Patricia Irene McMahon

The appellant, Baron Alloway, appealed two Highway Traffic Act tickets after being deemed not to dispute them due to non-attendance at a rescheduled trial.

He claimed he never received the Revised Notice of Trial.

The court considered Section 87(2) of the Provincial Offences Act, which establishes a rebuttable presumption of mail delivery.

The appellant provided an affidavit and testified unequivocally that he did not receive the notice, and this evidence remained uncontradicted.

The court found the presumption rebutted and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

The appellant sought to set aside two de facto guilty pleas for speeding tickets, arguing he was unaware of the consequences on demerit points and insurance coverage.

The court considered whether demerit points and insurance changes constitute "legally relevant collateral consequences" for an informed plea in provincial offence matters.

The court held that these are generally not legally relevant collateral consequences.

Applying the Wong analysis in the alternative, the court found the appeals failed the objective test for sufficiently serious undisclosed information.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The decision also provides guidance on affidavit requirements for future appeals seeking to vacate guilty pleas.

The appellant appealed a denied reopening of a deemed conviction for disobeying a stop sign, arguing inability to respond due to COVID-19 court closures.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to demonstrate that their inability to respond was "through no personal fault" as required by the Provincial Offences Act.

The court emphasized that the pandemic did not serve as a blanket excuse for inaction, especially given available online services, and stressed the need for appellants to provide specific details and supporting affidavits for such claims.

The defendant brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The charge was operating a motor vehicle while using a handheld communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, alleged to have occurred on February 20, 2018.

The matter proceeded through multiple adjournments over approximately 24 months.

The court applied the framework established in R v Jordan, determining that the presumptive ceiling for Part 1 Provincial Offences Act matters is 18 months.

After deducting periods of delay attributable to the defence, the net delay was approximately 15 months, falling below the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant, a woman of colour, sued her former employer for constructive dismissal, alleging racial discrimination.

The motions judge struck paragraphs of her statement of claim that alleged systemic discrimination against employees of colour, holding that only discriminatory acts directed specifically at the appellant could be pleaded.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no principled basis to distinguish between direct discrimination and systemic discrimination for the purpose of pleading discriminatory conduct to support a wrongful dismissal claim.