R.A. Wildman

The applicant father brought an urgent 14B motion to stay the enforcement of a 2013 child support order by the Family Responsibility Office (FRO).

The children had been living primarily with the father since 2014, yet the mother continued to collect ongoing support and arrears, including emergency pandemic relief benefits garnished by FRO.

The court found the issue urgent and ordered a temporary stay of the support order pending a scheduled Motion to Change, noting the mother should not receive ongoing support for children not in her care.

The applicant father, residing in New Brunswick, brought an interjurisdictional variation application to terminate child support for his two adult children and to fix his support arrears.

The respondent mother, residing in Ontario, opposed the reduction of arrears but agreed to the termination dates for child support.

The court terminated child support for the two children effective July 2015 and July 2018, respectively, and calculated the ongoing support amounts based on the applicant's actual income for the intervening years.

The court dismissed the applicant's request to retroactively eliminate spousal support arrears from 2009 to 2014, finding no merit due to his delay in raising the issue, and scheduled a supplementary hearing to finalize the exact arrears amount with the Family Responsibility Office.

The parties reached a settlement on the second day of a family law trial, leaving the issues of costs and minor chattel disputes to the court.

The respondent sought $1,000 in damages for damaged or missing chattels, which the court largely dismissed as petty, save for $150 for a missing video game.

On costs, the court applied Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules, finding the applicant unreasonably delayed accepting the respondent's reasonable settlement offer made months prior.

The respondent was awarded full recovery costs from the date of the offer, fixed at $17,500.

Following a lengthy custody and mobility trial where the applicant mother was largely successful, she sought costs of $276,850.

The respondent father, who was self-represented after having four different lawyers, failed to file costs submissions despite multiple extensions.

The court found the father's behaviour throughout the litigation to be highly unreasonable, unnecessarily prolonging the trial.

Applying the Family Law Rules, the court awarded the applicant costs at the mid-to-high end of partial recovery, fixing the total amount at $97,745 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following a 27-day family law trial where the mother was permitted to relocate to England with the children, the self-represented father requested a further 30-40 day extension to file his costs submissions.

The father had already delayed the process through multiple changes of counsel and had missed a previous peremptory deadline.

The court noted the need for finality and the prejudice to the mother.

The court granted one final, peremptory extension of just over two weeks for the father to file his submissions, and ordered that he bring no further motions without leave.

Following a lengthy family law trial, the respondent's counsel improperly relied on a three-year-old temporary order to freeze the applicant's business accounts.

The court held that temporary orders do not survive a final judgment unless specifically continued.

On the issue of trial costs, the respondent was the successful party but his costs were significantly reduced due to unreasonable conduct, bad faith (including surreptitiously recording the applicant), and disproportionate legal fees claimed by his counsel.

The applicant was ordered to pay $70,000 in costs to the respondent.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion in a status review application regarding two children who had been placed with their maternal grandparents.

The Society sought a final custody order for the grandparents, a continuation of a restraining order prohibiting the parents from contacting the children, and an order denying parental access.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing that access and their involvement in monitoring the grandparents' care should be determined at trial.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother's ongoing conflictual behaviour and the parents' lack of insight as established by a recent parenting capacity assessment.

Summary judgment was granted, placing the children in the grandparents' custody and denying the parents access.

The applicant children’s aid society brought a summary judgment motion within a status review proceeding relating to a prior Crown wardship with access order.

The society argued that the Crown wardship component of the consent order was final and that only the access terms could be reviewed, seeking amendment of the access provisions to facilitate adoption placement.

The respondent parents contended that they consented to the order on the understanding that the children could be returned to them after demonstrating stable housing and parenting capacity.

The court held that several genuine issues for trial existed, including the interpretation of the consent Crown wardship order, the circumstances of the parents’ consent, and the children’s best interests regarding possible return to parental care or adoption.

Summary judgment was refused and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order for Crown wardship without access for two children.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the return of the children to her care.

The court found that the mother had a long-standing history of substance abuse, involvement in domestic violence, and instability, and had failed to demonstrate an ability to meet the high special needs of the children.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue for trial, as the statutory timelines for temporary care had expired and a return to the mother was not a viable option.

The motion was granted, and the children were made Crown wards without access for the purposes of adoption.

Following a family law motion to change involving child support and section 7 expenses, both parties sought costs after a multi‑day hearing and related proceedings.

The court considered the principles in Rules 18 and 24 of the Family Law Rules, including the presumption that the successful party is entitled to costs and the potential effect of offers to settle.

The court found that neither party achieved a result as good as or better than their respective offers.

It further concluded that the applicant pursued unreasonable positions regarding income and extensive section 7 expenses, while the respondent’s settlement offer lacked clarity and was not capable of acceptance.

Finding divided success and unreasonable litigation conduct on both sides, the court exercised its discretion to deny costs to either party.

The applicant society sought an order for Crown wardship without access for an 11-year-old child who had been in care for over 38 months.

The respondent mother withdrew from the trial and abandoned her claim for access.

The court found the child could not be safely returned to the mother due to her ongoing substance abuse, domestic violence issues, and failure to engage in services.

The court ordered Crown wardship without access, finding that access would not be beneficial and would impair the child's opportunities for adoption.

A self‑represented spouse sought spousal support and a proprietary interest in a home following the breakdown of a marriage.

The property was legally owned by the respondent brother‑in‑law, though the spouse and her husband had contributed labour and funds while living there under the belief that the husband would eventually acquire it.

The court rejected claims that the husband owned the property or that the brother held title in trust, but found the owner had been unjustly enriched by the applicant’s contributions.

Applying the principles from Kerr v. Baranow, the court awarded a monetary remedy reflecting half of the mortgage principal reduction and a share of the property’s value increase.

Limited retroactive spousal support was also ordered against the husband.