ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
— AND —
MICHAEL MEINZINGER
Before: Justice C.A. PARRY
Heard on: June 17 and September 9, 2021
Reasons for Judgment released on: December 23, 2021
Counsel: Fedak-Tarnopolsky, A. .................................................................... counsel for the Crown Ritter, B........................................................................ counsel for the accused Meinzinger
PARRY J.:
I. Introduction
I. Introduction
1Mr. Meinzinger has pleaded guilty to the offences Careless Storage of a Firearm (a shotgun), contrary to s. 86 of the Criminal Code and to Possessing a Loaded Restricted handgun, contrary to s. 95(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
2This decision outlines the reasons for the sentence that will be imposed.
II. The Circumstances of the Offence
II. The Circumstances of the Offence
3Mr. Meinzinger was a registered gun owner. He lawfully owned a number of weapons. He kept those weapons at his home at 32 Devonglen Drive in the City of Kitchener. For the purposes of the plea, the defence asserted, and the Crown did not dispute, that Mr. Meinzinger ordinarily stored his guns properly.
4The offences before the court occurred on October 28, 2018, three years ago. In the pre-sentence report, Mr. Meinzinger’s mother suggests that at the time of the offences, Mr. Meinzinger had recently broken up with C.C. A week prior to the incident, Mr. Meinzinger had expressed suicidal ideations to C.C., who had begun a relationship with another man. The facts tendered at the sentencing do not, however, elaborate upon whether Mr. Meinzinger expressly attributed either the break-up or C.C.’s new relationship as the impetus for his suicidal ideations.
5On the day of the incident, Mr. Meinzinger again expressed suicidal ideations to C.C. Again, the facts do not disclose if Mr. Meinzinger expressed to C.C. the reason for his suicidal ideations. In particular, the facts do not disclose that Mr. Meinzinger expressly blamed his suicidal state on the demise of his relationship with C.C., nor do the facts disclose that Mr. Meinzinger was seeking to reunite with C.C. when writing these test messages. Similarly, there is no suggestion in the evidence presented to me that Mr. Meinzinger expressly used his suicidal ideations as an ultimatum. Although not expressing the reason for his despondency, he graphically expressed the means by which he wanted to die. He sent her texts containing photographs of him driving around with a black handgun. He also indicated in text messages that he wanted to find police officers. His comments indisputably implied that he wanted the police to be the agents of his death. One text message read, “The cops is what I want, this way I’m going down with a fight!”. C.C. understandably feared that Mr. Meinzinger was suicidal and that he wanted to commit “suicide by police.” She relayed those concerns to the police.
6Having received C.C.’s report, the police attended at Mr. Meinzinger’s residence. In Mr. Meinzinger’s bedroom, they discovered that Mr. Meinzinger’s gun safe had been left open. Incidentally, this gun case had never been bolted to the floor. The police also located one 12-gauge shotgun, two 22-calibre rifles and ammunition belonging to the respective firearms. They also found the empty gun case in which Mr. Meinzinger’s handgun was ordinarily stored. As the police would soon confirm, Mr. Meinzinger had taken this handgun with him from the house before embarking with it on a drive. As already noted, Mr. Meinzinger lawfully owned these guns and he asserts that, apart from the incident itself, he ordinarily safely stored these guns with the appropriate trigger locks in his gun safe. Nevertheless, Mr. Meinzinger acknowledges that when he departed his home with his handgun and in a suicidal state, he left his remaining firearms unsafely stored.
7The police pinged Mr. Meinzinger’s cell phone. The ping suggested that Mr. Meinzinger was only a few blocks away in the vicinity of a small plaza in the neighbourhood at the corner of Old Country Drive and Country Hills Road. The police sent several units to the area, including an Emergency Response Unit, and contained the area. They soon located Mr. Meinzinger’s pickup truck parked in the small plaza.
