Leon Wickham

Magdy Hamdy sought to assess the accounts of his former counsel, Leon Wickham.

The Assessment Officer referred issues of parties and scope to the court.

The court ordered the assessment of all accounts rendered by Mr. Wickham, including those for family law, partition and sale, and criminal charges, rejecting Mr. Wickham's arguments for limited scope.

The court also ruled that Peter Rickards and his law firm, who supervised Mr. Wickham, were not parties to the assessment.

Mr. Wickham was ordered to provide a Solicitor's Brief and an accounting of funds.

Costs were awarded to Mr. Hamdy on a partial indemnity basis, with full indemnity for written materials, and costs were also awarded to Mr. Rickards against Mr. Wickham.

The applicant husband sought to set aside a marriage contract signed shortly before the parties' 2004 marriage, arguing the respondent wife failed to make proper financial disclosure of her substantial trust and estate interests and that he did not understand the contract.

The court found the wife had adequately disclosed her net worth, even overestimating it, and that the husband had received independent legal advice and understood the nature and consequences of the agreement.

The court dismissed the application, finding no material misrepresentation, duress, or unconscionability to justify judicial intervention under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

Following a trial where the defendant was found liable for assaulting the plaintiff, the court determined costs and a request for a declaration under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs pursuant to s. 4(6) of the Victims' Bill of Rights, 1995, finding no reason it would not be in the interests of justice.

The court also granted a declaration that the damages and costs awarded to the assaulted plaintiff survive any future bankruptcy discharge, as the assault constituted bodily harm intentionally inflicted.

Following a lengthy family law trial, the respondent's counsel improperly relied on a three-year-old temporary order to freeze the applicant's business accounts.

The court held that temporary orders do not survive a final judgment unless specifically continued.

On the issue of trial costs, the respondent was the successful party but his costs were significantly reduced due to unreasonable conduct, bad faith (including surreptitiously recording the applicant), and disproportionate legal fees claimed by his counsel.

The applicant was ordered to pay $70,000 in costs to the respondent.

Following an 18-year marriage, the court determined competing equalization claims, a claim for unequal division of net family property, and the respondent’s claim for spousal support.

The applicant alleged the respondent held multimillion-dollar assets in Egypt and that an equal division would be unconscionable because of his conduct and minimal contribution to the marriage.

The court rejected the alleged Egyptian asset claims, disallowed unproven personal loan deductions, fixed the matrimonial home value at $840,000, and ordered an equalization payment of $607,569.66 payable by instalments.

The court held that the respondent had both compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support entitlement, but found the compensatory claim was modest, and restructured support at higher amounts for a shorter duration terminating in 2020.

A restraining order was refused.

In a personal injury action arising from an assault, the defendant moved to exclude two plaintiff medical reports proposed to be tendered under s. 52 of the Evidence Act at a contested damages trial.

The court held that both proposed experts were litigation experts within the meaning of Westerhof and that their reports complied with Rule 53.03(2.1) and Rule 4.1.01(1).

However, the court refused leave under s. 52(2) of the Evidence Act to file those reports in lieu of viva voce testimony, holding that litigation experts must attend trial so the judge can perform the gatekeeper function on qualification and scope of opinion evidence.

The motion was therefore granted, with costs in the cause.

Following a successful motion transferring an application to the Family Court Branch, the responding party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found the application had been commenced in the wrong forum and that the moving party had previously offered reasonable alternatives to avoid unnecessary motion proceedings.

The applicant nevertheless persisted with unsupported legal arguments and rejected offers to discontinue or consent to transfer.

The court held that the opposition was unreasonable and vexatious, warranting substantial indemnity costs.

Costs of $7,446 were awarded.

The responding party brought a motion to transfer an application challenging the validity of a marriage contract to the Family Court branch of the Superior Court of Justice.

The underlying application sought to set aside the contract under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act and obtain declaratory relief regarding jointly owned real property.

The court held that proceedings under the Family Law Act must be commenced and determined in the Family Court in municipalities where that branch exists, pursuant to ss. 21.1 and 21.8 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Because the application fell squarely within the Family Law Act and York Region has a Family Court, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction.

The motion to transfer the proceeding to the Family Court was therefore granted.

The defendants, operators of Turntable Restaurant and Lounge holding a liquor sales licence with a caterer's endorsement, were charged with four offences under Ontario's Liquor Licence Act and regulations arising from a catered event at Natraj Banquet Hall on July 31-August 1, 2011.

The charges were: failing to remove signs of service, permitting use of narcotics on premises, failing to display a Sandy's Law warning sign, and permitting removal of liquor from premises.

The court found the defendants guilty of three charges (failing to remove signs of service, permitting use of narcotics, and permitting removal of liquor) and acquitted them of the Sandy's Law charge.

The court determined these were strict liability offences and the defendants failed to establish a due diligence defence.

The plaintiff purchased a restaurant business and condominium unit.

After closing, she discovered an outstanding municipal work order against the property.

She settled her claim with the title insurer but sued her real estate solicitor for professional negligence, alleging he failed to conduct necessary searches.

The solicitor third-partied the title insurer, claiming a duty to defend and indemnify under an agreement with the Law Society.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the plaintiff's action, finding no negligence as the purchasers had insisted on a short closing and waived searches, and the plaintiff failed to prove any damages.

The court granted the third-party claim, holding that the title insurer had a duty to pay the solicitor's defence costs because the true nature of the plaintiff's claim fell within the scope of the title insurance policy.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding a title insurance claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge and finding that the claim was barred by the exclusions and exceptions relating to leases in the insurance policy.