Todd Carlton Hein

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary orders regarding decision-making responsibility for the parties' twin children.

While most issues were settled, the parties disputed decision-making for the children's religion and spirituality.

The mother sought sole decision-making to allow the children to participate in Catholic sacraments, including First Communion, while the father objected based on unparticularized concerns about the Catholic faith.

The court granted the mother temporary sole decision-making responsibility for religion and spirituality, finding it in the children's best interests to maintain the status quo of their religious upbringing and participate fully in their faith.

The father appealed a final family arbitration award that resolved parenting, child support, spousal support, and property issues.

He alleged procedural unfairness, bias, and errors in the arbitrator's parenting and financial decisions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The court held that the arbitrator's decisions, including imputing income due to the father's non-disclosure and awarding primary residence to the mother, were amply supported by the evidence and entitled to significant deference.

The mother appealed a trial decision in a high-conflict parenting dispute, which had resulted in an order for joint custody with parallel decision-making authority and equal parenting time.

The trial judge had rejected the mother's allegations against the father and the OCL's recommendation for sole custody to the mother.

The mother alleged errors regarding hearsay evidence, consideration of children's wishes, application of the maximum contact principle, the trial judge's jurisdiction to vary prior orders, and the award of costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's factual findings, assessment of evidence, or application of legal principles.

The court affirmed that OCL recommendations are not binding, the maximum contact principle does not mandate equal parenting time, and a trial judge has broad jurisdiction to make final parenting orders, not being bound by interlocutory orders.

The costs award against the mother was upheld due to her unreasonable conduct during the litigation.

The respondent father brought a motion for the immediate pre-trial sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home.

The applicant mother opposed the sale and sought an order for the father to cooperate in renewing the mortgage, arguing that their 19-year-old child with autism and intellectual disabilities required the stability of the home and its proximity to specialized school programs.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding that a pre-trial sale would irreparably prejudice the mother's claim for exclusive possession at trial and negatively impact the vulnerable child.

The court granted the mother's request, ordering the father to cooperate in refinancing the matrimonial home.

The parties separated after the respondent mother left the family home with the children to a women's shelter, alleging the applicant father was abusive and a threat due to his rigid religious beliefs.

Following an 18-day trial, the court rejected the mother's allegations of abuse and neglect, finding the father to be a competent and involved parent.

The court declined to follow the recommendations of the Office of the Children's Lawyer, which had suggested sole custody for the mother and restricted access for the father.

Instead, the court ordered joint custody with equal parenting time on an alternating weekly schedule.

Due to the parties' inability to communicate, the court ordered parallel decision-making, granting the father authority over medical decisions and the mother authority over education.

Finally, the court imputed income to the underemployed father based on his historical earnings as a counsellor for the purpose of calculating child support.

Four defendants—two individuals and two corporations—were convicted of multiple offences under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002 for failing to provide proper direct agreements, engaging in unfair practices through false representations, and failing to provide refunds to consumers.

The prosecution sought custodial sentences for the individuals and substantial fines for the corporations.

The court rejected custodial sentences, finding that while the conduct was blameworthy, it did not rise to the level of intentional fraud seen in comparable cases where contractors absconded with deposits or provided no work.

Instead, the court imposed significant fines, probation with restitution conditions, and additional restrictions on the primary offender.

This regulatory prosecution concerned allegations that electrical contractors and their principals breached Ontario’s Consumer Protection Act, 2002 in home-service transactions.

The court considered whether the consumer contracts were direct agreements, whether required contract terms and cancellation rights were provided, whether refunds were owed, and whether misleading representations were made.

After a lengthy trial, the court found the prosecution had proved offences against some or all of the defendants under the consumer protection regime.

The decision interprets the Act broadly as consumer-protection legislation applying to in-home electrical service agreements.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Electrical Safety Authority Review Panel suspending their Master Electrician and Electrical Contractor licences for 90 days.

The Review Panel found the appellants breached several rules of the Electrical Safety Code, including failing to obtain inspection permits, failing to obtain authorization to reconnect power, installing incorrect equipment, and charging grossly excessive fees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Review Panel's interpretation of the Code was reasonable, the appellants had sufficient notice of the allegations against them, and the remaining issues were questions of fact over which the court had no jurisdiction.

The appellant buyer appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for specific performance and damages arising from an aborted real estate transaction.

The respondent sellers relied on an annulment clause to terminate the agreement after a third party registered a Certificate of Pending Litigation on the property just prior to closing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant's correspondence on the closing date amounted to a demand for clear title rather than a request to extend closing, and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff purchaser sued the defendant vendors for specific performance or damages after a real estate transaction failed to close.

The transaction aborted because a third party, a previous prospective purchaser, registered a certificate of pending litigation against the property days before closing.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action, relying on the annulment clause in the agreement of purchase and sale.

The court granted the motion, finding the defendants acted reasonably and in good faith, and were unable to remove the certificate of pending litigation by the closing date, meaning the agreement came to an end by its own terms.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order disqualifying the respondent’s counsel due to a conflict of interest arising from a prior consultation with a lawyer from the same firm.

During the consultation, the applicant discussed confidential information regarding the contemplated family law dispute and provided a retainer before the conflict was discovered.

The firm attempted to implement a “Chinese wall” and asserted that no confidential information had been shared with the lawyer representing the respondent.

Applying the principles in MacDonald Estate v. Martin, the court held that undertakings alone were insufficient to rebut the presumption that confidential information could be shared within a firm.

Considering the duty of loyalty and the public interest in maintaining confidence in the administration of justice, the court concluded the firm must be disqualified from acting for the respondent.

The applicant sought judicial review of the City of Brampton's decision to remove his name from a priority list for a taxi plate licence.

The City removed the applicant after he failed to provide reliable documentation proving he met the ongoing eligibility requirement of driving a taxicab in Brampton for at least 24 hours a week for 40 weeks of the year.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found that the City's decision was justified, the by-law was valid, and the by-law officer did not fetter his discretion.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The plaintiff and other lien claimants sought a determination of the basic holdback amount under the Construction Lien Act following the sale of a partially completed retirement home project by the defendant mortgagee.

The mortgagee argued the holdback was reduced by payments made to sub-trades during construction.

The court found that the owner violated section 25 of the Act by releasing holdback funds before certificates of completion were issued, and that such a breach could not be cured retroactively.

The court fixed the basic holdback at the full 10% of the value of services and materials provided, plus applicable GST.

Following a lengthy family trial, the court determined costs on written submissions and found the responding party's disclosure failures and litigation conduct materially increased complexity and trial time.

The court declined to revisit prior costs awards and rejected the responding party's claim for personal compensation for business time.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the moving party, but full indemnity was not granted because the conduct did not meet an egregious bad-faith threshold.

The court fixed pre-trial, trial, and post-trial fees and disbursements totalling $74,537.43 and characterized the costs as related to child support enforcement and collection.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that the employee had resigned rather than being fired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the issue was fact-driven and the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in analyzing the evidence or applying the law regarding employee resignation.

The parties are neighbours who share a mutual easement for repair over a four-foot strip between their houses.

The appellants built a fence entirely on their own property, which restricted access to the easement from the front to about 26 inches.

The respondents successfully applied for an injunction to remove the fence, arguing it obstructed their use of the easement for equipment like a wheelbarrow.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the easement did not include an ancillary right to cross the appellants' unencumbered property.

Because the fence was built entirely on the appellants' own property and not on the easement itself, it could not constitute an obstruction in law.