8Mr. Meinzinger departed the plaza and drove down Country Hills Road, in the direction of his home. The police had deployed stop sticks on the road, however, and were thus able to flatten Mr. Meinzinger’s tires and stop his truck a couple of blocks away at 93 Old Country Drive. There is no suggestion in the facts before me that the police were actively pursuing Mr. Meinzinger or that he was actively fleeing them. Indeed, there is no suggestion that the police had ever signaled their presence or signaled for Mr. Meinzinger to stop.
9In any event, once they succeeded in stopping his truck, the police quickly arrested Mr. Meinzinger for Unsafe Storage of a Firearm. They also arrested him under the Mental Health Act, understandably forming grounds to believe that a mental illness had made him a danger to himself or others.
10Following the arrest, the police located the black handgun in the centre console of the truck. The gun contained a loaded magazine. However, there was no bullet in the chamber. There were also other magazines inside the truck.
11The regulations did not permit Mr. Meinzinger to travel with the handgun in the manner in which he did. It is on that basis that the Crown alleges, and the defence concedes, that Mr. Meinzinger contravened s. 95(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. When the facts were tendered by the parties, Mr. Meinzinger maintained that he was in fact suicidal at the time of the incident, that he had no intention of harming anyone other than himself, and that he did not behave in a confrontational manner with the police upon his arrest. The Crown does not challenge any of these contentions.
12Based upon the facts as presented to me, I am prepared to accept on a balance of probabilities that Mr. Meinzinger was in fact suicidal and that his suicidal state was causally linked to his offending conduct. I am also prepared to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that by expressing his suicidal ideations to his ex-girlfriend, he exposed her to trauma by shouldering her with the responsibility of addressing his mental health crisis. However, I am unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to harass her, manipulate her, or inflict upon her feelings of guilt for his mental breakdown and possible demise. The facts as presented do not allow me to draw the inference that his thoughts were sufficiently ordered and clear to form those malevolent intentions. On the other hand, I am prepared to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Meinzinger intended to inspire in the police an apprehension that they might be drawn into a violent conflict with Mr. Meinzinger. This was the means by which Mr. Meinzinger hoped to achieve his own death.
III. The Circumstances of the Offender
III. The Circumstances of the Offender
13Mr. Meinzinger is now 38 years old.
14He has had no prior involvement with the Waterloo Regional Police Service. He has one entry on his criminal record, an Over 80 conviction in 2010 stemming from an arrest by the OPP.
15Mr. Meinzinger was raised in a stable home environment by parents who provided love and support to Mr. Meinzinger and his brother.
16Mr. Meinzinger struggled with ADHD as a child. Consequently, he left school after grade 9. However, he obtained suitable skills to maintain steady employment over the last three decades. Currently he earns a good wage doing work he enjoys.
17Mr. Meinzinger has been involved in four past significant intimate relationships. One of those relationships produced his 8-year old son. After a lengthy court battle, Mr. Meinzinger and his mother recently obtained joint custody of his son. His son resides at both his and his mother’s home.
18Approximately one year ago (two years after the offences before the court) Mr. Meinzinger commenced an intimate relationship with Ms. Crabbe, a person with whom he had been friends for eleven years. Ms. Crabbe reports that their relationship is positive and stable. She has formed a strong bond with Mr. Meinzinger’s son and she hopes to maintain a long and committed relationship with Mr. Meinzinger. Mr. Meinzinger’s mother also voiced the belief that Ms. Crabbe has had a mature and stabilizing influence upon Mr. Meinzinger.
19Neither Ms. Crabbe, nor Mr. Meinzinger’s life-long friend, Mr. Chisolm, nor his mother describe Mr. Meinzinger as having any issues with anger, alcohol, or violence.
