Douglas R. Lent

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle and "over 80", and the imposed sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings on reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand, alleged violations of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter, and the sufficiency of evidence for impairment.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the conviction and the 18-month driving prohibition, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or legal reasoning.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, over 80, and dangerous driving after witnesses observed him driving a white van erratically, including swerving, running a red light, and driving with his feet out the window.

Police followed the van to the accused's residence, where he was arrested.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of his rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), arguing unlawful entry onto his property, failure to facilitate access to counsel of choice, and arbitrary detention.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding the police had an implied license to knock, fulfilled their duties regarding the right to counsel, and reasonably detained the accused due to his extreme intoxication and belligerent behavior.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) following a traffic stop on September 20, 2018.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of her arrest and detention on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to arrest for impaired driving, as the only observations were signs of alcohol consumption rather than impairment.

The court also found that the defendant's detention was unlawful as she was not brought before a justice within 24 hours as required by the Criminal Code.

The Intoxilyzer test results were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following a traffic stop on October 21, 2017.

The defendant challenged the charges on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that while the arrest was lawful and the defendant's section 9 rights were not breached, the police violated the defendant's right to counsel of choice under section 10(b) by failing to adequately facilitate contact with counsel of choice and by not informing the defendant of the option to contact an alternative lawyer.

The evidence of refusal was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving based on the officer's observations and video evidence from the police division.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving over 80mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter and in concluding that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge made no error in concluding that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion for the roadside demand and reasonable grounds for the breath demand.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, despite a delay caused by the police facilitating contact with duty counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with robbery with a knife of an iPhone from the complainant on March 21, 2018.

The Crown's case relied primarily on eyewitness identification evidence, specifically the complainant's yearbook identification and claimed recognition of the accused from prior sightings at a plaza.

The accused denied involvement and testified he was in Toronto with his girlfriend at the time.

The court found multiple frailties in the identification evidence, including significant discrepancies in height estimation, inconsistencies regarding accents and facial coverings, and the unreliability of the recognition evidence based on brief, distant observations.

The court concluded the Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 ml.

At trial, it was found that the police breached his Charter rights by arbitrarily detaining him for five hours after his breath tests, as the officer in charge had no notes explaining the detention.

The trial judge declined to stay the proceedings under s. 24(1) and held that s. 24(2) was not applicable because the breath tests were completed before the over-holding occurred.

On appeal, the court found no error in refusing a stay of proceedings.

However, the appeal court held that the trial judge erred in finding s. 24(2) inapplicable, as there was a sufficient temporal and contextual connection between the breath tests and the subsequent unlawful detention.

Applying the Grant framework, the appeal court concluded that the admission of the breath test results would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired care and control and 'over 80'.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding reasonable grounds for the breath demand, in failing to find a section 9 Charter breach for his detention in the back of a police cruiser during the roadside screening test, and in providing insufficient reasons.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the Charter and reasonable grounds arguments, finding the officer had sufficient grounds and the cruiser detention was reasonably necessary due to heavy pedestrian traffic.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to correct the disposition, entering an acquittal on the impaired count and a conviction on the 'over 80' count.

The appellant, Satgur Singh, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge's findings of guilt were unreasonable, specifically regarding the identification of the appellant as the driver.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's assessment of eight alleged inconsistencies in eyewitness identification evidence.

The court found that the trial judge was alive to the inconsistencies, addressed them fairly, and reasonably concluded that the appellant was the driver.

The cumulative evidence, beyond just eyewitness description, supported the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code to allow the arresting officer in an 'over 80' trial to testify via video link from South Carolina, where he would be on a pre-planned vacation.

The defence opposed the application, arguing it would diminish the right to make full answer and defence and that the technology would impede cross-examination on exhibits.

The court granted the application, finding that the defence failed to show that receiving the evidence by video link would be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, and set out minimal technical requirements for the testimony.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

At trial, the accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of his rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The accused argued that the police failed to accommodate his limited English comprehension, failed to facilitate his right to counsel by not allowing him to speak to a friend, and arbitrarily detained him for seven hours after breath testing.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the accused sufficiently understood his rights, the police made reasonable efforts to contact his friend for a lawyer's name before the accused spoke to duty counsel, and the continued detention was justified given the accused's high blood alcohol level and inability to care for himself.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test results under sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the approved screening device demand and reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand.

