R. v. Darkwa, 2026 ONSC 43
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
DEON DARKWA
COUNSEL:
Ayushi Kiran, for the Crown
Ayderus Alawi, for Deon Darkwa
HEARD: October 27, November 13, 17, and December 15, 2025
R.F. GOLDSTEIN J.
REASONS FOR DECISION ON REMEDY FOR BREACH OF CSO
Background
1On September 25, 2025, Deon Darkwa was subject to a conditional sentence order. He was required to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. He was also subject to a house arrest and was not to be outside his residence. In fact, he was not at his residence. He was at the Courtyard Mariott Hotel at 1011 Bloor Street East in Oshawa. And, while there, he was most decidedly not keeping the peace.
2On March 18, 2025, Mr. Darkwa had pleaded guilty to one count of robbery, one count of theft of a motor vehicle, and one count of failing to comply with a release order. The Crown and defence presented a joint submission to the court. In accordance with the joint submission, I imposed the following sentence:
On the robbery count, 12 months. After taking into account pre-sentence custody, he was sentenced to a further 221 days in custody. The sentence was to be concurrent to any other sentence being served. Mr. Darkwa was serving a sentence arising out of Thunder Bay. After taking into account pre-sentence custody, he was sentenced to a further 221 days in custody.
On the fail to comply with a release order, 60 days concurrent to the robbery count.
On the theft of motor vehicle count, 12 months conditional to be served in the community, consecutive to any other sentence being served. In other words, the theft was to run consecutive to the robbery sentence.
3Thus, Mr. Darkwa’s conditional sentence was to run consecutive to his custodial sentences. I was satisfied that this was not an illegal sentence as the total amount of time I imposed was less than two years: R. v. Fice, 2005 SCC 32.
4For the first six months of the conditional sentence Mr. Darkwa was to be under house arrest; for the second six months he was to be on a curfew.
5A breach hearing was held on October 27, November 13, and November 17, 2025. On December 15, 2025, I found Mr. Darkwa to be in breach of his conditional sentence order. After hearing submissions from counsel, I terminated his conditional sentence and directed that Mr. Darkwa be committed to custody until the expiration of his sentence. I indicated that my reasons would follow. These are my reasons for terminating the conditional sentence.
Was Mr. Darkwa Subject To A Conditional Sentence?
6Mr. Darkwa was released on statutory release on August 11, 2025, although his warrant expiry date would have been some time in October on the custodial sentences. At that point, the probation and parole authorities considered that Mr. Darkwa’s conditional sentence began to run.
7I raised the issue with counsel of whether Mr. Darkwa’s conditional sentence began running on his warrant expiry date or his statutory release date. It mattered, because if he was not actually subject to a conditional sentence then he could not have breached it. The answer was not obvious to me from a combined reading of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46, the Corrections And Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20, and the Prisons and Reformatories Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-20.
8There is no doubt that when two or more custodial sentences are imposed, whether concurrently or consecutively, they are deemed to be one sentence for sentence calculation purposes: Corrections And Conditional Release Act, s. 139(1).
9Both the Corrections And Conditional Release Act, and the Criminal Code are silent as to when a conditional sentence begins to run if it is consecutive to any other sentence being served. An inmate can be released into the community under supervision from custody prior to warrant expiry in various ways: temporary absence, parole, and statutory release if sentenced to federal time (two years or more); Corrections And Conditional Release Act, Part II. An offender can be released on earned remission if sentenced to provincial time (two years less a day or less): Prisons And Reformatories Act, s. 6(1).
10The key sentencing publications published by the federal government, Sentence Calculation: A Handbook for Judges, Lawyers And Correctional Officials, and Sentence Calculation: An Explanation of the Basics do not deal with sentence calculation where a conditional sentence is consecutive to a custodial sentence.1 There is nothing in R.v. Fice, supra, to suggest that the sentences are combined (as Fice admittedly deals with credit for pre-sentence custody in a conditional sentence situation).
11Counsel has not cited any authority directly on point. Crown counsel did, however, point to cases from courts of appeal in other provinces that she argues apply by analogy. I agree. I find that the probation and parole authorities were correct that the conditional sentence began to run when Mr. Darkwa was released from custody on statutory release. I take that from the logic of provincial appellate authorities cited to me by the Crown, especially R. v. Constant (1978), 1978 2300 (MB CA), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 329, 1978 CarswellMan 50 (Man.C.A.).
