Douglas R. Lent

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after his vehicle went into a ditch on a rural road.

The trial addressed three key issues: whether the defendant was in care or control of the motor vehicle; whether police had lawful grounds to make demands under section 254 of the Criminal Code; and whether breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the defendant was in care or control, the police had lawful grounds for their demands, and the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following a RIDE programme stop.

Three issues emerged at trial: whether the defendant's section 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated by an improper breath demand; whether the defendant's section 10(a) Charter right to be informed of the charge was breached; and whether the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer failed to follow mandatory protocols established by the Ontario Provincial Police regarding the reliability of the approved screening device, specifically failing to eliminate the possibility of false positives from sugary foods and beverages and failing to conduct required self-tests.

The court concluded that the officer's reliance on the screening test result was unreasonable, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 8 Charter right.

The breath test results were excluded as a remedy, resulting in a verdict of not guilty.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on Mr. Waisanen for impaired driving.

Mr. Waisanen had initially received a conditional discharge and no driving prohibition, despite a conviction for impaired driving, due to a trial judge's finding of a Charter breach (arbitrary detention).

A previous appeal had overturned the stay of proceedings and clarified that the police conduct, while a Charter breach, was not egregious enough to warrant such a significant sentencing reduction.

This court found the conditional discharge and lack of driving prohibition to be an unfit sentence, emphasizing the paramount sentencing objectives of general and specific deterrence, especially given the high blood alcohol readings.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to a fine and a mandatory driving prohibition.

The Crown appealed Kelly's acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams, which resulted from the exclusion of breath test results due to a s. 8 Charter violation.

The trial judge found that the police officer administered an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test despite knowing the respondent had a lozenge in his mouth, a circumstance the officer himself stated would invalidate the test.

This rendered the subsequent Intoxilyzer demand unlawful.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the officer's credibility, the s. 8 Charter violation, and the s. 24(2) Charter analysis for excluding the evidence, emphasizing the officer's misleading testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the defendant drove into a commercial plaza parking lot in Brampton where he was stopped at a fixed-point sobriety check stop.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the detention, the grounds for the approved screening device demand, and the voluntariness of statements made in the breath room.

The court found the detention was authorized under the Highway Traffic Act and common law, the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption based on bloodshot eyes and odour of alcohol on the breath, and the defendant's statements were voluntary given the multiple cautions provided and the fair manner in which the breath technician conducted the proceedings.

Expert toxicological evidence established the defendant's blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving.

The defendant was found guilty.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction decision acquitting the accused of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg and staying an impaired driving conviction due to an alleged Charter breach.

The trial judge had excluded the certificate of analysis because police made only an approved screening device demand rather than the required approved instrument demand, and had stayed the impaired driving charge due to the accused being detained for approximately ten hours after providing breath samples.

The appellate court held that the acquittal on the over‑80 charge was correct because the statutory presumption required strict compliance with the approved instrument demand under the Criminal Code.

However, although the extended detention constituted an arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Charter, the trial judge erred by imposing a stay of proceedings without applying the correct legal framework for such a remedy.

The appropriate response to the Charter breach was a lesser remedy, such as sentence reduction.

The stay was therefore set aside, a conviction entered for impaired driving, and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He brought a Charter application challenging the validity of the approved screening device (ASD) test and the subsequent breathalyzer readings, arguing violations of s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure), s. 7 (life, liberty, and security), s. 9 (arbitrary detention), and s. 10(a) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that the officer properly investigated whether the accused had consumed non-alcoholic substances prior to the ASD test and was entitled to rely on the "Fail" result to form reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand.

The accused was found guilty and sentenced to a $1,000 fine and a one-year driving prohibition.

The defendant was found sleeping in his parked car at a fast food restaurant in Mississauga with a blood alcohol concentration of 180 mg/100ml.

He was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The Crown and defence agreed that the defendant was arbitrarily detained for approximately 4.5 to 7 hours after the investigation was complete.

The court found the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle based on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which the defendant failed to rebut.

The court also found a breach of the defendant's section 9 Charter rights regarding arbitrary detention but declined to grant a stay of proceedings, instead imposing a reduced sentence as the appropriate remedy.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging a violation of section 11(b) of the Charter (right to be tried within a reasonable time) and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The trial commenced on September 22, 2014, but was adjourned to February 26, 2015 due to underestimation of trial time.

The defendant's section 11(b) application was heard on February 26, 2015, and the court reserved judgment.

The application was dismissed on July 8, 2015.

The court found that the total delay of approximately 25 months should be apportioned as follows: delay subject to waiver (6 months), inherent time requirements (8 months and 1 week), actions of the defence (4 months), and institutional delay (7 months).

