Peter Speyer

The accused was charged with driving a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding eighty milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

She brought a Charter application seeking to exclude breath samples obtained at a police station, alleging a violation of section 10(b) of the Charter regarding her right to counsel.

The accused argued that although she was read her rights from a pre-printed card at the roadside, the information was delivered too quickly while she was emotionally distressed and overwhelmed with other information, and that she was not effectively informed of her right to contact a lawyer of her choice.

The court found that the police adequately informed the accused of her section 10(b) rights and that she failed to take any positive action to invoke or exercise her right to counsel.

The application was dismissed and the accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle stop on November 3, 2013 in Cambridge, Ontario.

The defence brought Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 8 and 7 of the Charter based on: (1) the failure to conduct breath tests as soon as practicable; and (2) the failure to videotape the second breath sample.

The court dismissed both Charter applications, finding that the police acted reasonably in the circumstances and that any failure to preserve the video evidence did not constitute unacceptable negligence.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts based on the totality of evidence including civilian witness observations of impaired driving, police observations at the scene, and toxicology evidence.

The accused was charged with careless driving following a motor vehicle collision at an intersection.

The Crown presented evidence from police officers and the other driver involved in the collision.

The accused testified that she stopped at the stop sign, looked both ways, waited for traffic to pass, and then proceeded into the intersection where she was struck.

The court applied the legal test from R. v. Beauchamp and R. v. Wilson, finding that while the accused made a brief mistake in judgment, this constituted mere inadvertent negligence rather than the degree of carelessness required for conviction.

The charge was dismissed.