D. King

The applicants, a youth charged with assault and his paralegal, brought applications seeking a declaration that the paralegal could represent the youth in Youth Court.

Prior to the hearing of the applications, the Crown withdrew the underlying assault charge.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the applications for mootness, finding that there was no longer any criminal process against the youth and no good reason to depart from the normal practice of declining to adjudicate moot matters.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment of over $467,000 entered against her in an action for unpaid construction materials.

The defendant claimed she was unknowingly made a director of her son's construction company and had no involvement in its operations.

Applying the five-factor test under Rule 19.08, the court found she had an arguable defence and a plausible explanation for her default, having relied on her son's assurances.

Despite significant delay in bringing the motion, the court balanced the factors and set aside the default judgment, ordering the defendant to pay $2,000 in costs thrown away to the plaintiffs.

The offender, a 19-year-old first offender, was convicted of robbery, being disguised with intent, and dangerous driving following a home invasion where he and three others forced their way into an apartment while masked and armed with knives.

He later fled police, driving dangerously.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of the home invasion against the offender's youth, lack of record, and supportive family.

The court imposed a total sentence of 3 years in custody, prioritizing denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed convictions for mischief and breach of probation entered after guilty pleas, arguing that he had been not criminally responsible at the time of the offences due to mental illness.

He sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence suggesting a reasonable probability that he might have met the criteria for a defence under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

Applying the Palmer test for fresh evidence, the court held the appellant failed to demonstrate due diligence and failed to show the proposed evidence could reasonably have affected the result.

The psychiatrist’s letter did not connect the appellant’s mental condition to the specific conduct underlying the offences and did not undermine the record demonstrating awareness of wrongdoing.

The application to introduce fresh evidence and the conviction appeal were dismissed.

The accused applied to quash a production order and exclude hospital medical records and blood alcohol test results obtained following a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The defence argued that police improperly obtained the records through a production order under s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code rather than a search warrant and that the Information to Obtain was insufficient and misleading.

The court held that the statutory standard for a production order was constitutionally valid and materially equivalent to the search warrant standard, and that the issuing justice could reasonably have been satisfied that the statutory prerequisites were met.

Any inaccuracies or omissions in the Information to Obtain were found to be inconsequential and not misleading.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought to elicit from its witness in chief that she had given a previous inconsistent statement because she was afraid of the accused.

The defence objected, arguing this constituted impermissible oath-helping.

The court ruled that eliciting the fact of a previous inconsistent statement in chief does not constitute oath-helping, as it detracts from rather than bolsters the witness's truthfulness.

However, the court held that the explanation for the previous statement should generally wait for cross-examination and re-examination.

The Crown was permitted to elicit the fact of the previous statements and the timing of the witness's change of heart.