Peter Léger

The accused, L.H., was charged with repeated sexual assault of the complainant during their marriage.

The complainant described four incidents, which the accused denied.

Both parties presented evidence that was generally credible, but the court found minor concerns with the credibility and reliability of both.

Due to diametrically opposed narratives and insufficient corroborating evidence, the court was left in a state of doubt as to which version was true.

Applying the R. v. W.D. test, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, challenged the validity of a telewarrant to search his home and the admissibility of his statement to police.

The court found the Information to Obtain contained sufficient reliable evidence for the issuing justice to grant the warrant.

The court also held that the accused's statement was voluntary, as he possessed an operating mind despite his references to demons and curses, and that his rights to silence and counsel under ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter were not breached.

Both applications to exclude evidence were dismissed.

Derek Crespy appealed his conviction for assault and the imposed sentence of 45 days imprisonment.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's findings of fact, credibility assessments, and sentencing decision.

The court found no error in principle regarding the conviction, the rejection of self-defence, the credibility assessment of witnesses, or the reliance on photographic evidence.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and no error in principle in the sentencing decision, noting the aggravating factor of an unprovoked assault involving kicking to the head.

Both the appeal against conviction and the appeal against sentence were dismissed.

The appellant, Daniel Raymond Lavigne, appealed his conviction for failing to provide a breath sample and his sentence.

The trial judge found an 8-minute delay in demanding a breath sample was justified for officer safety and investigation, satisfying the "forthwith" requirement under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the law.

The court declined to hear the appeal from sentence, noting it was not properly advanced in the appellant's factum or oral arguments.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexual interference after having sexual intercourse with the 14-year-old daughter of his bail surety, resulting in her pregnancy.

The court considered the offender's Gladue factors, his difficult upbringing, and his guilty plea as mitigating factors, weighed against the severe breach of trust and the victim's young age.

The court sentenced the offender to 3.5 years in custody, less pre-sentence credit, resulting in a net sentence of 31.5 months in a federal penitentiary, along with ancillary orders.

K.R. was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young person, M.B. The trial focused on whether the alleged events occurred.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the child complainant, M.B., and the defence witnesses, K.R. and his wife, B.R. The judge found M.B.'s testimony to be rehearsed, inconsistent with other evidence, and illogical regarding timing and the presence of B.R. While not necessarily believing the accused's denials, the judge found B.R.'s testimony credible and compelling, particularly regarding the impossibility of the alleged incidents occurring unnoticed.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on both counts.

The accused, an adult firefighter, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against the 14-year-old daughter of a fellow firefighter.

The Crown relied on the complainant's testimony and electronic communications between the parties.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, particularly when contrasted with the testimony of her friend, an independent witness.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court concluded that while the accused's denials were not entirely credible, the totality of the evidence left a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault, alleging errors by the trial judge in assessing credibility and claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) principles and found no reversible error in the credibility findings or apprehension of evidence.

Regarding the ineffective assistance claim, the court scrutinized trial counsel's preparation and tactical decisions during cross-examination, concluding that counsel's performance fell within the acceptable range of professional judgment and did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of uttering forged documents, possession of property obtained by crime, and attempted fraud.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an accomplice who had already pleaded guilty to related frauds.

The court found the accomplice's testimony lacked credibility and reliability, and the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the mastermind or the driver who assisted in the frauds.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The accused was convicted after trial of sexual assault arising from sexual touching of a two‑year‑old child while acting as a babysitter.

The court conditionally stayed a related sexual interference conviction under the Kienapple principle.

In determining sentence, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the extreme youth of the victim and the breach of trust inherent in a caregiver abusing a child in his care.

After considering limited prior criminal history but the absence of remorse, the court imposed a custodial sentence within the established range and ordered numerous ancillary orders including SOIRA registration and long‑term prohibitions relating to children.

The accused was tried for sexual assault and sexual interference against a two-year-old child he was babysitting.

The Crown's case relied on statements the child made to his mother shortly after the incident and DNA evidence from a semen stain on the child's bed sheet that matched the accused.

The court admitted the child's hearsay statements for their truth and rejected the defence's theory of innocent transfer of DNA.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused touched the child for a sexual purpose and applied force.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was convicted after trial of sexual assault for engaging in sexual intercourse with a sleeping friend following a night of drinking.

The court considered aggravating factors including the seriousness of the offence and the breach of trust between friends, and mitigating factors including the offender’s lack of prior criminal record, good character, supportive family, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court reviewed sentencing principles under ss. 718 and 718.1 of the Criminal Code and authorities establishing the typical custodial range for sexual intercourse with an unconscious victim.

Finding the case fell within the upper reformatory range but did not require a penitentiary sentence, the court imposed a custodial term followed by probation and ancillary orders.

The accused was tried for sexual assault arising from sexual intercourse with his best friend after an office Christmas party involving heavy drinking and marihuana use.

The central issue was consent, with the Crown alleging the complainant was asleep during the intercourse.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable, found no evidentiary basis to infer that she awoke and consented, and applied the requirement that consent be a conscious, active agreement throughout the sexual activity.

Although the court was cautious about admissions potentially grounded in false memories, it found the remaining circumstantial evidence proved lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found guilty.

In a judge-alone sexual assault trial, the defence sought to call expert opinion evidence on memory to challenge the reliability of the accused's apparently inculpatory police statement and apology letter.

Applying the Mohan and Abbey framework, the court held that the proposed evidence was logically and legally relevant, necessary to assist the trier of fact on technical concepts concerning false and illusory memory, and not barred by any exclusionary rule.

The court also found that the benefits of admission outweighed any minimal litigation costs or risk of confusion.

The defence expert was therefore permitted to testify in specified memory-related areas, though not in the broader fields of cognitive psychology and memory generally.

In this pre-trial admissibility ruling in a sexual assault prosecution, the court considered whether the accused's police statement, apology letter, and consensual buccal swab should be excluded.

Applying the confessions rule, the court held the statement was voluntary, rejecting arguments that the interviewing officer used subtle compulsion, inducements, or implied leniency.

The court also found no breach of ss. 8 or 10(b) of the Charter, holding that the letter and DNA sample were provided with valid consent and that the accused was properly informed of his right to counsel but never asserted it.

The Charter application was dismissed and the statement was ruled admissible at trial.

Following a jury trial, the accused was convicted of public mischief and attempted fraud over $5,000 arising from a staged vehicle crash and false report to police and an insurer.

The offender caused his vehicle to roll down a hill and then falsely reported it stolen in an attempt to obtain insurance proceeds.

The court considered the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, supportive background, and positive presentence report as mitigating factors.

Emphasizing general deterrence for planned insurance fraud, the court held that probation alone would be inadequate.

A short intermittent custodial sentence followed by probation, along with restitution and a secondary DNA order, was imposed.