The institutional delay fell below established guidelines, and the defendant failed to establish actual prejudice resulting from the delay.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The trial addressed five key issues: whether dangerous driving was proven; whether the arrest and breath demand were lawful; whether the right to counsel was violated; whether evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter; and whether impaired driving was proven.

The court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving and excess blood alcohol concentration, but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, despite a blood alcohol concentration of 2.5 times the legal limit.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol after failing a screening test at a RIDE checkpoint in Brampton.

The trial raised two issues: whether the police properly relied on the screening test result to justify a breath demand, and whether the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights were violated.

The court found that the officer reasonably administered the screening test and that the accused was provided with sufficient information and reasonable opportunity to exercise his rights to counsel.

The accused failed to be reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights by not informing police that he had a specific lawyer he wished to contact.

The court found the accused guilty of driving with excess blood alcohol.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial addressed three issues: whether the accused's section 8 Charter right was breached regarding the screening test administration; whether the accused's section 10(b) Charter right was violated by police monitoring of the accused's call with counsel; and whether the Certificate of Qualified Technician was fatally flawed.

The court found no Charter breaches and upheld the Certificate, finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant was charged with Criminal Code and Highway Traffic Act driving offences arising from a three-car collision.

He brought a motion alleging a violation of his section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the scheduled trial date was 13¾ months.

The court assessed the delay against the Morin factors and regional guidelines for institutional delay in Peel Region.

The court found that the intake period was reasonable, the institutional delay was within acceptable parameters for a somewhat complex case, and any prejudice to the applicant was minimal.

The application was dismissed and the trial proceeded as scheduled.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood following two driving incidents on October 1, 2010.

The Crown established that the accused drove erratically on Highway 6 and Highway 5, causing a motor vehicle collision.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings of 270 and 260 mg per 100 mL.

The defence raised multiple Charter applications challenging the arrest, detention, and destruction of surveillance recordings.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused on both charges based on eyewitness identification, observations of impaired driving, and breath test evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg/100 mL following a motor vehicle collision on June 23, 2011.

The Crown relied on breath samples showing readings of 170 and 160 mg/100 mL, officer observations of impairment, and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence challenged the timing of the accident and the reliability of impairment indicators.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the exact time of the accident, preventing reliance on the statutory presumption.

The court also found conflicting evidence regarding impairment, with some officers and the victim not observing signs of impairment despite high blood alcohol readings.

The court rejected a purely scientific definition of impairment in favour of traditional legal indicators.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a motor vehicle accident on November 19, 2011.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer breath samples showing readings of 135 mg/100mL and 127 mg/100mL, and expert evidence regarding retrograde extrapolation to establish excess blood alcohol at the time of care or control.

The defence raised multiple Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the investigation and detention.

While the court found no breaches regarding the roadside screening demand, the right to counsel, or the initial detention conditions, the court found that the accused's reasonable expectation of privacy while using the cell toilet was breached by video monitoring and recording.

The court excluded the Intoxilyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the privacy intrusion and its impact on human dignity outweighed the societal interest in adjudicating the charge on its merits.

The charge was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial decision that stayed a charge of operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg based on an alleged s. 9 Charter breach arising from prolonged detention after breath testing.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s reasons for finding an overholding were sufficient and disclosed no reversible error.

However, the trial judge erred by ordering a stay of proceedings without articulating reasons or applying the governing legal framework for such an exceptional remedy.

The court concluded the breach occurred post‑offence, had no connection to the gathering of evidence, and caused minimal prejudice.

The stay was therefore set aside and a conviction entered, with a reduced fine imposed as a remedy for the Charter breach.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was stopped by police as he exited a licensed establishment that appeared on the Peel Police Last Drink Programme statistics.

The accused challenged the stop as an arbitrary detention violating section 9 of the Charter and challenged the video surveillance of his consultation with counsel as violating section 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found no Charter violations and convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence raised two Charter applications: first, alleging a breach of section 8 rights regarding the validity of the screening demand; and second, alleging a breach of section 9 rights regarding arbitrary detention.

The court found that the screening demand was properly made based on reasonable suspicion and that the detention was justified under section 498 of the Criminal Code as the accused was held until sober and safe to be released.

Both Charter applications were dismissed and the accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the police investigation, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a blended voir dire on the Charter issues and found that the arresting officer failed to properly formulate the requisite reasonable suspicion under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code for the roadside screening device demand, and further failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds under section 254(3) for the breath demand at the police station.

The court found that the officer's testimony regarding what the "F" reading on the approved screening device meant was entirely absent, and the officer admitted he had no grounds to arrest the accused until obtaining that reading.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.