12Mr. Constant was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment and one year probation. The probation order required that he not be present in Wabowden, Manitoba. He was released on earned remission. After release, but before the expiry of his warrant of committal, the RCMP arrested him in Wabowden. He argued that since the probation order was to commence upon the expiry of his sentence, and his sentence had not yet expired, he was not yet subject to the probation order. The trial judge disagreed with him and found him guilty of breach of probation.
13The Manitoba Court of Appeal, in a 3-2 decision, dismissed the appeal. Guy J.A. was caustic in his dismissal:
… the general argument put forward by counsel for the appellant was that the 15 months' sentence of imprisonment had not expired and, consequently, the probation order of Macphee Prov. J., which was to follow the expiration of the sentence, had not yet come into force. In other words, Mr. Constant's return to Wabowden following his release from imprisonment occurred before the probation order had taken effect. Put in another way, there is a blank space for hiatus between the release from incarceration and the commencement of the probation order.
I have no hesitation in saying that, in my view, this argument has no merit whatsoever. Without going into all of the ramifications of the various points raised, I think it is enough to say that, at the time in question, the Prisons and Reformatories Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-21, s. 17(1), entitled a person sentenced to imprisonment to statutory remission…
… the learned trial judge is presumed to know the law and to know that his 15-month sentence imposed upon Mr. Constant would not be 15 months but would be automatically reduced by operation of law to about 11 ½ months. The probation order would then come into effect as following the term of incarceration. It is ludicrous to suggest that there is a period of some 2 ½ months when neither the incarceration nor the probation order is in effect.
14Matas J.A. agreed in a separate judgment. He referred to s. 664(1) of the Criminal Code (now s. 732.2(1) of the Criminal Code. Section 664(1) stated at the time:
- (1) A probation order comes into force
(a) on the date on which the order is made, or
(b) where the accused is sentenced to imprisonment under paragraph 663(1) (b)otherwise than in default of payment of a fine, upon the expiration of that sentence.
15Matas J.A. noted that for the purposes of the Parole Act (now the Corrections And Conditional Release Act), expiry of sentence would mean warrant expiry such that the offender would remain under the supervision of the Parole Board. The Parole Act, however, did not determine the meaning of the expiration of a sentence under the Criminal Code nor could it change that sentence. Matas J.A. asked then asked “when did the sentence of imprisonment expire?” for the purposes of s. 664(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. He answered:
Dovetailed with the provisions of s. 664 are the bases for earlier release set out in the Prisons Act. It seems manifest to me that by virtue of that Act and in the context of ss. 663 and 664 of the Code, the expiration of the sentence of imprisonment must mean the date when the actual incarceration is ended and the prisoner is released from imprisonment.
16Section 732.2(1) of the Criminal Code has since been amended, but in my respectful view, Matas J.A.’s interpretation would still be correct under new version of the legislation. I also agree with the interpretation of Matas J.A. that being subject to parole legislation for the purpose of the Corrections And Conditional Release Act does not necessarily govern the commencement of a probation order. By extension, that should also apply to a conditional sentence. In other words, the logic of Constant is that the Criminal Code should not be interpreted such that there is a gap between the release of an offender and the commencement of a probation order or conditional sentence.
17The British Columbia Court of Appeal considered a similar situation respecting driving prohibitions in R. v. Bansal, 2017 BCCA 93, 2017 CarswellBC 515 (B.C.C.A.). Bansal had been sentenced to a penitentiary sentence with a driving prohibition to commence from the day of sentencing. When he was released on parole, however, he was advised by the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia that his driving prohibition did not commence until release, which meant it added an extra three years to what the judge had intended to impose. The ICBC (and the BC Ministry of the Attorney General) had taken the position that a driving prohibition commenced upon sentence, rather than release. In the interim, however, due to legislative changes and the effect of R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, the Ministry advised the ICBC that driving prohibitions would now run consecutively from the end of imprisonment. Bansal brought an application for leave to appeal (years later, obviously) which the Crown consented to and the Court granted. Understandably, he wanted the Court to clarify that he was subject to the shorter period of driving prohibition.
