Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CJ 10122 Date: 2023/04/11 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: His Majesty the King – and – Hesham Aly

Counsel: Benjamin Schnell and Julia Forward, Counsel for the Crown Darwin Witmer, Counsel for Hesham Aly

Heard: February 15 and April 11, 2023

Reasons for Sentence

Gibson J.:

Overview

[1] This disturbing case involves a planned, deliberate and repeated manifestation of malice in pursuit of personal vengeance against both individuals and institutions, and an egregious breach of trust and violation of the professional ethics of the social work profession that has occasioned significant harm to professional colleagues, vulnerable young persons, social work agencies and to the broader community.

[2] Hesham Aly (“Aly”) was tried by judge and jury on an Indictment charging that between October 23, 2017 and September 18, 2018, he fraudulently personated Tina Thomas and Kevin Brown with intent to cause disadvantage to them, contrary to s.403(1)(c) of the Criminal Code. The jury found him guilty on December 13, 2022, following a three-week trial at which 20 witnesses testified and there were six Agreed Statements of Fact.

[3] It is now my task to determine a fair, fit and principled sentence.

Absconding Offender

[4] Following the jury’s verdict of guilty on December 13, 2022, a Pre-Sentence Report was ordered and Aly was remanded to a sentencing hearing on February 15, 2023, at which the Crown and Defence made submissions as to sentence. The Crown suggested a custodial sentence of 12 months and probation. The Defence suggested a conditional discharge, or in the alternative, a suspended sentence, or in the further alternative, a conditional sentencing order.

[5] Although this was not a situation such as that described in R. v. Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37 in which Moldaver J. held that a sentencing judge should advise the parties in a situation of a contested sentencing hearing following a guilty plea with open submissions in which the judge was considering imposing a sentence which exceeded the Crown’s proposed sentence, in the spirit of fairness consistent with the direction in Nahanee, I advised the parties on February 15 that I was considering imposing a more severe sentence than that suggested by the Crown, and adjourned the sentencing hearing to March 31, 2022, to allow them to make supplementary submissions in this light. Aly was remanded to that date for a continuation of the sentencing hearing.

[6] On March 31, 2023, Aly failed to appear, without notice to the court or to his defence counsel. A Bench Warrant was issued for Aly, and the matter was adjourned to April 11, 2023.

[7] On April 11, 2023, Hesham Aly again failed to appear, without notice or explanation to the court.

[8] The Crown now submits that I should continue the trial and impose a sentence on Aly in his absence pursuant to s.475(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code.

[9] Section 475 of the Criminal Code provides:

Accused absconding during trial

475 (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, where an accused, whether or not he is charged jointly with another, absconds during the course of his trial,

(a) he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present at his trial, and

(b) the court may

(i) continue the trial and proceed to a judgment or verdict and, if it finds the accused guilty, impose a sentence on him in his absence, or

(ii) if a warrant in Form 7 is issued for the arrest of the accused, adjourn the trial to await his appearance,

but where the trial is adjourned pursuant to subparagraph (b)(ii), the court may, at any time, continue the trial if it is satisfied that it is no longer in the interests of justice to await the appearance of the accused.

Adverse inference

(2) Where a court continues a trial pursuant to subsection (1), it may draw an inference adverse to the accused from the fact that he has absconded.

Accused not entitled to re-opening

(3) Where an accused reappears at his trial that is continuing pursuant to subsection (1), he is not entitled to have any part of the proceedings that was conducted in his absence re-opened unless the court is satisfied that because of exceptional circumstances it is in the interests of justice to re-open the proceedings.

Counsel for accused may continue to act

(4) Where an accused has absconded during the course of his trial and the court continues the trial, counsel for the accused is not thereby deprived of any authority he may have to continue to act for the accused in the proceedings.

[10] The word “absconds” in this section means more than mere failure to appear and imports a requirement that the accused has voluntarily absented himself from his trial for the purpose of impeding or frustrating the trial, or with the intention of avoiding the consequences. The necessary intent can however be inferred from proof that the accused deliberately absented himself. Upon a determination that the accused has absconded, the trial may proceed although defence counsel has been permitted to withdraw: R. v. Garofoli (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont.C.A.), affirmed [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421.

