Kevin Wiedekowsky

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay, arguing the 18-month Jordan ceiling for Provincial Offences Act matters was exceeded.

The total delay from the filing of the Certificate of Offence to the trial date was 31 months and 11 days.

The court considered the COVID-19 pandemic as a discrete exceptional event and deducted 22 months and 6 days (from May 29, 2020, to April 4, 2022) from the total delay, resulting in a net delay of 9 months and 7 days.

As this net delay was below the presumptive ceiling, the onus shifted to the applicant to demonstrate meaningful efforts to expedite the proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

Finding no evidence of such efforts by the defence, the court dismissed the application for a stay.

The appellant appealed his conviction for disobeying a sign prohibiting U-turns contrary to section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant argued that he did not make a U-turn because he pulled off the roadway into a private driveway to change direction.

The appellant also raised concerns about trial fairness, alleging the trial justice became an advocate for the prosecution.

The appellate court upheld the conviction on the merits, finding that the appellant's manoeuvre constituted a prohibited U-turn under the statutory definition.

However, the court varied the conviction to a different offence under municipal by-law to avoid adverse insurance consequences, with the consent of the respondent.

The defendant was charged with careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act after his Toyota Corolla collided with the rear of a KIA Sorrento SUV at an intersection controlled by traffic lights.

The Crown's case rested on the testimony of the vehicle owner who was struck and an independent witness who observed the collision.

The defendant claimed the struck vehicle had entered the intersection on a green light and then abruptly stopped on the pedestrian crosswalk when the light changed to yellow, forcing him to brake suddenly on a wet road surface.

The court found the defendant's testimony to be implausible, internally inconsistent, and contradicted by credible independent evidence.

The court determined that the defendant failed to maintain a safe following distance and speed appropriate for the wet road conditions, and that he did not exercise due diligence to avoid the collision.

The defendant was convicted of careless driving.

The defendant, owner of a residential townhouse in Brampton, was charged with using or permitting her property to be used as a lodging house in contravention of the City of Brampton Zoning Bylaw 270-2004.

The prosecution relied primarily on evidence of locks on bedroom doors observed during inspections and the officer's belief that individuals present were boarders.

The defendant testified she rented to only one family member and that the locks predated her ownership.

The court found that while locks on doors are one factor indicative of lodging house use, the presence of locks alone, without evidence of a rental relationship, multiple lodgers, or shared facilities, was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the property was being used as a lodging house.

The defendant was acquitted.

An employee of a car dealership was convicted of unauthorized use of a dealer plate while driving a vehicle with a dealer plate on her way to work.

The trial judge relied on erroneous evidence from the arresting officer that dealer plates could only be used by the owner, a family member of the owner, or for purposes related to the sale of a vehicle.

On appeal, the court found that the regulation permits private use of dealer plates by persons other than the owner and owner's family, and that the trial judge erred in law by accepting the officer's incorrect interpretation of the regulation.

The appellant, an employee of a car dealership, was convicted of unauthorized use of a dealer plate after being stopped while driving to work.

The trial judge relied on the arresting officer's testimony that dealer plates could only be used by the owner, a family member, or for demonstration purposes.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in law, as the regulation permits private use of a dealer plate by persons other than the owner and their family.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered to determine if the vehicle was part of the dealer's inventory.