18Frankel J.A. stated:
ICBC's (Insurance Corporation Of British Columbia) concern arises from the gap that could arise if a driving prohibition does not commence until the expiration of a warrant of committal. For example, if an offender sentenced to what is referred to as "federal time" (i.e., two years or more) is released on parole, then he or she would not immediately be prohibited from driving unless the Parole Board imposed a driving prohibition as a condition of release. Such a condition, however, could not be imposed on an offender who is sentenced to what is often referred to as "provincial time" (i.e., less than two years), as early release — which normally occurs at two-thirds on the basis of earned remission — brings the sentence to an end. A gap would also occur with respect to an offender who receives a conditional sentence order or an intermittent sentence.
19Frankel J.A. pointed out that Gascon J. in dissent in Lacasse had noted that the term “upon release from imprisonment” could be confusing – presumably for the same reasons that it was confusing in Bansal and other cases – ie – was the “release from imprisonment” at warrant expiry or some earlier release date? Frankel J.A.’s view was that the best practice was to express the driving prohibition from the date of sentencing, which would avoid complicated calculations. It would avoid uncertainty about when the prohibition began. He also modified the sentence to give effect to the manifest intention of the sentencing judge.
20I respectfully agree with Frankel J.A. In my view, the logic of this case is, like Constant (not referred to by Frankel J.A.) that legislation should be interpreted to avoid the kind of “gap” he refers to.
21I also find persuasive R. v. Alberts, 2000 BCCA 628, 2000 CarswellBC 2509. On February 1, 1999, Mr. Alberts was sentenced to one year imprisonment for criminal harassment and breach of probation. While in custody he uttered a threat. On October 1, 1999, he was sentenced to two years in custody and three years’ probation for the threat. Alberts appealed. He argued that the sentence was illegal. The blending of the two sentences meant that it was now a three-year sentence: Corrections And Conditional Release Act, s. 139(1). The probation order was, therefore, invalid. The Court of Appeal rejected that argument because Mr. Alberts was on earned remission for the first offence when he was sentenced to the second offence. Hall J.A. stated at para. 5:
If, as argued by the appellant, the original warrant on the one year sentence imposed on February 1, 1999 had not expired as of the date that the sentence in this case was imposed on October 1, 1999, that is of no particular relevance since it seems clear that within the meaning of the terms of s. 139, the appellant was not subject to that sentence when he was sentenced on this offence. His earned remission made him not then subject to that original sentence. The result is that I see no illegality in the sentence imposed by the Honourable Judge Rohrmoser on October 1, 1999. I would not accede to the argument of the appellant that this was an unlawful sentence.
22From a policy point of view, it would not make sense that an offender be subject to the limited conditions (if any) of statutory release or earned remission for a period of time, and then be subject to the stricter conditions of a conditional sentence. That would offend the penal principle that restrictions are loosened as the offender is re-integrated into society: Criminal Code, s. 718(d), s. 732.1(3)(h); Corrections And Conditional Release Act, s. 3(b). It would not make sense for conditions to be loosened, and then tightened again.
23Accordingly, I find that Mr. Darkwa was subject to the conditional sentence on September 25, 2025. He was subject to a conditional sentence upon his release from custody on statutory release even though his warrant of committal had not technically expired. He was no longer serving sentence for the purpose of imposing the conditional sentence. Moreover, had I considered the issue at the time of sentencing, it would have been my manifest intention that Mr. Darkwa be subject to the conditional sentence immediately upon release rather than after a hiatus of a few months with less stringent conditions and more limited supervision. I realize that this comment includes a certain ex post facto reasoning, but I think any judge, upon due consideration, would have the same intention.
Circumstances Of The Breach
24The following is a summary of my oral reasons for judgment delivered on December 15, 2025 finding Mr. Darkwa in breach of his conditional sentence order.
25On September 25, 2025, members of the Durham Regional Police were called to the Courtyard Marriott Hotel at 1011 Bloor Street East in Oshawa. Hotel staff called the police because of a disturbance in Room 111. Officers attended at Room 111 with hotel staff at about 4:14 am. The officers could hear male and female voices arguing. The officers knocked on the door and announced “police”. A woman named Aliena Ahmed opened the door and assured the police officers that everything was fine. The officers, however, could hear a female calling for help. Based on the cry for help, the officers entered the room and in addition to Ms. Ahmed they found Deon Darkwa and his girlfriend, Shayna Dallas. Ms. Dallas was calling for help. She was distraught. She was bleeding from her nose and had blood on her face. I found that Ms. Dallas, Ms. Ahmed, and Mr. Darkwa were all engaged in some kind of loud and protracted argument in the middle of the night.