[11] In the circumstances of this case, it is evident that Hesham Aly has deliberately absented himself with the intent of avoiding the consequences of the jury’s finding of guilty. He has waived his right to be present at his trial. I find that Aly has absconded from his trial, it is no longer in the interests of justice to await the appearance of the accused, and I will proceed to sentence him pursuant to s.475(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code.

Circumstances of the Offence

[12] As provided at s.724(2) of the Criminal Code, where the court is composed of a judge and jury, the court shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty.

[13] As McLachlin C.J.C. stated at paras. 16-18 in R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6:

[16] This poses a difficulty in a case such as this, since, unlike a judge sitting alone, who has a duty to give reasons, the jury gives only its ultimate verdict. The sentencing judge therefore must do his or her best to determine the facts necessary for sentencing from the issues before the jury and from the jury’s verdict. This may not require the sentencing judge to arrive at a complete theory of the facts; the sentencing judge is required to make only those factual determinations necessary for deciding the appropriate sentence in the case at hand.

[17] Two principles govern the sentencing judge in this endeavour. First, the sentencing judge “is bound by the express and implied factual implications of the jury’s verdict”: R. v. Brown, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 518, p. 523. The sentencing judge “shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty” (Criminal Code, s. 724(2)(a)), and must not accept as fact any evidence consistent only with a verdict rejected by the jury: Brown; R. v. Braun (1995), 95 C.C.C. (3d) 443 (Man. C.A.).

[18] Second, when the factual implications of the jury’s verdict are ambiguous, the sentencing judge should not attempt to follow the logical process of the jury, but should come to his or her own independent determination of the relevant facts: Brown; R. v. Fiqia (1994), 162 A.R. 117 (C.A.). In so doing, the sentencing judge “may find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial to be proven” (s. 724(2)(b)). To rely upon an aggravating fact or previous conviction, the sentencing judge must be convinced of the existence of that fact or conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; to rely upon any other relevant fact, the sentencing judge must be persuaded on a balance of probabilities: ss. 724(3)(d) and 724(3)(e); see also R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368; R. v. Lawrence (1987), 58 C.R. (3d) 71 (Ont. H.C.). It follows from the purpose of the exercise that the sentencing judge should find only those facts necessary to permit the proper sentence to be imposed in the case at hand. The judge should first ask what the issues on sentencing are, and then find such facts as are necessary to deal with those issues.

[14] Carizon Family Community Services (“Carizon”) is a non-profit social service agency operating in Waterloo Region that has been serving the community for over 160 years. It specializes in children’s mental health, youth engagement and development, family violence, individual and family counselling, credit counselling, settlement supports and collective wellness. Carizon is organizationally close to and sometimes partners with Lutherwood, another social service agency operating in Waterloo Region and Wellington County that specializes in children’s mental health and housing services. Lutherwood has grown to annually care for more than 17,000 people, including those with diverse and intersectional identities.

[15] During the relevant time period, Carizon and Lutherwood partnered in the Front Door initiative, with the goal of providing a first access point for children’s mental health services in Waterloo Region. Workers for this initiative were supplied by both agencies.

[16] Hesham Aly was hired as a family support worker with Carizon, in the Partners program, and started his employment in August 2015 on a full-time one-year contract, working out of the joint location at 1770 King Street East in Kitchener. He had a BSW degree and was a Registered Social Worker (RSW). Aly signed an acknowledgement of orientation and training, and a code of conduct and ethics agreement. Aly was terminated without cause from his employment in January 2016. He had unilaterally informed Carizon that he would be taking unpaid leave.

[17] Aly subsequently made a human rights complaint arising from what he said was discrimination concerning his interaction with another person with whom he shared an office, Tina Thomas. Nick Brown was a witness to that conversation. Tina Thomas was a Carizon employee. Nick Brown was an employee of Lutherwood. An internal investigation was conducted which did not find that there had been a human rights violation. A hearing was scheduled in Toronto before the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal, at which both Tina Thomas and Nick Brown were scheduled to testify. The complaint was resolved by a mediated settlement on the day scheduled for the hearing, on September 18, 2017, without the necessity for the witnesses to testify.