20The sources consulted for the pre-sentence report revealed that at the time of his apparent break-down, Mr. Meinzinger was enduring a number of stressful situations. Mr. Meinzinger’s relationship with C.C. had recently ended. In addition, his father was suffering from serious health issues. He was also was in the midst of a contentious custody battle with the mother of his son. Mr. Meinzinger’s mother reported that Mr. Meinzinger had previously struggled at times to cope with anxiety and stress, but she had never known him to behave in a suicidal manner or to over-react to a situation. The sources consulted for the presentence report unanimously expressed the view that Mr. Meinzinger became overwhelmed by the stresses he was currently experiencing and behaved in a manner completely out of character for him.
21Mr. Meinzinger was released on his own recognizance on October 30, 2018. Since his release, he resumed his employment and achieved stability. His recognizance forbids any contact with C.C. and forbids him from being anywhere near her. The recognizance also forbids him from possessing weapons. There is no suggestion that he has breached any of these terms in the three years since his release.
IV. The Position of the Crown
IV. The Position of the Crown
22The Crown seeks a custodial sentence of two years less a day. The Crown agrees that a conditional sentence is at least theoretically available, but the Crown opposes one.
23In support of its position, the Crown contends that I must take into account a number of aggravating factors.
24First, the Crown contends Mr. Meinzinger’s texts contain threats to engage the police in conflict. In this way, they do not simply involve ideations of harm but also threats intended to provoke the police to harm him.
25Second, the Crown contends that Mr. Meinzinger’s texts harassed and manipulated C.C. and thereby constituted intimate partner violence.
26Third, the Crown submits that the fact that the handgun was loaded is an aggravating factor.
27The Crown acknowledges that various mitigating factors exist in this case. In particular, the Crown concedes that Mr. Meinzinger should receive credit for his guilty plea. The Crown also agrees that Mr. Meinzinger has only one unrelated offence on his criminal record and that collateral sources suggest his offending conduct was out of character. The Crown further acknowledges that Mr. Meinzinger has not reoffended since being released on bail three years ago. The Crown also takes no issue with the evidence suggesting Mr. Meinzinger has continued employment and found stability in his personal life.
28However, the Crown further contends that certain significant mitigating factors are absent in this case.
29First, the Crown argues that the evidence fails to establish that Mr. Meinzinger suffered from a mental illness, much less one that contributed to the commission of the offences in question. The Crown takes this position while simultaneously declining to take issue with the veracity of Mr. Meinzinger’s suicidal ideations. In other words, the Crown appears to suggest that, although Mr. Meinzinger was suicidal, his suicidal condition does not constitute a mental illness. At one point the Crown argued that Mr. Meinzinger’s motivation for committing the offences was “just as likely if not more likely” the desire to harass and manipulate C.C. than bring actual harm to himself. In response to this submission, I asked the Crown whether it was challenging the veracity of his claimed suicidal intentions. In response, the Crown indicated that it did not take issue with the fact Mr. Meinzinger was suicidal. However, the Crown took issue with the suggestion that Mr. Meinzinger was mentally ill at the time he was suicidal.
30The Crown argues that denunciation and general deterrence are the primary sentencing principles that must govern the determination of a just and proportionate sentence.
31The Crown relied upon the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision of R. v. MacDonald, 2014 NSCA 106. In that case, the accused was an oil industry worker who maintained residences in Calgary and Halifax. He was also a gun collector who traveled with firearms to events inside and outside of Canada. His collection included a 9mm Beretta handgun that was registered in Alberta but not in Nova Scotia. In 2009, the accused was the subject of a noise complaint in his Halifax condominium. He responded with profanity and police were called. The accused responded to police with further profanity. Backup arrived and police kicked at the accused's door until he answered holding his loaded Beretta. He claimed he had been in the process of packing the firearm into a suitcase. The accused was disarmed after a struggle and was arrested. The accused was convicted of careless use of a weapon, dangerous possession of a firearm, and possession of a loaded restricted weapon. Using a reasonable hypothetical situation, the Court of Appeal concluded that the mandatory 3 year prison term applicable in the case violated section 12 of the Charter. The court observed that the accused had no prior criminal record and was an otherwise law-abiding and industrious citizen. In their view, a three-year sentence would jeopardize his present employment. However, the court also observed that the circumstances of the offence involved a dangerous situation of a struggle between police and a homeowner wielding a loaded handgun. Based on the jurisprudence and the circumstances, the court concluded that a two-year sentence would have been appropriate at the time of sentencing. However, having regard to his antecedents and having regard to his completion of a two-year term of probation and the five-year period in which he remained in jeopardy without further offending, the court imposed an 18-month period of custody and stayed the enforcement of that sentence.