The accused also challenged whether the breath tests were conducted as soon as practicable.

The court found the police had reasonable suspicion and reasonable and probable grounds, dismissed the Charter application, and found the breath tests were conducted as soon as practicable.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) following a traffic stop at the Peace Bridge border checkpoint.

The defendant sought to exclude breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found no breach of ss. 8 and 9, as the officer had reasonable suspicion and reasonable grounds based on the odour of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, difficulty opening the trunk, and the defendant's confusion over two simple options.

However, the court found a serious breach of s. 10(b) when the officer delayed facilitating contact with counsel by over an hour, prioritizing the two-hour breath test window over the defendant's Charter rights.

The breath evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).

The defendant was acquitted of the over 80 charge due to lack of evidence.

On the impaired driving charge, the court found insufficient evidence of impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, as the officer's testimony regarding unsteadiness was contradicted by video evidence, leaving only odour, bloodshot eyes, trunk fumbling, and confusion—insufficient to prove impairment beyond reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The Crown relied on observations of erratic driving by civilian witnesses and breath sample analysis.

The accused claimed his poor driving was due to unfamiliarity with his new vehicle's technology and fear of being robbed.

The court rejected the accused's explanations as internally and externally inconsistent, finding them incapable of raising reasonable doubt.

The court also found that the 22-minute delay in obtaining breath samples, which resulted from facilitating the accused's right to counsel, was reasonable and did not violate the "as soon as practicable" requirement.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He argued that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand, that his identity as the driver was not proven, and that the breath tests were not administered 'as soon as practicable'.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in concluding that reasonable grounds existed, that the appellant was the driver, and that the breath tests were administered within a reasonably prompt time following the collision.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 (impaired driving) following a roadside breath test.

The Crown sought to admit breath sample results showing a blood alcohol content of 180 mg%.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the evidence, alleging multiple Charter breaches during his arrest and detention, including unlawful handcuffing before arrest, failure to provide section 10(b) rights, an unlawful pat-down search, and unlawful detention in a police vehicle.

The court found that while the pat-down search was justified on officer safety grounds and the detention in the police vehicle did not constitute a Charter breach, the defendant was unlawfully handcuffed before his arrest.

This serious Charter infringement was found to outweigh the minimal intrusiveness of the breath test itself under the section 24(2) analysis.

The breath sample results were excluded and the charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after his vehicle went into a ditch on a rural road.

The trial addressed three key issues: whether the defendant was in care or control of the motor vehicle; whether police had lawful grounds to make demands under section 254 of the Criminal Code; and whether breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the defendant was in care or control, the police had lawful grounds for their demands, and the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The defendant was convicted.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for 'over 80', arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter applications under s. 10(b) and s. 11(b).

The appellant claimed his right to counsel was violated because police did not offer a Spanish interpreter, and that his trial was unreasonably delayed beyond the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no 'special circumstances' required police to offer an interpreter as the appellant communicated effectively in English.

The court also upheld the s. 11(b) ruling, agreeing that the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances, primarily the gross underestimation of trial time and the expanding defence witness list.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following a RIDE programme stop.

Three issues emerged at trial: whether the defendant's section 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated by an improper breath demand; whether the defendant's section 10(a) Charter right to be informed of the charge was breached; and whether the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer failed to follow mandatory protocols established by the Ontario Provincial Police regarding the reliability of the approved screening device, specifically failing to eliminate the possibility of false positives from sugary foods and beverages and failing to conduct required self-tests.

The court concluded that the officer's reliance on the screening test result was unreasonable, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 8 Charter right.

The breath test results were excluded as a remedy, resulting in a verdict of not guilty.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

Following a trial, the court dismissed Charter applications regarding the right to counsel and the lawfulness of the screening test process.

The accused was found guilty of driving with an illegal blood alcohol concentration of 130 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, which was 50 milligrams over the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of a $1,200 fine plus a $360 victim surcharge (total $1,560) payable within one year, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The court noted the accused's youth, education, lack of criminal record, and strong family support as mitigating factors, but emphasized the seriousness of the offense and the high blood alcohol reading.