Douglas R. Lent

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c), which requires that breath samples be taken "as soon as practicable" after the alleged offence.

The central issue was whether the 57-minute delay between the traffic stop and the first breath sample was reasonable.

The court found that the Crown discharged its burden by establishing that the police acted reasonably throughout the chain of events, including the time spent on booking procedures, facilitating contact with duty counsel, and preparing the approved instrument.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood).

The trial addressed two Charter issues: whether the police breached the accused's rights under section 10(b) by failing to provide an interpreter or Polish-speaking officer, and whether the police breached section 8 rights by making an illegal demand for a breath sample into an approved screening device.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as the accused demonstrated sufficient understanding of English and his rights to counsel.

However, the court found a serious breach of section 8 rights because the officer failed to provide direct evidence of forming a reasonable suspicion that the accused had alcohol in his body while driving, as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The breath test evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on Mr. Waisanen for impaired driving.

Mr. Waisanen had initially received a conditional discharge and no driving prohibition, despite a conviction for impaired driving, due to a trial judge's finding of a Charter breach (arbitrary detention).

A previous appeal had overturned the stay of proceedings and clarified that the police conduct, while a Charter breach, was not egregious enough to warrant such a significant sentencing reduction.

This court found the conditional discharge and lack of driving prohibition to be an unfit sentence, emphasizing the paramount sentencing objectives of general and specific deterrence, especially given the high blood alcohol readings.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to a fine and a mandatory driving prohibition.

The Crown appealed Kelly's acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams, which resulted from the exclusion of breath test results due to a s. 8 Charter violation.

The trial judge found that the police officer administered an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test despite knowing the respondent had a lozenge in his mouth, a circumstance the officer himself stated would invalidate the test.

This rendered the subsequent Intoxilyzer demand unlawful.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the officer's credibility, the s. 8 Charter violation, and the s. 24(2) Charter analysis for excluding the evidence, emphasizing the officer's misleading testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of driving with an excess amount of alcohol in his blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the accused alleged Charter violations and sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence.

The court found no s. 8 or 10(b) violation but determined that the accused's s. 9 Charter rights were violated when he was unjustifiably held at the police station for approximately four hours and twenty minutes after the investigation was completed.

The court declined to grant a stay or exclude evidence but considered whether a sentence reduction below the statutory minimum was an appropriate remedy for the Charter breach.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

Police observed the accused in the driver's seat of a truck in a motel parking lot known for drug activity.

Following an initial investigative detention for suspected drug offence, officers discovered the accused had consumed alcohol and administered an approved screening device test, which the accused failed.

The accused was arrested and subsequently provided breath samples at the police station showing readings of 160 and 170 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the detention, the administration of the breath tests, and argued the accused had rebutted the presumption of care or control.

The court found the detention lawful, the breath tests administered as soon as practicable, and the presumption of care or control was not rebutted.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with driving with an excess amount of alcohol in his blood.

The accused alleged violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of breath readings.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 10(b) rights.

However, the court found a breach of section 9 rights due to arbitrary detention (overholding) for approximately four hours and twenty minutes after the investigation was complete.

The court rejected a stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence as remedies, finding that the breach occurred post-offence and was unrelated to evidence gathering.

The breath test readings were admitted and the accused was found guilty, with the court indicating it would consider a sentence reduction as a remedy for the section 9 breach.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown withdrew the over-80 charge and did not introduce breath test results.

The defence initially pursued a Charter application but abandoned it after evidence was heard.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's poor driving was caused by alcohol impairment rather than a medical condition or language barrier.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on the totality of evidence, including aggressive driving patterns, inconsistent defence testimony, and the accused's behaviour following police intervention.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the defendant drove into a commercial plaza parking lot in Brampton where he was stopped at a fixed-point sobriety check stop.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the detention, the grounds for the approved screening device demand, and the voluntariness of statements made in the breath room.

The court found the detention was authorized under the Highway Traffic Act and common law, the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption based on bloodshot eyes and odour of alcohol on the breath, and the defendant's statements were voluntary given the multiple cautions provided and the fair manner in which the breath technician conducted the proceedings.

Expert toxicological evidence established the defendant's blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving after being acquitted at trial of the related “over 80” offence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding impairment beyond a reasonable doubt and improperly reversed the burden of proof in dismissing a Charter s. 8 challenge to the breath demand.

The Superior Court held that, when read as a whole, the trial judge correctly found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand a breath sample.

Any misstatement regarding the burden of proof caused no miscarriage of justice, particularly since the appellant was acquitted on the over‑80 charge.

The appellate court further found no error in the trial judge’s factual or credibility findings and confirmed that impairment and over‑80 are distinct offences that may yield different verdicts.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction decision acquitting the accused of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg and staying an impaired driving conviction due to an alleged Charter breach.