32The Crown also relied upon the case of R. v. Smickle, 2014 ONCA 49. In that case, Smickle was convicted of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm. He was not a licensed owner of the firearm in question. Smickle, age 27, was alone in his cousin's apartment. He decided to pose with a loaded handgun for a photograph for his Facebook page. At the same time, an emergency police task force was outside the apartment ready to execute a search warrant for illegal firearms in relation to the cousin. Police broke down the door and caught the offender with the firearm in his hand. He was arrested immediately. The Court of Appeal concluded that the sentencing judge made several findings of fact that were not supported by the record, resulting in imposition of a wholly inadequate sentence. The Court concluded that there was no evidence about how the offender came into possession of the handgun, or for how long. It could not be said that he was alone at all times in possession of the gun. There was no evidence of his intent in respect of the gun and no evidence his possession was solely for the purpose of taking a photograph with his laptop. It was erroneous to characterize his conduct as adolescent preening given the offender's age and the moral culpability and danger associated with his conduct. He had a loaded cocked gun in his hand and was engaged in conduct that posed a serious and immediate risk to others. Even having regard to the personal circumstances of the offender, a sentence approaching two years less a day would have been appropriate absent a mandatory minimum sentence. Smickle had served the equivalent of 7 months custody prior to being sentenced. The sentencing judge imposed a 5-month conditional sentence, which Smickle served long before the appeal. Smickle therefore received a total credit of 12 months for time already served. Relying upon the principles of general deterrence and denunciation, the Court of Appeal imposed a sentence of two years less a day, but stayed the enforcement of that sentence.
33The Crown argues that the case before me is distinguishable from the Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Fabbro, 2021 ONCA 494.
34Mr. Fabbro was 36 years old at that time and in the throes of a heroin addiction. His domestic situation had broken down. He wanted to end his life. In the month leading up to the offences, he went to the hospital three times due to suicidal ideations, but was turned away each time. On the day of the incident, the police received information that the appellant had been seen leaving a residence with a gun and that he might harm himself. At the time, the appellant was wanted on a surety revocation warrant related to outstanding firearm charges. He was also bound by a recognizance not to possess firearms. Shortly after receiving the call, the police located the appellant, who was driving a truck. They initiated a traffic stop. The appellant pulled into a driveway and put a shotgun in his mouth. The police officer on the scene called for backup. More police officers, the Emergency Services Unit, and a negotiator arrived on the scene. The buildings in the vicinity were evacuated. The appellant spoke to the police officers. He was emotional and upset. He repeatedly said that he did not want to hurt the police or anyone else, only himself. He also said he had a tough life, was still using heroin but wanted to stop, did not want to go to jail, and did not know if he wanted to live. After a standoff lasting several hours, Mr. Fabbro tossed the gun out of his car. It was a sawed-off shotgun. The police arrested Mr. Fabbro for various offences and also arrested him pursuant to the Mental Health Act. After his eventual release from custody, Mr. Fabbro engaged in substantial treatment for both his addiction and mental health issues. The appeal panel concluded that there existed a causal connection between Mr. Fabbro’s addiction and mental health issues, and his offending conduct. They relied upon the content of the pre-sentence reports, hospital records, medical reports, and post-arrest treatment records. The court concluded that the primary principles of general deterrence and denunciation were attenuated by a causal connection between Mr. Fabbro’s dual disorders and the offences and Mr. Fabbro’s post-arrest rehabilitation. The court therefore concluded that a conditional sentence could satisfy the principles of deterrence and denunciation. In doing so, the court observed that, “Imposing a custodial sentence was likely to have a serious negative effect on the appellant's progress and would not serve the genuine societal interest.” The court therefore imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day.