[18] A few weeks after this settlement, Carizon and Lutherwood were informed that six organizations had received documents by mail which clearly constituted a privacy breach. The documents contained personal information pertaining to clients of Carizon and Lutherwood. These organizations comprised regulatory and social service organizations, some of whom provided funding for Carizon and Lutherwood. Carizon is a not-for-profit organization which relies on grants and donations for its funding. These documents were returned to Carizon and Lutherwood.

[19] Starting in April 2018 through to December 2018, Lutherwood subsequently received at least 21 emails purporting to have come from Nick Brown or Tina Thomas. These emails had been sent to a number of recipients, including media outlets including the CBC and the Waterloo Region Record newspaper. These emails contained highly sensitive records of clients of the agencies.

[20] None of the letters or emails were sent by Nick Brown or Tina Thomas.

[21] Following an extensive police investigation by the Waterloo Region Police Service, which included surveillance, the analysis of DNA and fingerprint evidence, and the analysis of electronic documents, Aly was charged and brought to trial. He was found guilty following a jury trial.

[22] In this case, the evidence at trial disclosed, and I find as a fact beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hesham Aly, who had been terminated from his position by Carizon, sent letters to six organizations throughout Ontario, including the Provincial Advocate for Children and Youth of Ontario, the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, the Trillium Foundation, the Canadian Centre for Accreditation, a probation office, which then sent it to the Ministry of Children and Youth Services, and the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner. These letters purported to be from Nick Brown, and included a photocopy of his business card, as well as documents that clearly breached client confidentiality and the privacy rights of the children and families concerned. Emails were also sent to at least 21 email addresses containing documents clearly intimating that they had been sent by Nick Brown and Tina Thomas. These letters and emails were not sent by Nick Brown and Tina Thomas, but rather were sent for revenge by Hesham Aly as retaliation against Nick Brown and Tina Thomas, as well as against Carizon and Lutherwood, as a fraudulent personation of Nick Brown and Tina Thomas. It is patent that the letters and emails were sent in order to cause disadvantage for Nick Brown and Tina Thomas, including injury to their reputations and potentially to their employment, as well as injury to the reputations of Carizon and Lutherwood.

Evidence on Sentencing

[23] The evidence on sentencing included a Pre-Sentence Report, and multiple Victim Impact Statements, which I shall discuss in more detail below.

Pre-Sentence Report

[24] A Pre-Sentence Report was produced by a probation and parole officer Paul Hamill dated February 7, 2023. It indicates that Hesham Aly is 50 years old. He is single and has no criminal record. He was born in Egypt and obtained a social work degree at the Higher Institute of Social Work in Alexandria in 1996. He immigrated to Canada in 2003 and has been employed in social work settings since. He became a Canadian citizen in 2017. He has been a Registered Social Worker since 2003. He has been employed intermittently and has not been employed since he had a three-month contract with a social service agency in 2018. He has recently been supported by Ontario Works.

Victim Impact Statements

[25] Three sets of Victim Impact Statements were made exhibits on the sentencing hearing: those of Tina Thomas and Nick Brown; those of parents of the children whose personal information had been wrongfully disclosed, on behalf of the children; and a community impact statement on behalf of Carizon and Lutherwood.

[26] In her Victim Impact Statement submitted to the Court, Tina Thomas details the significant and ongoing stress and anxiety that Aly’s actions caused her, including difficulty sleeping, concern about her employment prospects, and damage to her professional reputation. She recounts the feelings of fear, violation and betrayal that his fraudulent theft of her identity engendered. She also experienced financial costs due to lost time at work and attendance at police interviews.

[27] In his Victim Impact Statement, Nick Brown recounted the stress, anger and confusion that Aly’s theft of his identity caused, and the detriment to his reputation. He detailed the loss of sleep and effect on his health, along with fear for his family’s safety.

[28] The Victim Impact Statements of three of the parents of the children whose confidential and private information was used by Aly in the letters and emails he sent (P.J., on behalf of A.M.; A.B., on behalf of J.B.; and T.M., on behalf of M.L.) related their profound sense of betrayal and the adverse impact it had on their children and their families’ trust in these organizations and their willingness to seek assistance from them in the future. As one stated, “the breach of confidentiality that we experienced was painful, emotionally disturbing, and a deep violation of trust. Our son deserved better care, he deserved to be shown more respect and to be treated with far more dignity than he was.”

