John S. Struthers

Following a prior release order modifying bail conditions for multiple accused, the court was advised of a change in circumstances requiring further modification of the recognizances.

The court accepted that the proposed adjustments were necessary in the public interest despite limited disclosure of the underlying circumstances.

The conditions were amended to require each accused to inform the officer in charge of the address at which they would reside with their sureties and to remain amenable to household rules.

For one accused, an existing condition in the recognizance was vacated and replaced with the new residency condition, and a geographic restriction requiring the accused to remain in Ontario was removed.

The court also ordered that the addresses of the sureties not be publicly disclosed absent further court order.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to review a justice of the peace’s order granting judicial interim release to three accused charged with multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences.

The Crown argued that the justice erred in assessing the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under s. 515(10).

The reviewing judge held that although the case involved serious allegations including possession of handguns with obliterated serial numbers, a silencer, and drugs, the justice of the peace did not commit an error in law or principle.

The strength of the prosecution’s case was uncertain due to potential Charter issues concerning warrantless access to a safe and evidentiary concerns linking some accused to the seized items.

The Crown’s request to substitute detention orders was dismissed, though several release conditions were modified to address inconsistencies and strengthen supervision.

The Crown appealed an acquittal arising from impaired driving charges where the trial judge found the arrest was premature due to insufficient reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellate court held that the trial judge erred in law by applying an overly stringent standard when assessing whether the officer had objective grounds for arrest and a breath demand.

The court further held that the trial judge failed to conduct the required Charter s. 24(2) analysis after finding a potential Charter breach.

The right to counsel under s. 10(b) was a live issue and required proper consideration, particularly regarding the accused’s request to contact counsel of choice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and marijuana and with trafficking offences arising from a police wiretap investigation known as Project Gladiator.

The defence brought a Charter application challenging a Highway Traffic Act stop used to identify the accused as the driver involved in a suspected drug transaction.

The court held the stop did not violate ss. 7, 8, 9, or 10 of the Charter and that, in any event, the identity evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2).

On the merits, the Crown relied largely on circumstantial evidence and surveillance to prove that the accused transported drugs and participated in a conspiracy with two other individuals.

The court found the circumstances highly suspicious but concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that drugs were actually exchanged, that the substance was cocaine or marijuana, or that the accused had the required knowledge for conspiracy to traffic in the specific drugs alleged.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude evidence of a firearm and cocaine found during the execution of a search warrant at his apartment, alleging a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The search warrant was based largely on information from two confidential informants.

The court applied the step 6 Garofoli procedure, providing a judicial summary of excised material and permitting limited cross-examination of the affiant.

The court found the informants' information was credible, compelling, and sufficiently corroborated by police investigation to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

The application was dismissed, with the court noting that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was stopped by police for a by-law infraction at a transit station, which escalated into an arrest and search incident to arrest after an officer observed him moving a bag of drugs.

The accused brought a Charter motion alleging violations of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) rights, arguing the police fabricated the grounds for arrest.

The court dismissed the Charter motion, finding the officer's account credible and that reasonable grounds existed for the arrest.

The accused was found guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking and not guilty of possession of proceeds of crime.

The accused was charged with manslaughter following the death of her common-law spouse, who was cut during an altercation at a house party.

The Crown sought to admit a portion of the accused's statement to police made during a 15.5-hour interrogation.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused, rendering her detention unlawful and a breach of section 9 of the Charter.

Furthermore, the police violated the accused's right to silence by using a Commissioner of Oaths to compel a KGB statement under threat of criminal sanction.

The court excluded the statement under both the common law confessions rule and section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with three counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana), two counts of simple possession (marijuana and oxycodone), and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

Following a trial based on circumstantial evidence, the defendant was found guilty of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The defendant was acquitted of the cocaine trafficking charges and the oxycodone possession charge due to reasonable doubt regarding possession, despite the court's suspicion of guilt.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant testified that she awoke to find the accused engaged in sexual activity with her while she was asleep in her bedroom.

The accused claimed the complainant was kissing him back and that he believed she had consented.

The court found that the complainant did not consent as she was incapable of consenting while asleep, and that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The court rejected the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, finding no air of reality to the defence given the circumstances and the accused's self-induced intoxication.

In a judge-alone retrial involving historical allegations of sexual abuse by a mother's intimate partner against two child complainants, the court separately assessed the allegations because evidence of collaboration undermined the force of similar fact reasoning.

The court found the evidence relating to one complainant insufficiently reliable to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given inconsistencies, frailties in disclosure, and surrounding family dynamics.

However, the allegations of the other complainant were accepted as credible and reliable, supported by circumstantial evidence and, most significantly, a surreptitious tape-recorded conversation treated as containing implicit admissions.

Convictions were entered on two counts, with acquittals on the remaining two.