35The Crown notes that Mr. Fabbro had a documented history of mental health and addiction issues, whereas Mr. Meinzinger does not. The Crown further notes that Mr. Fabbro had engaged in significant post-offence therapy, whereas Mr. Meinzinger has not. In essence, the Crown argues that a transient period of suicidal ideation does not, in and of itself, constitute a mental health issue that could serve as a mitigating factor. The Crown appears to suggest that Fabbro requires that before a mental illness can be relied upon as a mitigating factor, the accused must prove that a chronic condition caused the offending conduct and prove that the offender achieved a sustained recovery from that chronic condition.
36The Crown also notes that Mr. Fabbro took pains to inform the police that he did not intend to harm them with his shotgun, only himself. The Crown also noted that, although Mr. Fabbro possessed ammunition for the gun, he had not yet loaded the gun prior to being stopped by the police.
V. The Defence Position
V. The Defence Position
37The defence seeks a conditional sentence of two years less a day in duration.
38The defence acknowledges the seriousness of the offence but takes issue with any suggestion that Mr. Meinzinger intentionally harassed or manipulated C.C. However, the defence concedes that Mr. Meinzinger’s behaviour undoubtedly had a profoundly negative impact on C.C., even if that impact was neither intended nor contemplated at the time of the suicidal ideations. The defence also concedes that Mr. Meinzinger’s conduct likely caused great alarm in the police officers assigned to diffuse the situation.
39The defence asks that I look at all of the agreed facts and, on a balance of probabilities, accept as genuine Mr. Meinzinger’s suicidal state of mind. In doing so, the defence also relies upon the input from collateral sources in the pre-sentence report, who opined that Mr. Meinzinger became overwhelmed at that point in his life by a number of stressors, which included a protracted custody battle with the mother of his child, the illness of his father, and the demise of his relationship with C.C. To a lesser degree, the defence also relies upon the fact that the police subjectively formed grounds to apprehend Mr. Meinzinger under the Mental Health Act.
40The defence also notes that Mr. Meinzinger ultimately cooperated with his arrest and did not attempt to carry out any suicidal ideations.
41The defence further relies upon the fact that, apart from the manner in which Mr. Meinzinger used and stored the firearms on the date of the offence, Mr. Meinzinger had otherwise lawfully possessed and stored the firearms.
42The defence submits that the offending conduct was therefore entirely the by-product of a transient mental health crisis which culminated in the offending conduct on the date of his arrest.
43Other mitigating factors cited by the defence include his guilty plea, his genuine remorse, the fact that collateral sources indicate that his offending conduct is out of character, and the fact that he regained stability following his release from custody and has not reoffended or violated his bail since being released about three years ago.
44The defence also points out that Mr. Meinzinger is now one of the custodial parents of his 8-year-old son, is in a new stable and loving relationship with someone he has known for over a decade, and is steadily employed in a job he thoroughly enjoys.
45The defence disagrees with the contention that the Fabbro decision is distinguishable. The defence contends that while the facts in each case differ, I can nevertheless properly infer from the admitted facts that Mr. Meinzinger’s conduct was the product of a transient mental health crisis and that he has since regained stability in his life. The defence therefore contends that I can consider that transient mental health crisis as a mitigating factor. Consequently, the defence contends that the principles of deterrence and denunciation can be met by the imposition of a conditional sentence. Given Mr. Meinzinger’s proven stability over the last three years, the defence further contends that the imposition of a conditional sentence would not endanger the safety of the community.
