6 total
The accused was acquitted after breath samples were excluded due to serious police misconduct.
The accused, Brian Foreman, faced charges of impaired driving and "80 Plus" after crashing his car.
He brought a Charter application to exclude breath samples and observations of alcohol odour, alleging violations of his rights against arbitrary detention, unreasonable search and seizure, and right to counsel.
The court found that while reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand existed, the police officer failed to immediately inform the accused of his right to counsel and delayed facilitating access to counsel.
Despite the minimal impact on the accused's rights, the seriousness of the police misconduct, particularly the officer's dishonesty in testimony and persistent ignorance of constitutional obligations, led the court to exclude the breath samples and related observations under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
With the exclusion of this key evidence, the Crown lacked sufficient proof, leading to acquittals on both charges.
The court dismissed the summary conviction appeal for failing to provide a breath sample.
The appellant appealed her conviction for failing to provide a breath sample into an Approved Screening Device, contrary to section 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.
The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge's alleged error in relying on roadside utterances for credibility assessment, a misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's hearing, and the unreasonableness of the verdict due to an alleged lack of unequivocal refusal.
The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning, no material misapprehension of evidence, and abundant evidence of unequivocal refusal.
Accused acquitted of sexual offences due to reasonable doubt but subjected to a peace bond.
The accused was charged with four sexual offences against a child complainant: two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference (touching for a sexual purpose), occurring during two distinct time periods.
The first alleged incident (the "shopping incident") occurred in May or June 2011 when the accused was left alone with the complainant.
The second set of allegations (the "babysitting incidents") involved repeated alleged touching over approximately 18 months between January 2012 and June 2013.
The Crown called the complainant and her mother as witnesses.
The accused testified in his own defence, denying the allegations and providing alternative explanations for the complainant's account.
The trial judge found significant credibility and reliability issues with the Crown's evidence, including material inconsistencies in the complainant's account, the absence of the grandmother as a witness despite her alleged presence during most of the alleged abuse, and implausibilities regarding the complainant's delayed disclosure.
While the judge concluded the accused was "probably guilty," the Crown failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The accused was acquitted on all counts but was subject to a common law peace bond for three years.
Breathalyzer evidence was excluded after police relied on an uncalibrated screening device and interfered with the accused's right to counsel.
The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while blood alcohol content exceeded 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.
The Crown's case depended entirely on the results of an Approved Screening Device test and subsequent breath samples.
The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.
The court found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to rely on the ASD results because he could not establish the device had been calibrated within the required timeframe, resulting in an unlawful arrest and arbitrary detention.
The court also found a breach of the right to counsel, as the officer failed to inform the accused of his right to search for counsel of choice, controlled all means of contacting counsel, and withheld information that the accused's father had called with a lawyer's name.
The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.
The court dismissed the accused's Charter applications regarding delayed breath tests and unrecorded video evidence, convicting him of impaired driving.
The accused was charged with impaired operation and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle stop on November 3, 2013 in Cambridge, Ontario.
The defence brought Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 8 and 7 of the Charter based on: (1) the failure to conduct breath tests as soon as practicable; and (2) the failure to videotape the second breath sample.
The court dismissed both Charter applications, finding that the police acted reasonably in the circumstances and that any failure to preserve the video evidence did not constitute unacceptable negligence.
The court found the accused guilty on both counts based on the totality of evidence including civilian witness observations of impaired driving, police observations at the scene, and toxicology evidence.
The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence for historical sexual assaults, holding that section 11(i) of the Charter entitled the accused to the benefit of the conditional sentencing regime available between the time of the offence and sentencing.
The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault against two young sisters occurring in 1986.
The offences involved inappropriate touching of the victims' genital areas and buttocks during social visits.
The court considered whether a conditional sentence was available given that such sentences were not available at the time of the offence (1986) or at the time of sentencing (2012), but were available between 1996 and 2007.
The court held that section 11(i) of the Charter entitled the accused to the benefit of the lesser punishment available during the intervening period.
The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence with strict conditions including house arrest for eight months and electronic monitoring, followed by one year of probation, finding that denunciation and deterrence could be adequately addressed through community-based sentencing given the accused's lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, and 25-year history without incident.