Douglas R. Lent

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol after failing a screening test at a RIDE checkpoint in Brampton.

The trial raised two issues: whether the police properly relied on the screening test result to justify a breath demand, and whether the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights were violated.

The court found that the officer reasonably administered the screening test and that the accused was provided with sufficient information and reasonable opportunity to exercise his rights to counsel.

The accused failed to be reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights by not informing police that he had a specific lawyer he wished to contact.

The court found the accused guilty of driving with excess blood alcohol.

The court heard consolidated summary conviction appeals concerning police authority to stop motorists emerging from LCBO stores or licensed establishments to assess sobriety.

One trial judge had excluded breathalyzer evidence and acquitted an accused after finding that a targeted stop outside an LCBO constituted arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, while two other trial judges upheld convictions following similar stops near bars.

The court held that s. 216 of the Highway Traffic Act authorizes random roadside stops related to highway safety, including targeting motorists leaving alcohol-related establishments, even without prior signs of impairment.

Such stops are constitutionally valid under the Charter as reasonable limits justified under s. 1.

The court also held that videotaping detainees in a telephone room did not violate s. 10(b) where conversations with counsel were not recorded and there was no evidence that the accused believed their consultations lacked privacy.

The Crown's appeal from acquittal was allowed and the conviction appeals were dismissed.

The Crown sought to introduce a statement made by the defendant to Constable Foreman in the Intoxilyzer room for purposes of cross-examination.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80 mgs. per cent blood alcohol.

The court conducted a voluntariness voir dire and found that the Crown failed to call all persons in authority who had dealings with the defendant, specifically the Staff Sergeant and booking officer who were observed in conversation with the defendant on video.

The court excluded the statement, finding that the Crown's failure to call these witnesses prevented it from satisfying the burden of proving the statement was voluntarily made.

The accused, a newly trained police officer with Peel Regional Police, was charged with impaired operation and over 80 following a single-vehicle collision on the QEW in Burlington on August 3, 2011.

The trial involved three Charter applications: one alleging violation of s. 7 (right to remain silent), one alleging violation of s. 10(b) (right to counsel), and one alleging violation of s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure).

The court found a s. 10(b) breach due to inadequate facilitation of access to counsel of choice and poor note-taking by the arresting officer.

However, the court excluded the breath test results and statements made after rights were read, but found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on the erratic driving observed by an independent witness and the accused's conduct at the scene.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred regarding the standard of proof for a s. 8 Charter breach, the lawfulness of the police officer entering his driveway, the timing of the breath tests, and the failure to find arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the officer was lawfully on the driveway under an implied invitation, the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, and although the trial judge erred in inferring the reasons for the appellant's continued detention, a stay of proceedings was not warranted.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial addressed three issues: whether the accused's section 8 Charter right was breached regarding the screening test administration; whether the accused's section 10(b) Charter right was violated by police monitoring of the accused's call with counsel; and whether the Certificate of Qualified Technician was fatally flawed.

The court found no Charter breaches and upheld the Certificate, finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant was charged with Criminal Code and Highway Traffic Act driving offences arising from a three-car collision.

He brought a motion alleging a violation of his section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the scheduled trial date was 13¾ months.

The court assessed the delay against the Morin factors and regional guidelines for institutional delay in Peel Region.

The court found that the intake period was reasonable, the institutional delay was within acceptable parameters for a somewhat complex case, and any prejudice to the applicant was minimal.

The application was dismissed and the trial proceeded as scheduled.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of having care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had excluded breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a breach of the accused’s s. 8 privacy rights arising from continuous video monitoring of a detention cell while the accused used the toilet.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by finding a sufficient nexus between the Charter breach and the breath samples and by misapplying the Grant framework.

The court held that a causal connection was not required and that a sufficient temporal and contextual nexus existed between the breach and the obtaining of the breath samples.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded the exclusion of the evidence was justified and dismissed the Crown’s appeal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood following two driving incidents on October 1, 2010.

The Crown established that the accused drove erratically on Highway 6 and Highway 5, causing a motor vehicle collision.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings of 270 and 260 mg per 100 mL.

The defence raised multiple Charter applications challenging the arrest, detention, and destruction of surveillance recordings.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused on both charges based on eyewitness identification, observations of impaired driving, and breath test evidence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make an approved screening device demand and that the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence regarding alcohol consumption.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the constellation of factors—including departure from a bar near closing time, admission of recent drinking, and bloodshot eyes—objectively supported reasonable suspicion.