26The officers formed reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Darkwa had assaulted Ms. Dallas. They placed him under arrest. As he was being escorted out of the hotel to a police cruiser, he began to make a serious ruckus. He refused to move his legs. He refused to respond to the commands of the police officers. Although it was between 4 am and 5 am, he began shouting and screaming very loudly, both at the exit of the hotel, and in the driveway circle where a police cruiser was parked. It was only with great difficulty, and without cooperation, that Mr. Darkwa was placed in the cruiser. It subsequently came to light that Mr. Darkwa was subject to a conditional sentence order.
27Mr. Darkwa was required to reside at 32 Centrefield Drive, Courtice, Ontario. That was the home of Ms. Dallas’s grandmother, Heather Dallas. Apparently, she is an elderly woman in her 80’s and possibly unable to care for herself properly. He was under a house arrest condition on September 25, 2025. He was not permitted to be outside his residence, with certain exceptions. He was also required to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
28Mr. Darkwa’s counsel conceded that he breached his house arrest condition by being in a hotel room in Oshawa when he was supposed to be residing in Courtice. Counsel argued, however, that Mr. Darkwa had a reasonable excuse due to a gas leak in the house. I rejected that argument and found him in breach of the house arrest condition. I also found that his behaviour in the hotel, and his resistance to the police, constituted a breach of the peace: R. v. W. (L.T.), 2004 CarswellNfld 225, [2004] N.J. No. 260 (Nfld.P.C.); R. v. Smith, 2014 CarswellNS 557, 2014 NSPC 44, [2014] N.S.J. No. 399 (N.S.P.C.).
29The police later found a bag of cocaine in a drawer in the room. The room was registered in Ms. Dallas’s name. Mr. Darkwa’s conditional sentence supervisor noted that at their meetings Mr. Darkwa was escorted by Ms. Dallas, who was his girlfriend. He was living in Ms. Dallas’s grandmother’s home, with Ms. Dallas, at the time he breached his conditional sentence. The Crown did not allege that the cocaine belonged to Mr. Darkwa, and I make no finding in that regard. Although the Crown did allege that Mr. Darkwa assaulted Ms. Dallas, I was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he had done so. Although I think it likely Mr. Darkwa assaulted her, and I would be surprised if he did not know about the cocaine, I make no finding in that regard either. To be clear, I do not treat either the alleged assault or the presence of the cocaine as an aggravating factor. Neither plays a role in my decision.
Analysis
30Mr. Alawi argued that the appropriate remedy for the breach of the conditional sentence was to release Mr. Darkwa with a variation to the conditional sentence order. I could, for example, extend the house arrest terms and order that he be placed on ankle monitoring. The reality is that in order to rehabilitate Mr. Darkwa, a conditional sentence, rather than further jail, would be appropriate given his status as a young, racialized man. The purposes and principles of sentencing apply at a breach hearing and rehabilitation is still an important sentencing principle.
31Respectfully, I did not agree with counsel’s submissions. I ordered that the conditional sentence be terminated, and that Mr. Darkwa serve the remainder of his sentence in custody.
32A judge at a breach hearing as several options, as set out in s. 742.6(9) of the Criminal Code:
742.6(9) Where the court is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the offender has without reasonable excuse, the proof of which lies on the offender, breached a condition of the conditional sentence order, the court may
(a) take no action;
(b) change the optional conditions;
(c) suspend the conditional sentence order and direct
(i) that the offender serve in custody a portion of the unexpired sentence, and
(ii) that the conditional sentence order resume on the offender’s release from custody, either with or without changes to the optional conditions; or
(d) terminate the conditional sentence order and direct that the offender be committed to custody until the expiration of the sentence.
33The Court of Appeal summarized the options in R. v. Antaya, 2022 ONCA 819 at para. 8:
It is clear that the remedial options set out in s. 742.6(9) represent a sliding scale of options available to a sentencing judge, from least restrictive (take no action), to moderately restrictive (change the optional conditions or order the offender to serve a with or without a change in conditions), to most restrictive (terminate the conditional sentence and direct that the offender be committed to custody for the balance of the sentence).
