G. A. Leach

The defendant, Christopher Judge, was charged with multiple Criminal Code offenses including assaulting a peace officer, failing to stop at the scene of an accident, failing to stop while pursued by police, and dangerous operation of a conveyance, following an incident involving a drug complaint, police chase, physical altercation, and vehicle collisions.

The defendant brought Charter motions alleging arbitrary detention (s. 9) and excessive force (s. 7).

The court dismissed the Charter motions, finding the investigative detention justified and the force used by the officer necessary given the defendant's resistance.

The court found the defendant guilty on all five remaining charges, rejecting his testimony as incredible and unreliable.

This sentencing decision addresses Vernon Hill's guilty pleas to multiple driving offences, including impaired driving and driving while disqualified, along with breaches of bail conditions, committed over several dates.

The court considered the seriousness of the offences, the accused's extensive criminal record involving similar conduct, and significant Gladue factors stemming from intergenerational trauma and addiction.

Despite the tragic personal circumstances and the absence of an accident with injury, the court emphasized specific deterrence and public safety, finding a conditional sentence inappropriate due to the accused's persistent disregard for court orders and public safety.

The judge imposed a total sentence of nineteen months' imprisonment, followed by three years of probation and a fifteen-year driving prohibition.

Darren Smith, a police officer, was found guilty of forgery and uttering for falsifying destruction waivers for surrendered firearms.

The offences were not for personal gain but to avoid inconvenience.

The court considered mitigating factors, including his PTSD and alcohol abuse, and aggravating factors, primarily the breach of trust as a police officer.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with community service, while the defence sought an absolute discharge.

The court granted a conditional discharge with 18 months probation and 75 hours of community service, balancing denunciation and deterrence with the offender's rehabilitation and the less serious nature of the specific crimes compared to other police misconduct.

A police officer was charged with two counts of forgery and two counts of uttering forged documents after he created firearms destruction waivers by forging the signatures of the weapon owners without their authorization.

The officer completed the waiver forms entirely, signed the owners' names, and attested to witnessing those signatures before uploading the documents to the police service's document management system.

The court found that the signatures were material elements of the waivers, that no authorization existed (express or implied), and that the officer possessed the requisite mens rea for forgery (intent to deceive).

The court rejected the defence arguments that the signatures were non-essential, that implied consent existed, and that uploading the documents did not constitute "using" them.

The officer was convicted on all four counts.

The accused, charged with two counts of second-degree murder, applied for judicial interim release (bail).

The Crown presented exceptionally strong evidence, including DNA, cell phone records placing the accused near the crime scene and a pawnshop where victims' items were sold, and testimony from five witnesses alleging confessions or suspicious inquiries.

The proposed sureties, the accused's mother and a friend, were deemed weak due to lack of positive influence, lack of knowledge about the accused's history, and questionable commitment to surety duties.

The court found that electronic monitoring could not compensate for the weak sureties and dismissed the application on both secondary and tertiary grounds, confirming the accused's continued detention pending trial.

The Crown brought an application under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code to allow the arresting officer in an 'over 80' trial to testify via video link from South Carolina, where he would be on a pre-planned vacation.

The defence opposed the application, arguing it would diminish the right to make full answer and defence and that the technology would impede cross-examination on exhibits.

The court granted the application, finding that the defence failed to show that receiving the evidence by video link would be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, and set out minimal technical requirements for the testimony.

The Crown brought an application for a ruling on the admissibility of post-offence conduct evidence against three accused in a first-degree murder trial.

The court deferred the decision on the admissibility of vehicle cleaning evidence, finding it premature to balance probative value against prejudicial effect until further trial evidence was presented.

However, the court granted the admission of evidence regarding alleged witness intimidation by one accused, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to proper jury instructions and prior identification evidence.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of cell phone evidence and the use of a PowerPoint presentation summarizing call detail records at a first-degree murder trial.

The court permitted non-expert telecommunications company representatives to testify about the "general rule" regarding cell phone location in relation to towers, acknowledging exceptions.

The court also allowed the use of a PowerPoint presentation as demonstrative evidence, provided it was amended to be neutral, fact-based, and accurate, with consistent formatting and scale for maps, and subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit thermal-imaging video evidence, lay opinion evidence from a surveillance technician interpreting heat signatures, and demonstration evidence.

The defence objected to the lay opinion and demonstration evidence, and requested the full unedited video.

