to the fraud or to the disbursement of the proceeds of the fraud.

[12] In my view, subsections 380.1(1)(a), (c), and (c.1) apply by analogy.

[13] There are also mitigating factors. The most important mitigating factor is that Mr. Samoodi pleaded guilty. Pleading guilty is an expression of remorse and is entitled to considerable weight. Here, the plea saved the state the resources required to put him on trial in a case that would have been complicated. A trial involved litigation risk for both sides. As I understand it, there were triable issues in relation to the fraud count.

[14] It is not mitigating that Mr. Samoodi has made efforts to make restitution to the victims. The victims lost about US$238,000.00 in the scheme, or about CDN$327,000.00 at the exchange rates prevailing at the time of the sentencing hearing. Mr. Samoodi has made several significant payments towards restitution. At the time of sentencing there was still an outstanding amount of about CDN$150,000.00.

[15] In the companion case to R. v. Cady, 2022 ONSC 5637, which I discuss below, the husband of a fraudster was convicted of possession of the proceeds of crime and money laundering. In sentencing the husband, the trial judge at para. 15 quoted the judge who sentenced the fraudster:

The recovery of some of the proceeds of crime through forfeiture is not a consideration that inures to the benefit of the offender (R. v. Cady, Sudbury Court File No. CR-20-1738, September 3, 2021, para. 50). As noted by Carnegie, J. in sentencing Karen Cady (para. 50):

...It has been represented that Ms. Cady has done all that can be expected of her by pleading guilty and conceding forfeiture of the remaining offence related proceeds seized. The rest of the loss has been consumed. There is nothing left available to take or use as compensation. That some of the property is available for forfeiture as proceeds of crime is not a mitigating circumstance - that would be like rewarding her for spending the victims' money in a partially recoverable fashion although she could not realize when or if her scheme would fail, or when or if she would be arrested. If the remaining proceeds are relevant to anything, it would be relevant to the quantum of restitution that may be ordered…

[16] I agree with that statement. It is not mitigating for an offender to pay back money that he or she was never entitled to in the first place.

Positions of the Crown and Defence and Cases in Support

[17] Ms. Mehkeri, Crown counsel, submits that an appropriate sentence in this case is 12-24 months to be served conditionally. She argues that it is at the low end of the range but that reflects the fact that Mr. Samoodi has made a significant amount of restitution and pleaded guilty. She also seeks a restitution order, and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

[18] As Ms. Mehkeri pointed out, it is difficult to find cases where a person is sentenced to a sentence for a standalone money laundering offence. Most cases involve laundering money along with other crimes. In Sheck v. Canada, 2019 BCCA 364, the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered a surrender order by the Minister of an alleged drug dealer to the United States. The requesting state alleged that Sheck had laundered millions of dollars in drug proceeds. He faced a sentence of 19 to 27 years in the United States. The person sought argued that the Minister failed to consider a number of actors, including the gross disparity between the sentence he would have faced in the United States and the sentence he would have faced had he been prosecuted in Canada. The Court suggested at para. 62 that, based on the authorities, the range would have been a conditional sentence at the low end, to 18 months to five years incarceration at the middle or higher end.

[19] In R. v. Cady, supra, Cady's wife defrauded her employer of just over $1 million. The funds went into a joint account. Cady was convicted of possession of the proceeds of crime and money laundering. Cady had a criminal record that included convictions for arson and property crimes. The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence. Cullin J. sentenced Cady – the husband of the fraudster – to 30 months incarceration and a restitution order.

[20] In R. v. Abdel, 2019 ONSC 690, the offender was convicted after a judge-alone trial of one count of the possession of proceeds of crime and one count of money laundering in relation to just under CDN$349,000.00. Funds that were the proceeds of crime were deposited into an account he controlled. He did not inquire into the origins of the funds but rather immediately disbursed the money where the victims could not access it. Abdel was a first offender. The impact on the victim was significant. None of the money was recovered. The trial judge sentenced him to 18 months in custody and a restitution order.

[21] Abdel and Cady can be distinguished, to some degree, from this case. Unlike Mr. Samoodi, Cady and Abdel did not plead guilty. The magnitude of the offence was more significant, certainly in Cady's case.