34There is a presumption that an offender will serve the remainder of the sentence in jail where the offender breaches a condition: R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 at para. 39; R. v. Antaya, at para. 6. As Rosenberg J.A. stated in R. v. W.(J.) (1997), 1997 3294 (ON CA), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 18, 33 O.R. (3d) 225 (C.A.) at paras. 40-41:
In my view, Parliament intended that committal to prison be a real threat both to indicate to the offender the seriousness of violation of the terms and to reassure the community…
… this simple and expeditious procedure for dealing with violations of the order has important implications in understanding and applying the conditional sentence regime. This procedure which is set out in s. 742.6 reinforces the point that this is a sentence of imprisonment that the offender is permitted to serve in the community. It is appropriate that if the offender breaches the order, and particularly if the breach represents the commission of a further offence or endangers the community, all or a portion of the unexpired term of the sentence be served in prison.
35Ordinary sentencing principles apply to a breach of conditional sentence. In addition, the sentencing judge must also consider the nature and circumstances of the breach, the time remaining on the conditional sentence order, and the circumstances of the offender: R. v. Antaya, at para. 9.
Circumstances of Mr. Darkwa
36Mr. Darkwa is a young Black man, only 22 years old. He immigrated to this country at the age of 9. He lived with his father until he was 14. His father apparently kicked him out, but he did have some support in the community and was able to finish high school. I’m told that he did experience some structural racism in school and employment. No pre-sentence report was ordered, as there was a joint submission before the court. When asked if he had anything to say before I sentenced him, Mr. Darkwa said that he was very remorseful and would make sure he never did anything like that again. At this point, there are obviously very good reasons to doubt his sincerity.
37Mr. Darkwa has a significant criminal record. It includes two youth entries:
On January 8, 2020, he was convicted of failure to comply with a recognizance. He was placed on probation for 12 months.
On May 21, 2020, he was convicted of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code. He received credit for 199 days of pre-sentence custody plus 3 months open custody, 45 days community supervision, and probation for 12 months.
38Mr. Darkwa had the following adult entries prior to his guilty pleas before me:
On August 19, 2025, Mr. Darkwa was convicted in Thunder Bay of possession of a scheduled substance for the purpose of trafficking. He received 1 day in custody and probation for 12 months in light of 120 days of pre-sentence custody.
On March 12, 2025, he was convicted (also in Thunder Bay) of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code. He received 228 days and probation for two years, in addition to credit for 501 days of pre-sentence custody.
Also on March 12, 2025, Mr Darkwa was convicted in Thunder Bay of failure to comply with a recognizance. He received 30 days and probation for two years.
39To repeat, Mr. Darkwa pleaded guilty before me to the following offences:
On the robbery count, 12 months concurrent to any other sentence being served. Mr. Darkwa was serving a sentence arising out of Thunder Bay. After taking into account pre-sentence custody, he was sentenced to a further 221 days in custody.
On the fail to comply with a release order, 60 days concurrent to the robbery count.
On the theft of motor vehicle count, 12 months conditional to be served in the community, consecutive to any other sentence being served. In other words, the theft was to run consecutive to the robbery sentence.
Aggravating And Mitigating Factors
40There are two mitigating factors in this case. The first is Mr. Darkwa’s youth and status as a young, racialized man. The other is that through counsel Mr. Darkwa admitted to one of the breaches, that of failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. That mitigation is limited, however, as the Crown was still required to call the totality of the evidence. I certainly did not hear an admission or remorse from Mr. Darkwa himself.
41I am aware that Mr. Darkwa has been in custody since his arrest. Section 742.6(12) of the Criminal Code provides that the conditional sentence continues running where an offender is ordered detained pursuant to s. 515(6). That said, as far as I am aware, Mr. Darkwa has not had a bail hearing – undoubtedly because his counsel realistically determined that he would be very unlikely to receive bail. In my view, that constitutes a functional detention order for the purposes of a conditional sentence: R. v. Menezes, 2023 ONCA 838 at paras. 47-52. Accordingly, I find that his conditional sentence continued to run upon his arrest. I decline to grant Mr. Darkwa credit for time spent in custody as a mitigating factor. I ask that this decision be provided to the correctional authorities for the purpose of sentence calculation.
42On the other hand, there are significant aggravating factors in this case. Mr. Darkwa was less than two months into his conditional sentence. He was flagrantly breaching his house arrest condition, and did not even attempt to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. His criminal record and disregard of court orders are also significant aggravating factors.