The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge’s credibility findings or rejection of the defence theory that mislabelled beer bottles explained the elevated readings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction decision quashing an information charging the accused with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The trial judge had held that the information was a nullity due to deficiencies in the confirmation process under s. 508 of the Criminal Code.

Relying on the Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Ladouceur, the appeal court held that non-compliance with the confirmation process does not invalidate a properly laid information but only affects jurisdiction over the person.

Because the accused attended court on multiple occasions, any loss of jurisdiction over the person was cured.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice to set a trial date.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg/100 mL following a motor vehicle collision on June 23, 2011.

The Crown relied on breath samples showing readings of 170 and 160 mg/100 mL, officer observations of impairment, and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence challenged the timing of the accident and the reliability of impairment indicators.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the exact time of the accident, preventing reliance on the statutory presumption.

The court also found conflicting evidence regarding impairment, with some officers and the victim not observing signs of impairment despite high blood alcohol readings.

The court rejected a purely scientific definition of impairment in favour of traditional legal indicators.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a motor vehicle accident on November 19, 2011.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer breath samples showing readings of 135 mg/100mL and 127 mg/100mL, and expert evidence regarding retrograde extrapolation to establish excess blood alcohol at the time of care or control.

The defence raised multiple Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the investigation and detention.

While the court found no breaches regarding the roadside screening demand, the right to counsel, or the initial detention conditions, the court found that the accused's reasonable expectation of privacy while using the cell toilet was breached by video monitoring and recording.

The court excluded the Intoxilyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the privacy intrusion and its impact on human dignity outweighed the societal interest in adjudicating the charge on its merits.

The charge was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial decision that stayed a charge of operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg based on an alleged s. 9 Charter breach arising from prolonged detention after breath testing.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s reasons for finding an overholding were sufficient and disclosed no reversible error.

However, the trial judge erred by ordering a stay of proceedings without articulating reasons or applying the governing legal framework for such an exceptional remedy.

The court concluded the breach occurred post‑offence, had no connection to the gathering of evidence, and caused minimal prejudice.

The stay was therefore set aside and a conviction entered, with a reduced fine imposed as a remedy for the Charter breach.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle while impaired and having a blood alcohol content in excess of eighty milligrams percent while operating a motor vehicle.

The offences allegedly occurred on October 28, 2012 in the Town of Caledon.

The accused struck a tree in a residential area after proceeding through a stop sign.

The court dismissed a Charter Section 8 application challenging the arrest and breath sample demand, finding sufficient grounds existed.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges, relying on expert toxicology evidence projecting a blood alcohol concentration of 165 to 215 milligrams percent at the time of driving, corroborated by the circumstances of the accident and police observations.

A judicial stay was imposed on the impaired charge pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was stopped by police as he exited a licensed establishment that appeared on the Peel Police Last Drink Programme statistics.

The accused challenged the stop as an arbitrary detention violating section 9 of the Charter and challenged the video surveillance of his consultation with counsel as violating section 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found no Charter violations and convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence raised two Charter applications: first, alleging a breach of section 8 rights regarding the validity of the screening demand; and second, alleging a breach of section 9 rights regarding arbitrary detention.

The court found that the screening demand was properly made based on reasonable suspicion and that the detention was justified under section 498 of the Criminal Code as the accused was held until sober and safe to be released.

Both Charter applications were dismissed and the accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a motor vehicle stop in Caledon, Ontario on October 28, 2010.

The Crown withdrew the companion charge of driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 milligrams) due to a breach of the defendant's right to consult with counsel in private, as his voice was inadvertently recorded on the breath room video while he spoke to his lawyer in the privacy booth.

The defendant raised three Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 9, and 10(b).

The court dismissed all Charter applications and found the defendant guilty of impaired driving based on extensive evidence of impairment, including breath test results of 283 and 267 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was sentenced to a $1,700 fine plus victim fine surcharge and a one-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the police investigation, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a blended voir dire on the Charter issues and found that the arresting officer failed to properly formulate the requisite reasonable suspicion under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code for the roadside screening device demand, and further failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds under section 254(3) for the breath demand at the police station.

The court found that the officer's testimony regarding what the "F" reading on the approved screening device meant was entirely absent, and the officer admitted he had no grounds to arrest the accused until obtaining that reading.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a rear-end collision in Brampton.

The Crown alleged the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol consumption.

The court found that while the police had reasonable grounds to make a breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt due to the equivocal nature of the evidence, particularly the absence of overt signs of intoxication such as slurred speech or significant balance problems.

However, the court found the accused guilty of driving with excess blood alcohol based on the breath test results.

The court also dismissed the accused's Charter application regarding trial delay, finding the delay was reasonable under the Morin factors.