Graham Stanley Ragan

Nine parties brought motions to intervene in an action concerning the interpretation of the Robinson Huron Treaty and the boundaries of the plaintiff's reserve lands.

Eight of the proposed intervenors were neighbouring First Nations who are also signatories to the Treaty, while the ninth was an unincorporated litigation trust.

The Superior Court of Justice granted party intervenor status to the eight First Nations, finding they had a direct interest in the boundary dispute and could provide useful context without overwhelming the plaintiff's case.

The court imposed strict conditions on their participation to prevent undue delay.

The motion by the litigation trust was dismissed, as it was not a rights-holder itself and its participation would be duplicative and unduly prejudicial to the plaintiff.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a Board decision requiring her to reimburse OHIP over $600,000 for COVID-19 vaccinations administered at mass clinics.

The Board found the applicant failed to meet strict billing requirements for delegated services because the medical students and other physicians who administered the vaccines were not her 'employees'.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's interpretation of the delegation requirements as reasonable.

However, the Court found the Board's refusal to grant relief under the 'extenuating circumstances' provision of the Health Insurance Act was unreasonable, given the context of the global pandemic and the applicant's good faith efforts to facilitate mass vaccinations.

The matter was remitted to the Board to determine the appropriate reimbursement amount.

The applicant, a psychologist, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) confirming an Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) order requiring him to complete a specified continuing education and remediation program.

The applicant argued the HPARB decision was unreasonable because the ICRC failed to address his submissions regarding a significant delay in the investigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that while the ICRC should have addressed the delay, the HPARB reasonably considered the issue and concluded the delay did not result in an inadequate investigation or a denial of procedural fairness.

The moving party hospital sought to compel the responding party physician to answer questions and produce documents regarding his financial income on cross-examination.

The physician had applied for a stay of the hospital's decision to suspend his privileges, alleging irreparable harm to his professional reputation and status, but not financial loss.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the financial information was not relevant to the issues on the stay motion because the physician was not relying on financial harm to meet the RJR-MacDonald test.

The respondent hospital brought a motion to compel the applicant physician to answer questions and produce documents regarding his financial income, which he had refused during cross-examination.

The cross-examination occurred in the context of the physician's motion to stay the hospital's decision to suspend his privileges.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the physician did not allege financial harm in his stay motion, relying instead on loss of professional satisfaction and reputation.

Therefore, the financial information sought was irrelevant to the issues of irreparable harm and balance of convenience.

Following a motion where the court struck a component of the plaintiff's tort claim and ordered parallel family and tort proceedings to be jointly case managed, the court determined costs.

Finding divided success and novelty in the issues, the court fixed costs at $8,500 on a partial indemnity scale.

Given the questionable utility of the second action, costs were ordered payable to the plaintiff in the cause.

The appellant physician appealed a Discipline Committee decision finding he sexually abused a patient and engaged in professional misconduct towards three nurses, resulting in the revocation of his certificate of registration.

The appellant argued the Committee applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and erred in imposing revocation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Committee's credibility assessments were fair, well-reasoned, and entitled to deference.

The Court also upheld the penalty of revocation, noting it was within the reasonable range for sexual misconduct, especially given the appellant's prior history of boundary violations and lack of rehabilitative potential.

The plaintiff commenced a divorce proceeding and a separate civil tort action against the defendant spouse, alleging assault and negligence.

The defendant moved to strike or stay the civil action as an abuse of process, arguing it improperly circumvented the family law regime.

The court declined to strike the entire civil action, finding it is not prima facie an abuse of process to commence a separate tort proceeding.

However, the court struck certain improperly pleaded claims, struck the jury notice, and ordered joint case management of both proceedings to avoid duplication and ensure judicial efficiency.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal the November 30, 2020 order of Davies J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were ordered as neither party filed a bill of costs.

This is an appeal of the dismissal of a medical malpractice claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review, failing to analyze essential components of the plaintiff's theory of liability and explain his findings on the standard of care.

Additionally, the trial judge erred in his contradictory treatment of a formal admission regarding the abscess location, effectively disregarding it despite having previously denied a motion to withdraw it.

This resulted in an unfair trial for the plaintiff.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action appealed a Master's decision upholding a defendant doctor's refusal to answer certain hypothetical questions during his examination for discovery.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master correctly ruled that the doctor was not required to answer hypothetical questions based on factual premises he disputed, nor questions that indirectly asked him to opine on the standard of care or decisions of other medical professionals involved in the infant plaintiff's care.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee revoking his medical licence for engaging in a sexual relationship with a former patient shortly after the termination of the doctor-patient relationship.

The Divisional Court found the penalty unreasonable because it vastly exceeded the typical range of penalties imposed in similar cases without adequate justification.

Furthermore, the Committee's finding that the appellant posed an ongoing risk to the public was not supported by clear and cogent evidence.

The appeal was granted and the matter of penalty was remitted to the Committee for reconsideration.

The applicants appealed a decision by Tarion Warranty Corporation regarding defective hardwood flooring in their new home.

The applicants sought over $17,000 to replace the entire floor, alleging improper installation.

Tarion and the builder maintained that only localized repairs and touch-ups were necessary, offering $1,800 in compensation.

The Tribunal accepted the expert evidence that the damage was limited and repairable, largely caused by elevated moisture rather than installation errors.

However, the Tribunal ordered Tarion to pay $2,400, reflecting the builder's revised estimate for the necessary repairs.