I. McCuaig

The accused, charged with importing cocaine, brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case.

The accused argued there was no evidence he caused his suitcase to clear customs or intended to import the drugs, as he was merely transiting through Canada to London.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding that the actus reus of importing commences when drugs cross the border into Canada, and the mens rea requires only an intention to bring the drugs into Canadian territory, not an intention to clear customs.

The court concluded there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to find the accused guilty.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for sentencing after the defendant was found in civil contempt for breaching multiple court orders requiring him to remove defamatory internet postings and cease publishing further defamatory statements.

The defendant engaged in a years-long campaign of vilification and deliberately flouted the court's orders, only purging his contempt shortly before sentencing.

The court found that a fine or conditional sentence would be inadequate given the defendant's history of non-compliance and the need for deterrence.

The defendant was sentenced to four months of incarceration without remission.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possessing ammunition while prohibited, arguing the trial judge misapplied the principles of circumstantial evidence by failing to consider plausible alternative explanations for how bullets ended up in his jacket.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly rejected the appellant's alternative theories as speculative rather than reasonable possibilities based on the evidence.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge reversed the onus of proof or provided insufficient reasons.

The applicants, charged with human trafficking offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay was approximately 32 months.

The central issue was whether a delay caused by defence counsel's unavailability following an adjournment necessitated by late Crown disclosure should be attributed to the defence.

The court held that the pre-Jordan principles in Godin no longer apply, and that periods where the court and Crown are ready but the defence is not must be deducted as defence delay.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to dismiss the mother's appeal for delay.

The mother had appealed a summary judgment order that granted custody of the children to the father and limited her to supervised access.

Applying the test for dismissing an appeal for delay, the court found that while the delay was not inordinate, the mother failed to demonstrate that her appeal had arguable merit.

The court also considered the children's best interests, emphasizing the need for stability and finality.

The motion was granted and the appeal was dismissed.