[22] Other cases where the offender was sentenced to jail after a trial are: R. v. Fletcher, 2015 ONSC 4800 (9 months jail and restitution orders totalling about $11,000.00); and R. v. Rosenfeld, 2009 ONCA 307 (a lawyer who laundered significant funds on behalf of a drug cartel, Rosenfeld received a 5 year sentence and a fine in lieu of forfeiture).

[23] Mr. Gold, for Mr. Samoodi, argues that the court should impose a suspended sentence with probation. He opposes a fine in lieu of forfeiture, to which I turn next.

Should I Impose a Fine in Lieu of Forfeiture?

[24] When a court sentences an offender and is satisfied on a balance of probabilities (upon application by Attorney General) that the offender possesses property that is proceeds of crime from a designated offence, the court shall make a forfeiture order: s. 462.37(1) of the Criminal Code.

[25] Where subsection 462.37(1) does not apply but the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the property was obtained by the commission of an offence then the court may make a forfeiture order: s. 462.37(2) of the Criminal Code. That section does not apply here.

[26] The Court shall make a forfeiture order when certain offences set out in s. 462.37(2.02) of the Criminal Code are committed (such as criminal organization offences): s. 462.37(2.01). Those subsections do not apply here as the offence of laundering the proceeds of crime is not one of the offences set out in subsection (2.02).

[27] If the court is satisfied that a forfeiture order under s. 462.37(1) should be made in respect of the property of an offender but cannot make the order (because the offender no longer has the property) then the court may order the offender to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture: s. 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code. See also: R. v. Dwyer, 2013 ONCA 34 at para. 15.

[28] Section 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code states:

462.37 (3) If a court is satisfied that an order of forfeiture under subsection (1) or (2.01) should be made in respect of any property of an offender but that the property or any part of or interest in the property cannot be made subject to an order, the court may, instead of ordering the property or any part of or interest in the property to be forfeited, order the offender to pay a fine in an amount equal to the value of the property or the part of or interest in the property. In particular, a court may order the offender to pay a fine if the property or any part of or interest in the property

(a) cannot, on the exercise of due diligence, be located;

(b) has been transferred to a third party;

(c) is located outside Canada;

(d) has been substantially diminished in value or rendered worthless; or

(e) has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without difficulty.

[29] In the case of Mr. Samoodi, the law would apply this way: Mr. Samoodi has been convicted of a designated offence (s. 462.37(01)). Forfeiture of the property is mandatory: the words "shall order that the property be forfeited". Mr. Samoodi, however, does not now have the funds that were sent to bank accounts under his control. The funds passed through his hands. Mr. Samoodi received the funds as part of the fraudulent scheme and disbursed those funds to third parties and outside the country. Thus, clauses (b), (c), and possibly (a) of s. 462.37(3) apply here. The court therefore has a discretion whether to order a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

[30] The purpose of the forfeiture provisions is to deprive offenders and criminal organizations of proceeds of crime in order to deter future crimes. The purpose of the fine in lieu of forfeiture provisions is to permit judges to impose a fine where the proceeds of crime cannot be located or have diminished in value. The principles of sentencing in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code (sentencing) apply to forfeiture proceedings where they are compatible with Part XII.2 of the Criminal Code (Proceeds of Crime): R. v. Angelis, 2016 ONCA 675 at paras. 32-33, 42. A fine in lieu of forfeiture is not punishment. The subsequent imprisonment for failure to pay is an enforcement mechanism. A fine in lieu is not, however, subject to the totality principle – which means that the principle of rehabilitation does not fully apply when considering whether to order a fine in lieu: R. v. Angelis, supra, at paras. 50-52. At the same time, restitution orders themselves form part of the general sentencing provisions of Part XXIII of the Criminal Code: R. v. Angelis, supra, at para. 68. Rehabilitation as a sentencing objective holds less sway where the offence involves a breach of trust: R. v. Angelis, supra, at para. 69. The availability of civil remedies is not a significant factor in determining whether to order a fine in lieu; neither is the ability to pay, although it is a factor when considering the amount of time set to pay the fine: R. v. Angelis, supra, paras. 74-74, 81; R. v. Lavigne, 2006 SCC 10 at paras. 37, 47-48.

[31] The objective of Part XII.2 (Proceeds of Crime) of the Criminal Code is to deal with proceeds of crime separately from punishment. The point is not to punish (which is dealt with during the main part of the sentencing) but to separate offenders from the proceeds of their crime: R. v. Lavigne, supra, at paras. 25-26.