The court reserved decision on the lay opinion evidence pending further qualification of the witness, disallowed the demonstration evidence due to its high prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value, and permitted the Crown to present an edited version of the thermal-imaging video, finding the timestamp sufficient to convey time gaps.

The accused, indicted for first-degree murder, applied for an order requiring the Crown to produce criminal records and police occurrence reports for all Crown witnesses.

The Crown agreed to provide criminal records but opposed the production of occurrence reports, arguing they were not first-party disclosure and that the third-party disclosure procedure had not been followed.

The court found that occurrence reports from the investigating police service (NRPS) for nine specific Crown witnesses fell within the Crown's first-party disclosure obligation under *Stinchcombe* and *McNeil*, as credibility was a live issue and the reports related directly to the investigation.

However, the court declined to order disclosure from other police services, deeming them third parties, and dismissed the third-party disclosure application due to procedural non-compliance under *O'Connor*.

The applicants, charged with violence and neglect, sought to vacate their election for a judge-alone trial and re-elect for a judge and jury trial.

They argued their initial waiver of a jury trial was not validly informed and that the Crown's refusal to consent to re-election constituted an abuse of process.

The court found the initial election was voluntary and unequivocal, and that the applicants were sufficiently informed, having received some legal advice.

The court also determined that the Crown's refusal to consent did not meet the high threshold for abuse of process, as there was no prosecutorial misconduct that would shock the conscience of the community.

The application to re-elect was dismissed.

On a Crown application in a murder trial, the court considered whether preliminary inquiry testimony of an unavailable inmate witness could be admitted under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the Crown proved on a balance of probabilities that the witness was absent from Canada, largely through hearsay evidence with sufficient indicia of reliability.

However, the court exercised its discretion to exclude the evidence because admission would operate unfairly to the accused, given the centrality of credibility, the witness's potential motive to shift blame, significant internal and external inconsistencies, the availability of surveillance video never put to the witness, and new evidence arising after the preliminary hearing.

The Crown application was dismissed.

In a murder prosecution, the Crown sought leave under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine a Crown witness who was a co-accused and had previously given a videotaped statement pursuant to a plea agreement.

The defence argued the statement was unreliable because of pressure arising from plea negotiations, fear of sanctions, and an apparent inconsistency with surveillance evidence.

The court held that those concerns could be adequately addressed through cross-examination and found the videotaped statement to be a reliable record given under circumstances indicating the witness understood the importance of telling the truth.

Applying the ends of justice analysis, the court granted leave to cross-examine the witness on the inconsistent portion of the statement.

The accused moved for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the Crown's case on charges of second degree murder and the included offence of manslaughter arising from an inmate's suicide in custody.

The court interpreted s. 222(5)(c) of the Criminal Code, defined the elements of threat, fear of violence, and causation, and held there was some evidence on which a properly instructed jury could find that the moving party's conduct, including making and sending a noose, constituted a threat or contributed significantly to the victim's fear of violence and suicide.

Applying the directed verdict test and the circumstantial evidence framework, the court held the case should go to the jury on second degree murder and manslaughter.

The alternative theory that the moving party aided and abetted another inmate was removed from the jury for lack of evidence.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference with a minor complainant during the summer of 2009.

The complainant alleged that the accused engaged in digital penetration on two occasions while she was staying at his home.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming the complainant was an unwelcome intruder whom he had banished from his home after discovering her in a sexual situation with his daughter.

The trial judge rejected the accused's evidence as internally inconsistent and incredible, finding that his professed behavior following the alleged sexual assault of his daughter was unreasonable and unbelievable.

The trial judge accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable, finding her testimony concrete, guileless, and unexaggerated.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of both counts, with the sexual assault count conditionally stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle, resulting in a conviction on sexual interference.

The defendant was charged with driving while disqualified.

At the conclusion of the Crown's case-in-chief, the defence brought a motion for non-suit, arguing there was insufficient evidence that the defendant knew she was disqualified from driving.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendant's acknowledgment of the prohibition order, combined with the certificate of suspension and deemed knowledge provisions under the Highway Traffic Act, provided sufficient evidence of mens rea for a jury to consider.

The Crown objected to the introduction of certain evidence on the basis that it offended the collateral fact rule.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving a 12-year-old complainant.

The defence sought to introduce evidence to impeach the credibility of the complainant's mother and support the theory that the allegations were false and made to deflect responsibility from the mother's own inappropriate conduct toward the accused's autistic son.

The court considered three categories of proposed evidence and applied the collateral fact rule and its exceptions.