Douglas R. Lent

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence raised two Charter applications: first, alleging a breach of section 8 rights regarding the validity of the screening demand; and second, alleging a breach of section 9 rights regarding arbitrary detention.

The court found that the screening demand was properly made based on reasonable suspicion and that the detention was justified under section 498 of the Criminal Code as the accused was held until sober and safe to be released.

Both Charter applications were dismissed and the accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a motor vehicle stop in Caledon, Ontario on October 28, 2010.

The Crown withdrew the companion charge of driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 milligrams) due to a breach of the defendant's right to consult with counsel in private, as his voice was inadvertently recorded on the breath room video while he spoke to his lawyer in the privacy booth.

The defendant raised three Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 9, and 10(b).

The court dismissed all Charter applications and found the defendant guilty of impaired driving based on extensive evidence of impairment, including breath test results of 283 and 267 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was sentenced to a $1,700 fine plus victim fine surcharge and a one-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the police investigation, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a blended voir dire on the Charter issues and found that the arresting officer failed to properly formulate the requisite reasonable suspicion under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code for the roadside screening device demand, and further failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds under section 254(3) for the breath demand at the police station.

The court found that the officer's testimony regarding what the "F" reading on the approved screening device meant was entirely absent, and the officer admitted he had no grounds to arrest the accused until obtaining that reading.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a rear-end collision in Brampton.

The Crown alleged the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol consumption.

The court found that while the police had reasonable grounds to make a breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt due to the equivocal nature of the evidence, particularly the absence of overt signs of intoxication such as slurred speech or significant balance problems.

However, the court found the accused guilty of driving with excess blood alcohol based on the breath test results.

The court also dismissed the accused's Charter application regarding trial delay, finding the delay was reasonable under the Morin factors.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following an incident on July 14, 2010.

The Crown's case relied on observations of erratic driving by civilian witnesses, police observations of impairment, and breath test results.

The court found that the police violated the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 by conducting an illegal search of the accused's garage without informed consent.

The court excluded the breath test results and the accused's admissions as a remedy for these violations.

On the admissible evidence, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver of the vehicle, as the only evidence linking him to the vehicle was the illegal search of his garage.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown established that the accused was observed driving at excessive speeds on Highway 410, making abrupt lane changes without signalling, and displaying delayed reaction time to police emergency signals.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings well in excess of the legal limit.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath evidence on the basis of a breach of the right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that language barriers prevented meaningful access to legal advice.

The court found a technical breach of the Charter right to counsel but admitted the breath evidence under section 24(2), finding that the integrity of the administration of justice would not be compromised by admission.

The court convicted the accused on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 on August 1, 2010.

An information was sworn on August 9, 2010.

A trial date was set for June 20, 2011, but the trial did not proceed due to disclosure issues, particularly the late delivery of a 911 call recording and surveillance footage from the police division.

A second trial date was set for May 23 and 24, 2012, resulting in a total delay of 21.5 months.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that the delay infringed his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found that the delay exceeded constitutional limits and granted the stay.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a traffic stop on the Queen Elizabeth Way.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving, physical signs of impairment, and observations by both a civilian witness and police officers.

The accused testified that he was fatigued rather than impaired.

The court found the Crown's evidence of impairment overwhelming and rejected the accused's testimony.

The accused also brought a Charter application alleging a breach of section 7 rights due to audio-visual surveillance of his cell, including while using the toilet without his knowledge.

The court dismissed the Charter application, distinguishing the case from R. v. Mok on the basis that the police evidence did not establish a systemic practice with the same characteristics.

The accused was found guilty of impaired driving.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with greater than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood on October 23, 2010.

The trial was initially scheduled for August 12, 2011, but was not reached due to an overbooked court list.

The matter was then adjourned to November 30, 2011.

The court found that the total institutional delay of approximately 11 months, just outside the 8-10 month guideline established in R. v. Morin, combined with actual prejudice to the accused (including doubled legal fees and emotional stress from two trial dates), constituted a violation of the accused's section 11(b) rights.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

At trial, the accused brought Charter applications alleging breaches of his right to counsel (s. 10(b)), right against arbitrary detention (s. 9), and right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)).

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding the police acted reasonably in facilitating access to counsel, the 5.5-hour detention was justified given the accused's intoxication and belligerence, and the 23.75-month delay was largely due to inherent time requirements and defense actions.

The court accepted the expert toxicological evidence and police observations, finding the accused guilty on both counts.

The accused, charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the information was approximately 13 months.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, attributing much of it to the defence's failure to accurately estimate trial time after raising new constitutional issues.

The court found the institutional delay to be 7 to 8 months, which was within the administrative guidelines, and found no prejudice to the accused.

The application was dismissed.

At the beginning of his trial for impaired driving, the defendant moved for a stay of proceedings under s. 24 of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total time from the swearing of the information to the trial date was nearly 14 months.

The court found that a significant portion of the delay was neutral, including time for the parties to be ready for trial and a four-month delay caused by the investigating officer being injured in a serious motor vehicle accident.

The court concluded that the institutional delay was under six months, well within the Morin guidelines, and that the defendant had contributed to the delay through poor trial time estimates and late filing of applications.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to the stay was just over 14 months, with 12 months of institutional delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not err in assessing actual prejudice, including psychological harm, strict bail conditions, and additional expenses.

The Court also agreed that the offer of 'Blitz Court' dates did not shorten the systemic period in this case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against a young person due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Crown argued the trial judge gave undue emphasis to prejudice and erred in attributing delay related to closed-circuit television facilities to institutional delay.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in finding prejudice from bail conditions, it was open to him to infer prejudice from faded memories.

The Court also agreed that a substantial part of the delay regarding the closed-circuit television application was institutional.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The trial was adjourned on the first scheduled date because the trial judge had a potential conflict of interest.

The system accommodated a new trial date three months later.

The Court of Appeal held that this three-month rescheduling period was neutral for the purposes of the s. 11(b) assessment and that the total elapsed time did not exceed recognized limits.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision setting aside the accused's conviction for driving over 80.

At trial, the accused called evidence of his alcohol consumption to rebut the presumption of accuracy of the breathalyzer certificate.

The trial judge considered the breathalyzer readings as some evidence, without the presumption of accuracy, in rejecting the accused's evidence to the contrary.

The summary conviction appeal judge held this was circular reasoning and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that under s. 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code, the certificate is some evidence of its contents and can be weighed along with other evidence in assessing the accused's evidence to the contrary.

The respondent, a young offender, was charged with wilfully failing to comply with a probation order.

At trial, the charge was dismissed because the youth court had failed to provide a copy of the disposition to the respondent's counsel, as required by s. 20(6)(a) of the Young Offenders Act.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's further appeal, holding that the requirement in s. 20(6)(a) is imperative.

The failure to provide counsel with a copy of the disposition deprived the young person of the opportunity to obtain legal advice regarding the probation order, rendering it unenforceable.