[29] The use of community impact statements is provided for at s.722.2(2.1) of the Criminal Code. In accordance with this section, the court shall consider a community impact statement that describes the harm or loss suffered by the community as a result of the commission of the offence and the impact of the offence on the community. As noted by Di Luca J. in R. v. Theriault, 2020 ONSC 5784, they are intended to provide a mechanism for enhanced public participation in the criminal sentencing process. They also recognize that the impact of certain offences is often felt by the community where the offences occurred and not just the individual victims of the specific offence or offences. Within permissible confines, community impact statements provide the court with meaningful and helpful information to be considered in arriving at a fit sentence for a particular offence.

[30] Consideration of a community impact statement is apt in this case. The community impact statement submitted on behalf of the 17 Carizon and Lutherwood staff directly involved in the investigation, drafted by John Colangeli, the CEO of Lutherwood, and Tracy Elop, the CEO of Carizon, succinctly stated the following:

Trust in Carizon and Lutherwood, their counsellors, and their processes and systems is paramount to success in helping people cope. Trust enables people to fully disclose their struggles and with trust they are more likely to accept the advice and counsel of those they turn to for help. Trust is built over time as the professional relationship grows yet is completely shattered when personal and confidential information is repeatedly exposed by an unknown person an unknown number of times to an unknown number of people.

When describing the emotional impact of the ongoing breaches, our staff used words such as frustrating, upsetting, anger, fear, worry, dread, stress, betrayal, anxious, distracting, emotionally draining and helpless.

Submission of the Crown

[31] The Crown submitted during the sentencing hearing on February 15, 2023, that Aly should receive a 12-month custodial sentence and a probation order. It suggested that a custodial sentence is required for purposes of denunciation and deterrence.

Submission of the Defence

[32] The Defence submitted that, as Hesham Aly is a first offender, a conditional discharge should be considered. If this is not accepted, the Defence submits, the alternatives of a suspended sentence and probation order should then be considered; in the further alternative, it contends, a conditional sentence order would be appropriate.

Sentencing Principles

[33] As succinctly summarized by Watt J.A. in R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 28, in determining a fit sentence, the sentencing judge must consider a complexity of factors including the nature of the offence and the personal characteristics of the offender. As well, the sentencing judge must weigh the normative principles Parliament has enshrined in the Criminal Code; the sentencing objectives in s. 718, the fundamental principle of proportionality in s. 718.1, the aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as the principles of totality and restraint in s. 718.2: R. v. M. (L.), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163, at para. 17.

[34] Proportionality is a cardinal principle that governs the fitness of a sentence imposed on an offender. It requires that every sentence be proportionate not only to the gravity of the offence, but also to the degree of responsibility of the offender who committed that offence: Criminal Code, s. 718.1.

[35] Individualization is central to the assessment of proportionality in that it demands focus upon the individual circumstances of each offender: R. v. A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487 at para. 82.

[36] The severity of a sentence depends not only upon the seriousness of the consequences of a crime, but also on the moral blameworthiness of the offender. The more serious the crime and its consequences, or the greater the offender’s degree of responsibility for that crime, the heavier the penalty.

Caselaw

[37] All sentencing starts with the principle that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Sentencing judges must also consider the principle of parity: similar offenders who commit similar offences in similar circumstances should receive similar sentences. Parity is an expression of proportionality and gives meaning to proportionality in practice. It helps calibrate proportionate sentences.

[38] As both Crown and Defence submitted, there is a paucity of relevant caselaw in this matter to facilitate consideration of parity. The s. 403(1)(c) offence of fraudulent personation for the purpose of causing disadvantage is a relatively new offence which has not received much reported judicial consideration.

[39] The Crown referred me to the case of R. v. Balaram-Sivaram, 2019 ONSC 6000. In that case, Brown J. found the defendant guilty of all charges on a ten-count indictment, which included three counts of criminal harassment, three counts of uttering a death threat, one count of advocating genocide, and two counts of personation contrary to s.403(1)(c). The counts on the indictment all related to a variety of communications received by various people or organizations. Some of these communications were in the form of phone calls, emails, or letters, or in other cases communications from social media accounts, such as Facebook and Twitter. The global sentence was 3 years, of which 6 months was allocated to each of the counts of personation, to be served concurrently. One count of personation related an attempt by a disgruntled man motivated by revenge to cause harm to a man whom he blamed for his wife leaving their marriage. Justice Brown found that the defendant sought to frame that man and get him into trouble by personating him through a variety of hateful communications to various people and organizations. The second related to the wife’s supervisor at her work.