Principles of Sentencing
43The key principle of sentencing is that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Proportionality is, of course, important in any kind of sentencing proceeding. I see nothing disproportionate about Mr. Darkwa serving the remainder of his sentence in custody. One year in custody would have been a fit sentence in any event for Mr. Darkwa, given the circumstances of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. This is also in accordance with the principles of restraint and totality.
44General and specific deterrence also play a role here. Obviously, given Mr. Darkwa’s criminal record and history of breaching court orders, a measure of specific deterrence is required. As for general deterrence, those who are given the privilege – and it is a privilege – of a sentence to be served in the community must understand that willful breaches will result in meaningful sanctions.
45With regard to rehabilitation, at this point I see little evidence that Mr. Darkwa is interested in rehabilitation. I have heard nothing about any form of legitimate employment or education. On the other hand, I know that he has been involved in guns and drugs. He has shown disregard for court orders, having three convictions for breaching bail orders. He could not go more than six weeks without breaching his conditional sentence in this case. He is clearly on course to become a professional, full-time criminal. I say that without making any sort of finding about being in a hotel room with two women, one of whom had been assaulted, and a bag of cocaine, rather than in his residence as required by his conditional sentence. I certainly hope that Mr. Darkwa can reverse course, but he has shown no sign of it just yet. I therefore give the principle of rehabilitation little weight.
Time Left On The CSO
46Mr. Darkwa’s sentence began running, as noted, on August 11, 2025. He was arrested on September 25, 2025, six weeks later. Mr. Darkwa will basically have 10 ½ months left to serve his sentence. While I take that into account, I give it little weight. As I have already noted, a one-year sentence in custody would also have been a fit sentence on the taking auto without consent count. Mr. Darkwa’s predicament is entirely of his own making. I see no injustice in terminating the sentence and having Mr. Darkwa serve a further 10 ½ months in custody.
Conclusion
47Mr. Darkwa was given a break when he was sentenced to a conditional sentence. The joint submission reflected his guilty plea, and his lower level of culpability compared to the other individuals involved in the car theft. It was also a recognition that he saved the state resources by pleading guilty and accepting responsibility for his offences. In the absence of a joint submission, I might well have imposed a sentence of one year in custody. Regrettably, Mr. Darkwa abused the trust that was placed in him by breaching the conditional sentence terms in very short order.
48I must consider whether Mr. Darkwa should serve a portion of the remainder of his sentence in custody with a portion in the community. Regrettably, I have no confidence that Mr. Darkwa will abide by any court orders, or, realistically, the criminal law generally. He has already managed to accumulate two convictions for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm. One, admittedly, was as a youth and carries less weight but Mr. Darkwa’s inability to stay away from guns is obviously problematic. The adult gun offence, and the drug offence, both took place in Thunder Bay. There is no evidence that Mr. Darkwa had any legitimate purpose in being in Thunder Bay. As well, Mr. Darkwa has three times been convicted of breaching bail orders. Again, one carries less weight as it is a youth conviction, but it is still a very unfortunate pattern. None of this inspires confidence. It means, quite simply, that Mr. Darkwa cannot be trusted to comply with court orders. Under those circumstances, it is very difficult for me to understand how he can possibly be released yet again and trusted to abide by conditions, even strict conditions with electronic monitoring.
49It is critical that the public have confidence in the administration of justice. It is my duty as a sentencing judge to impose sentences that will maintain that confidence. Sometimes that means imposing a conditional sentence. Sometimes it means imposing a jail sentence. In my respectful view, releasing Mr. Darkwa yet again would only undermine confidence in the administration of justice. How would the average citizen react to yet another release into the community for a man who continues to breach court orders? As Armstrong J.A. stated in R. v. Filippellii (2002), 2002 41455 (ON CA), 169 C.C.C. (3d) 217, 2002 CarswellOnt 3377 (Ont.C.A.) at para. 26, “It is important to maintain the integrity of the conditional sentence regime. This is accomplished when the community understands that conditional sentences are not just another form of probation.”
50Accordingly, I directed that Mr. Darkwa’s conditional sentence be terminated, and he serve the remainder of his sentence in custody.
R.F. Goldstein J.
Released: January 12, 2026
CITATION: R. v. Darkwa, 2026 ONSC 43
COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-10000124-00SR
DATE: 20260112
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
DEON DARKWA
REASONS FOR DECISION ON REMEDY FOR BREACH OF CSO
R.F. Goldstein J.