H. Thompson

Sentencing for repeat sexual offences against adolescent victims and breach of a lifetime prohibition order.

The court applied the framework in Friesen, emphasizing the offender’s high likelihood of reoffending, grooming behaviour, abuse of trust and authority, prior similar record, breach of probation and prohibition conditions, and the need to prioritize denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society under ss. 718 and 718.01 of the Criminal Code.

Harsh pandemic lockdown conditions in pre-sentence custody were treated as a mitigating factor through Duncan credit, and statutory pre-sentence custody credit was also applied.

A global custodial sentence of 7 years and 11 months was imposed, with ancillary lifetime orders.

In a judge-alone criminal trial subject to a publication ban, the Crown alleged sexual exploitation, sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and breach of a prohibition order arising from the accused's interactions with two young complainants.

The court accepted the evidence of the older complainant on the core events and substantially accepted the younger complainant's evidence on the toe-related incident, finding that the accused groomed the complainants through money, alcohol, attention, and sexualized conversation.

Applying s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, the court held the accused occupied and knew he occupied a position of trust toward the older complainant, negating consent.

Findings of guilt were entered on all five counts, subject to further submissions on the application of the Kienapple principle before convictions were formally entered.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiffs' claims for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, and civil conspiracy were statute-barred.

The plaintiffs had successfully defended against both criminal and civil forfeiture applications brought by the state.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motions, finding that while the plaintiffs knew they had suffered damage when the criminal forfeiture application was dismissed, it was not legally appropriate for them to commence an action until the related civil forfeiture application and the appeal of the costs decision were finally resolved.

Therefore, the claims were brought within the two-year limitation period.

The Crown applied to admit similar act evidence of alleged sexual misconduct by the accused towards another complainant.

The accused had previously been tried and acquitted of the charges relating to that other complainant, although the trial judge in that case noted the allegations were likely true on a balance of probabilities.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, holding that the doctrine of issue estoppel prevents the Crown from re-litigating an issue determined in the accused's favour in a prior criminal proceeding, even if decided on the basis of reasonable doubt.

Admitting the evidence would violate trial fairness and judicial finality.

The applicant, a dangerous offender serving an indeterminate sentence, sought a writ of habeas corpus after his request to be transferred from medium to minimum security was denied.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the refusal to lower an inmate's security classification does not constitute a deprivation of residual liberty.

In the alternative, the court held that the Assistant Commissioner's decision to maintain the medium security classification was reasonable given the applicant's high risk for violent recidivism and dangerous offender status.

The accused pleaded guilty to 14 offences, including possession of prohibited firearms, possession of prohibited weapons, and possession contrary to a prohibition order.

The offences occurred in a motel room while the accused was highly intoxicated and subject to two weapons prohibition orders.

Despite the accused's genuine commitment to rehabilitation and substance abuse treatment, the court found a conditional sentence order inappropriate due to the gravity of the offences and the accused's related criminal record.

The court imposed a global sentence of 15 months' imprisonment, reduced to 10 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions, along with a three-year probation order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The accused applied for a bail review after being detained on the secondary ground following a contested bail hearing.

The reviewing court found a material change in circumstances because the proposed bail plan was significantly different and stricter than the one presented below, including residence with both parents as sureties, strict supervision, and employment with the father.

The court conducted a fresh hearing and assessed detention under the secondary ground in s. 515(10)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Despite the accused’s criminal record and history of breaches, the court found the revised bail plan sufficiently mitigated the risk of reoffending or interference with the administration of justice.

The application was granted and the accused was released on strict conditions including house arrest and two sureties.

The court sentenced an offender convicted after trial of sexual interference against a 13-year-old boy, with a related sexual assault count conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The offending involved repeated genital touching by an adult caregiver living in the same household and occupying a position of trust and authority.

The court treated repetition and breach of trust as aggravating factors, and the offender's traumatic background, medical issues, and family caregiving role as mitigating factors.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence under s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code, the court fixed a custodial range of 9 to 15 months and imposed a sentence at the low end with probation and ancillary orders.

Criminal trial concerning multiple historical sexual offence allegations involving two child complainants and a former partner of their mother.

The court reviewed the law governing assessment of child witness evidence and the criminal standard of proof, emphasizing that corroboration was not required and that each complainant's allegations had to be assessed independently.

The court found one complainant's evidence credible, reliable, detailed, and unshaken in cross-examination, proving sexual interference and sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The other complainant's evidence raised reasonable doubt because of material inconsistencies, omissions, uncertainty, and vagueness, resulting in acquittals on those counts.

The accused was tried on 11 criminal charges, including assault, attempting to choke, uttering threats, and criminal harassment, relating to his former partner.

The Crown's case relied almost entirely on the complainant's testimony.

The trial judge found significant credibility and reliability issues with the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies with other witnesses, prior untruths to authorities, internal inconsistencies, and contradictions with her own journal.

Consequently, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all charges.

The accused applied under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual activity in a prosecution for sexual interference, sexual assault, and invitation to sexual touching involving a person under 16 years old.

The proposed evidence concerned a later sexual assault allegedly committed against the complainant by another individual and earlier alleged assaults by unknown persons.

Applying s. 276(2)–(3), the court held that the specific instance involving the later alleged assault was relevant to issues of credibility and possible confusion of events and had probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

However, broader allegations of unspecified prior sexual activity were rejected for lack of specificity.

The application was therefore granted in part.

During a criminal trial involving multiple assault, uttering threats, and criminal harassment charges, the defence sought to compel a mediator to testify about communications during a confidential family mediation session between the accused and the complainant.

The mediator objected based on a contractual confidentiality clause and settlement privilege.

The court considered the Wigmore criteria for privilege and the doctrine of settlement privilege.

It held that privilege had been waived when the complainant testified about the mediation and alleged threatening conduct by the accused during the session.

The court further found that the accused’s right to make full answer and defence outweighed concerns about the confidentiality of mediation and ordered the mediator to answer the defence’s questions.

The accused, charged with historical sexual offences against his daughter and granddaughter, brought an application for the production of the daughter's therapeutic records from a health centre.

The complainant opposed the application.

The court found that the accused established the records were likely relevant to an issue at trial, specifically the reliability of the complainant's memory, as she had admitted to police and at the preliminary inquiry that electro-shock treatments had affected her memory.

The court ordered the records to be produced for judicial review at the first stage of the application.

The parties separated after a lengthy marriage and proceeded to trial on property issues, including the calculation of net family properties, premarital deductions, excluded property, and the return of chattels.

The respondent claimed that joint GICs funded by his inheritance should be excluded property, but the court found he failed to rebut the presumption of joint ownership.

The respondent also sought an unequal division of net family property based on unconscionability, which the court dismissed.

The court determined the allowable premarital deductions and ordered the return of specific personal property items.