The trial judge had excluded the certificate of analysis because police made only an approved screening device demand rather than the required approved instrument demand, and had stayed the impaired driving charge due to the accused being detained for approximately ten hours after providing breath samples.

The appellate court held that the acquittal on the over‑80 charge was correct because the statutory presumption required strict compliance with the approved instrument demand under the Criminal Code.

However, although the extended detention constituted an arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Charter, the trial judge erred by imposing a stay of proceedings without applying the correct legal framework for such a remedy.

The appropriate response to the Charter breach was a lesser remedy, such as sentence reduction.

The stay was therefore set aside, a conviction entered for impaired driving, and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He brought a Charter application challenging the validity of the approved screening device (ASD) test and the subsequent breathalyzer readings, arguing violations of s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure), s. 7 (life, liberty, and security), s. 9 (arbitrary detention), and s. 10(a) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that the officer properly investigated whether the accused had consumed non-alcoholic substances prior to the ASD test and was entitled to rely on the "Fail" result to form reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand.

The accused was found guilty and sentenced to a $1,000 fine and a one-year driving prohibition.

The defendant was found sleeping in his parked car at a fast food restaurant in Mississauga with a blood alcohol concentration of 180 mg/100ml.

He was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The Crown and defence agreed that the defendant was arbitrarily detained for approximately 4.5 to 7 hours after the investigation was complete.

The court found the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle based on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which the defendant failed to rebut.

The court also found a breach of the defendant's section 9 Charter rights regarding arbitrary detention but declined to grant a stay of proceedings, instead imposing a reduced sentence as the appropriate remedy.

The Crown brought an application to recall Constable Bell to provide additional evidence regarding the location and circumstances of a vehicle stop.

The defence raised a Charter argument regarding arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, arguing the stop occurred on private property without legal authority.

The Crown sought to recall the witness to elicit evidence relevant to this Charter issue, which had not been specifically particularized in the defence's notice of application.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that while the defence was not at fault for failing to provide specific notice due to inadequate disclosure, it had an ongoing obligation to alert the Crown once the issue became apparent.

The court balanced procedural fairness to both parties and permitted the Crown to recall the witness to address the Charter claim.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging a violation of section 11(b) of the Charter (right to be tried within a reasonable time) and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The trial commenced on September 22, 2014, but was adjourned to February 26, 2015 due to underestimation of trial time.

The defendant's section 11(b) application was heard on February 26, 2015, and the court reserved judgment.

The application was dismissed on July 8, 2015.

The court found that the total delay of approximately 25 months should be apportioned as follows: delay subject to waiver (6 months), inherent time requirements (8 months and 1 week), actions of the defence (4 months), and institutional delay (7 months).

The institutional delay fell below established guidelines, and the defendant failed to establish actual prejudice resulting from the delay.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The trial addressed five key issues: whether dangerous driving was proven; whether the arrest and breath demand were lawful; whether the right to counsel was violated; whether evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter; and whether impaired driving was proven.

The court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving and excess blood alcohol concentration, but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, despite a blood alcohol concentration of 2.5 times the legal limit.

The Crown appealed acquittals on impaired operation and over-80 charges arising from a roadside stop involving swerving, indicia of alcohol consumption, and later breath readings of 140 mg.

The appeal court held that the trial judge reasonably found the respondent had clearly waived the right to counsel, and that the police-created delay in arranging an unnecessary duty counsel call meant the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The certificate evidence was therefore properly excluded.

On the impaired operation count, the court held the acquittal was reasonably supported by the evidence, given the limited bad driving and minimal indicia of impairment.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for excess blood alcohol, arguing that the trial judge erred in upholding the arresting officer’s grounds, rejecting a right-to-counsel breach, and finding the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court held that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the driving conduct and multiple indicia of impairment, notwithstanding some inconsistencies with later video evidence.

The court further held that the appellant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult duty counsel in private and adduced no evidence that the video presence impaired that consultation.

Finally, the court found the breath samples, taken within 65 and 88 minutes of driving, were obtained as soon as practicable in the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed and the stay of the driving prohibition was vacated.

Summary conviction appeal from convictions arising out of an impaired care and control investigation where the appellant was found asleep in the driver's seat of a vehicle stopped in a live lane with the engine on and gear in drive.

The appellant argued the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable, the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand, and the evidence did not prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal court held that the police acted reasonably in waiting in the sally-port and in contacting duty counsel given the appellant's state of intoxication, and that the officer had sufficient grounds based on the totality of observations.

The court further held that the trial judge's conclusion on impaired care and control was open on the evidence and the appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol after registering a fail on an approved screening device (ASD) at the roadside.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained at the police station.

The defence argued that the ASD result was unreliable due to the presence of a throat lozenge in the accused's mouth and the officer's failure to consider the effects of certain foods and substances on the device, as outlined in an Ontario Provincial Police memorandum.

The court found that the officer could not have reasonably relied on the ASD result and that the breath samples were obtained in violation of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded and the accused was acquitted.