VI. Analysis and Disposition
VI. Analysis and Disposition
46I accept that Mr. Meinzinger’s words and actions undoubtedly had a profound impact upon C.C. and upon the police tasked with defusing the situation. The impact upon C.C., whether intended or not, constitutes a statutorily aggravating factor. The likely impact upon responding police officers also constitutes an aggravating factor, in my view. While I do not have sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Meinzinger intended those profound impacts, the impacts themselves are aggravating. The intention to cause those impacts is simply another aggravating factor that the evidence fails to establish.
47I further accept that Mr. Meinzinger’s actions created a very dangerous and volatile situation. Mr. Meinzinger put himself in danger, the police in danger, and members of the public in danger.
48However, as already noted, I am prepared to accept on a balance of probabilities that Mr. Meinzinger was for a brief period in his life experiencing suicidal ideations. He first voiced those ideations to C.C. a week before the date of the offence. Those ideations were clearly manifest when he drove around his neighbourhood with a loaded gun and he gave voice to his intentions in text messages to C.C. It is clear that C.C. genuinely believed him to be suicidal. As a result, she contacted the police. It is also clear that the police who arrested him subjectively formed reasonable grounds to come to the same belief prior to apprehending him under the Mental Health Act. Furthermore, collateral sources that have long-standing and close relationships with Mr. Meinzinger posit that he became overwhelmed by a number of significant stressors at the time of the offences. I would further note that, if his intentions were solely to harass and obtain the attention of his former girlfriend, a photograph of an unloaded weapon would have sufficed. Instead, he loaded his weapon, left his home and sat in a parking lot nearby and talked in graphic detail about his desire to be killed by the police. Therefore, just as C.C. and the police did, I accept as genuine Mr. Meinzinger’s purported desire to be killed by the police. Thankfully, that desire subsided when the police intervened and arrested him.
49In my view, the suicidal episode constituted a mental health crisis. While I appreciate that Mr. Meinzinger did not suffer from a chronic mental illness, and while I appreciate that he has not proffered an expert opinion to substantiate the veracity of his expressed intentions, I am satisfied that the evidence tendered provides a sufficient basis from which I can conclude on a balance of probabilities that his mental health crisis was real. I think it a matter of common sense and human experience that not all suicides are ones that we see coming. And yet, in my view, it is reasonable to conclude that suicides, generally speaking [1], are in one way, shape, or form, the product of mental illness, whether situational or chronic.
50I therefore conclude that there existed a causal relationship between Mr. Meinzinger’s transitory mental health crisis and his offending conduct. Mr. Meinzinger’s use of a handgun on the day of the offence was intrinsically intertwined with his suicidal intent. Likewise, the careless way in which he left his other lawfully owned weapons laying about his room is intrinsically intertwined with his suicidal state and his ultimate decision to load one of his weapons and leave the house.
51While the facts in the Fabbro case differ in some respects from Mr. Meinzinger’s case, the principles articulated in the case are instructive. In my view, the Fabbro decision stands for the proposition that where there exists evidence of a link between a mental health (and/or addiction) issue and the commission of a criminal offence, that link serves as a mitigating factor. The link serves as a mitigating factor because it lessens the degree of the offender’s moral blameworthiness for their behaviour, which in turn lessens the ability for punishment to deter the general public or to serve as an expression of society’s denunciation of the offending conduct. Therefore, I conclude that the causal link between Mr. Meinzinger’s mental health crisis and his offending conduct to some extent attenuates Mr. Meinzinger’s moral blameworthiness for his offending behaviour.
52I am also of the view that Fabbro stands for the proposition that, when a weapons offence is motivated by an intention to commit suicide, the seriousness of the offence is also attenuated. The court in Fabbro noted, “The appellant had the gun because he intended to use it to commit suicide. An act of attempted suicide is the ultimate plea for help. It does not cry out for a denunciatory sentence.” In R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, the majority of the court recognized that section 95 of the Code, “captures a wide array of conduct, ranging from the "true crime" end of the spectrum to conduct that resembles a licensing infraction.” In my view, the Fabbro decision stands for the proposition that when there exists a link between a mental health crisis and the commission of a weapons offence, the offence ought to be seen as existing further away from the “true crime” end of the spectrum than would otherwise be the case if the offender’s actions were not linked to a mental health crisis. I have concluded that Mr. Meinzinger was suicidal and that this suicidal state gave rise to his unlawful conduct. It follows that Mr. Meinzinger’s conduct falls further away from the true crime end of the spectrum than it otherwise would if it did not occur during his mental health crisis.