[40] The Defence drew my attention to a variety of cases illustrating general principles relating to sentencing.

[41] Balaram-Sivaram is a useful analog in considering parity, but in my view, it is distinguishable on several bases. In that case, there were convictions for other more serious offences that were the focus of Brown J.’s analysis. There were more instances of fraudulent personation committed in the present case, and the degree of harm caused to both the individual victims and to the broader community was more severe. Aly’s actions were calculated and persisted over an extended length of time.

Aggravating Factors

[42] This case highlights the necessity of properly identifying and conceptualizing the novel sorts of harm that Parliament sought to address in creating the identity theft and identity fraud offence provisions in the Criminal Code in Bill S-4, which reflect and acknowledge both evolving societal and technological factors.

[43] The objective gravity of the offence is reflected in the fact that Parliament has prescribed a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment.

[44] Identity theft has been called the crime of the 21st century. With the proliferation of personal and financial information as a result of such electronic media as the Internet and associated technology, new life has been given to an old crime. Not so long ago, assuming and using another person’s identity was a relatively small-scale operation that required time and effort to execute (e.g., stealing a purse, breaking into a house, and overhearing a private conversation). Today, however, perpetrators of identity theft can operate at a distance from their victims, access databases containing large amounts of personal information and transmit stolen data quickly and easily around the world.

[45] The rapidly and continuously evolving nature of technology requires that we adapt our understanding of what constitutes harm, and how it should be assessed.

[46] Victims of identity theft may suffer significant financial loss as well as damaged reputation or credit ratings. There may also be losses suffered in terms of the time, expense and emotional stress associated with restoring reputations and recovering financial and other losses incurred. Governments, businesses, and other organizations may also suffer financial loss and damaged reputations.

[47] This case exemplifies many aspects of this enhanced understanding of what constitutes harm in the contemporary context. It shares some attributes with fraud cases, but also incorporates novel and unique forms of harm deserving of criminal sanction.

[48] There is a powerful catalogue of significant aggravating factors in this case. They include:

i. This was a planned and deliberate series of actions by Aly, which persisted over many months. It was not the spontaneous product of a moment of passion, but was calculated and repeated many times;

ii. Aly’s actions manifested a particular viciousness, cruelty and malice towards Nick Brown and Tina Thomas, as well as to the two organizations Carizon and Lutherwood which perform important work benefitting some of the most vulnerable members of society;

iii. There was a sophistication to the use of the multiple emails and email addresses intended to cloak the identity of Aly as the person who sent the emails. Aly sought impunity for his mischief through the camouflage of anonymity though the use of contrived email addresses, and by the subterfuge of deception and misdirection of the fraudulent personation of two innocent victims, Nick Brown and Tina Thomas;

iv. The direction of Parliament at s.718.2(a)(iii.1) that the offence had a significant impact on the victim. This has been amply demonstrated in the Victim Impact Statements of Nick Brown and Tina Thomas;

v. Aly’s actions deliberately imperilled, and sought to injure, the financial viability of Carizon and Lutherwood, as well as their reputation in the community, which is the lifeblood of their continued viability, as reflected in their community impact statements. Aly obviously sought to create suspicion amongst their various regulatory, oversight and funding agencies;

vi. In addition to this reputational harm, there was a significant direct harm to Carizon and Lutherwood. The evidence disclosed, and I accept, that nearly 1,000 hours of staff time was spent by these organizations in dealing with the consequences of Aly’s actions. This entailed a huge opportunity cost. I also do not accept the submission of the Defence that there was no financial harm in this case. A calculation of the financial value of this amount of staff time would be very substantial, in addition to the opportunity cost that accrued to these social work organizations in terms of the time that could otherwise have been spent to the provision of assistance to vulnerable members of society;

vii. There was an enormous breach of trust of the vulnerable children and their families whose personal confidential information Aly utilized as part of the instruments of the harm he sought to inflict. The Victim Impact Statements of P.J., A.B. and T.M. reflect the degree of harm he caused to them; and,

viii. More broadly, there was a betrayal of professional standards of the social work profession, as reflected in the Canadian Association of Social Workers’ Code of Ethics, in which confidentiality of client information is necessarily a core construct. Instead of being a helper, Aly perversely chose to become an instrument of harm towards those whom he had been entrusted to help.