[32] The imposition of a fine in lieu of forfeiture is not mandatory; however, the use of the words "a court may order the offender to pay a fine" indicate that a fine is discretionary. In other words, I have a discretion as to whether to order a fine. That discretion, however, is limited: R. v. Angelis, supra, at para. 72; R. v. Dwyer, supra, at para. 18; R. v. Lavigne, supra, at para. 25. The circumstance under which a sentencing court may refuse to order a fine in lieu of forfeiture is not limited to those set out in s. 437.01(3)(a) to (e). The court's discretion is limited by the purpose for which the order is to be made and may be exercised where the court cannot order forfeiture or forfeiture is not practical.

[33] Where the offender fails to pay the fine in lieu of the time set aside to pay it, s. 437.01(4) sets out the mandatory periods of incarceration in default of payment. In this case, the mandatory period of incarceration would be between two and three years: s. 473.01(4)(v).

[34] In sentencing Mr. Samoodi, I exercised my discretion not to impose a fine in lieu of forfeiture. My view at the time was that Mr. Samoodi had already made significant restitution and the potential for 2-3 years in the penitentiary if he did not pay the rest of the restitution was draconian. [1]

Principles of Sentencing and Sentence Imposed

[35] The most important principle of sentencing is that a sentence should be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. In fraud cases, the most important principles of sentencing are general and specific deterrence: R. v. Drabinsky, 2011 ONCA 582 at paras. 157-160. Although this is not a fraud case, the proceeds derived from a fraud. Mr. Samoodi had direct and specific knowledge of the fraudulent scheme. In my view, the key principles of sentencing in fraud cases apply.

[36] This was a crime that involved proceeds from fraud of well over US$200,000.00. It involved complexity and sophistication. Mr. Samoodi recruited others into the scheme. A suspended sentence and probation would, quite simply, be inadequate to denounce this crime. A suspended sentence would fail to comply with the principle of general deterrence. Mr. Samoodi has already received a suspended sentence for a fraud-like offence. Another suspended sentence would also fail to comply with the principle of specific deterrence. I have not seen any authorities where a suspended sentence and probation was imposed for either money laundering or fraud in cases involving these amounts. Indeed, in the absence of a guilty plea, I would almost certainly have imposed time in custody.

Disposition

[37] Mr. Samoodi is sentenced to 12 months, or 365 days, to be served conditionally in the community. He has credit for 5 days of custody so the warrant of committal will read 365 days less 5 days credit, 360 days left to serve.

[38] The conditional sentence will be subject to the standard statutory terms.

[39] Standard statutory conditions:

• Report to a conditional sentence supervisor within 2 days and thereafter as required
• Take counselling if required by your conditional sentence supervisor and sign releases to allow your supervisor to monitor progress
• Live at an address approved of by your supervisor and not to move within 48 hours notice to your supervisor
• Remain in Ontario and not to leave except with prior written permission of your supervisor
• Seek and maintain employment and provide documentation of employment or employment search to your supervisor; employment can be self-employment

[40] For the first 4 months of his conditional sentence Mr. Samoodi will be on house arrest. He is not to leave his residence except with the following exceptions:

First period (four months):

• House arrest – not to leave your home except under the following conditions:
  • For a medical emergency for you or a member of your household
  • Travelling to, being at or travelling from work
  • Provide your work schedule to your conditional sentence supervisor
  • One four-hour period per week at a time to be agreed upon with your supervisor in order to run personal errands

Second period (four months):

• Curfew from 10 pm to 6 am – not to leave residence except under the following conditions:
  • For a medical emergency for you or a member of your household
  • Travelling to, being at or travelling from work
  • Provide your work schedule to your conditional sentence supervisor

Third period (four months less five days):

• Standard conditions only

[41] In addition, there will be a restitution order in the amount of CDN$150,783.

R.F. Goldstein J.

Released: September 9, 2025

Footnote

[1] During the sentencing hearing I raised the question of whether a fine in lieu should be ordered given that failure to pay would potentially have meant a 2-to-3-year prison sentence for Mr. Samoodi. Counsel did not expect the question. Crown counsel later provided cases. With more time and more complete submissions (for which I do not fault counsel) I may have made a different decision. My reasons on this point, which were written when I had the luxury of more time, should therefore have very limited precedential value.