53In summary, the fact that Mr. Meinzinger’s unlawful use and storage of his weapons stemmed from his mental health crisis makes his offending conduct somewhat less serious that it would be otherwise, and it reduces his moral blameworthiness for that conduct.
54In my view, the facts in the case before me are more comparable to the Fabbro decision than to either the MacDonald decision or the Smickle decision.
55Mr. MacDonald presented as a hothead whose rowdiness gave rise to a noise complaint. When police came to his residence to speak to him about the noise complaint, he came to the door armed with a gun. When they tried to disarm him, he engaged in a struggle with them while holding his loaded handgun. While some aspect of his offending conduct could be considered a breach of regulatory provisions, other aspects involved engaging in a violent struggle while armed with a loaded gun. His offending conduct also had no link with any kind of mental health crisis. Also, Mr. MacDonald proceeded to trial, so he did not have the mitigating effect of a guilty plea.
56In the Smickle case, Mr. Smickle held a loaded and prohibited firearm when the police raided his cousin’s apartment. He was not a licensed gun owner. He was found at the scene of a crime during the execution of a search warrant that authorized the search for an illegal weapons cache. There was no evidentiary basis for his claim that he was only holding this loaded weapon to take pictures of himself. He was immersed in a criminal environment committing a criminal act as the police knocked down the door to investigate a crime. He was not mentally ill. He was not suicidal.
57In addition to the mitigating factor of Mr. Meinzinger’s mental health crisis, the evidence further establishes that Mr. Meinzinger has stabilized, has the support of loving friends and family, has convinced another court that he is a fit and proper custodial parent for his young child, and has obeyed the terms of his bail since his release three years ago. He also continues to be a fully employed and contributing member of our society.
58I accept that Mr. Meinzinger’s conduct was out of character. I also accept that he is sincerely remorseful for his behaviour on October 28, 2018. His guilty plea not only serves as an expression of his remorse, it also saves C.C. and others from testifying and reliving what was surely a traumatic event for a number of people.
59Having considered Mr. Meinzinger’s generally prosocial life prior to the offence date and the resumption of his prosocial life since the offence date, I am satisfied that Mr. Meinzinger poses no continuing threat to the safety of the community.
60Despite the seriousness of the offences and despite the aggravating factors present in this case, the mitigating factors present in this case persuade me that a conditional sentence of two years less one day would satisfy the principles of specific deterrence, general deterrence and denunciation while at the same time fostering Mr. Meinzinger’s role as a parent and contributing member of our community. When I consider all of the circumstances in this case, I come to the same conclusion as the court did in Fabbro: “Imposing a custodial sentence … [is] likely to have a serious negative effect on … [his] progress and would not serve the genuine societal interest.” He will receive the same sentence on each count, but the sentences shall run concurrently.
61To achieve a sufficient level of deterrence and denunciation, two-thirds of the conditional sentence will be served under house arrest and one-third will be served under a curfew. Mr. Meinzinger will be subject to the electronic monitoring program throughout. I will articulate the finer details of the conditional sentence orally in court.
62Following the conditional sentence, Mr. Meinzinger will be bound by concurrent probation orders for a period of 12 months on each count.
63For both counts, I will also impose a lifetime weapons prohibition pursuant to section 109 of the Code and a DNA order, pursuant to section 487.051 of the Code.
64Given the date of the offence, no victim fine surcharge is available.
Released: December 23, 2021 Signed: Justice C. A. Parry
1Exceptions, of course, exist. I would not, for example, characterize medically assisted suicides of terminally ill patients as being the product of mental illness.