Mitigating Factors

[49] The mitigating factors present on the facts of this case are few. They are primarily that Aly has no criminal record and is a first offender. He has made no meaningful expression of remorse. There is no documented evidence before the Court that he suffers from any relevant mental health or other mitigating condition. Moreover, it is apparent that Aly has now absconded in order to avoid the consequences of his conviction at trial.

[50] There was no pre-trial custody in this case, and there is no claim for Downes time (R. v. Downes (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.)) in respect of stringent pre-sentence bail conditions.

Assessment

[51] I have carefully considered all of the sentencing purposes and principles elaborated at ss. 718, 718.01, 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code. I have also considered the sentencing precedents in the caselaw jurisprudence submitted by the Crown and the Defence, and the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors in this case.

[52] I have considered the personal circumstances of Hesham Aly, including that he has no criminal record and is before the court as a first offender. However, I have also considered that he is a Registered Social Worker with professional obligations of confidentiality towards his clients of which he was aware and which comprise the bedrock of the social work profession, which he has knowingly violated. There has been no meaningful expression of remorse in this case.

[53] I have also had regard to the issue of rehabilitation, as well as the sentencing principles of separation of offenders from society, where necessary, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community. But, as stated, considerations of denunciation and deterrence must predominate in this case.

[54] The moral responsibility of Hesham Aly is high. His actions amounted to an egregious breach of trust. He put at risk the very vulnerable persons whom he was meant to serve. He cruelly sought to harm colleagues and the institutions they worked for, motivated by a malicious spirit of revenge. He put at risk the reputation and continuing financial viability of these important social institutions which play a vital role in the community. Nothing in his motives mitigated his breach of trust. This was not a crime of transient impulse. Rather, it was repeatedly committed by a person who is knowledgeable and should be aware of the consequences. There are few crimes where the aspect of deterrence is more significant.

[55] This is manifestly not a case in which a conditional sentence would be appropriate. It would be demonstrably unfit. It would not be consistent with the fundamental purposes of sentencing in ss. 718 to 718.2. At least four considerations, taken collectively, warrant a jail sentence. They are the seriousness of the offence, the defendant’s moral blameworthiness, the need for specific and general deterrence, and the ineffectiveness of a conditional sentence in this case. Moreover, it is apparent that Aly has now absconded in order to avoid the consequences of his conviction at trial.

[56] Having regard to the facts in evidence in this case, the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, the statutory provisions of the Criminal Code, including the objective gravity of the offence, and the sentencing precedents cited by the Crown and Defence, I am satisfied that, on the facts of this case, a penitentiary sentence is required to fulfill these objectives.

[57] I am alive to the principle of restraint. However, in this case I cannot see that a lower sentence would accord the appropriate weight to the aggravating circumstances, or suffice as an exemplary sentence for the purposes of denunciation and deterrence.

Sentence

[58] On the sole count of the Indictment, that of fraudulent personation with intent to cause disadvantage, Hesham Aly is sentenced to imprisonment for 4 years.

[59] As this is a secondary designated offence under the Criminal Code, Hesham Aly shall provide a sample of bodily substances for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis.

[60] During his incarceration, pursuant to s. 743.21, Aly is to abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, with Nick Brown, Tina Thomas or any other member of their families, as well as with Julie Newman and Sherrie Hyde.

[61] There shall be a s.109 weapons prohibition Order for 10 years in respect of any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, and any crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance, and for life in respect of any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition.

M. Gibson. J. Dated: April 11, 2023

COURT FILE NO.: CJ 10122 DATE: 2023/04/11 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE HIS MAJESTY THE KING – and – HESHAM ALY REASONS FOR SENTENCE M. Gibson J. Released: April 11, 2023