Deborah Lynn Krick

The appellant appealed his 15-month custodial sentence.

He had been denied bail on a second set of charges and refused a lifting of bail on his first charge.

The second set of charges was later withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge should have considered the six months served on the withdrawn charges as relevant information under section 726.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court agreed with the 15-month sentence but granted 12 months of credit (at a 2:1 ratio) for pre-trial custody.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to time served.

The appellant's appeal was dismissed as abandoned after he failed to appear at purge court and failed to provide the required transcripts.

The appellant subsequently appeared and requested that the matter be listed for a further hearing to consider rescinding the dismissal order.

The Court of Appeal heard submissions from the appellant's counsel but found no basis to rescind the order, noting the missed deadline for providing the transcript.

The appeal remained dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day, arguing it should be reduced to time served (13 months) so his probation period would commence immediately.

He also argued that the one-year conditional sentence imposed on his co-accused created an unjustified disparity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit when imposed and the disparity was justified by differences in the relevant circumstances of the two cases.

The appellant appealed the ten-year driving prohibition imposed for impaired driving causing bodily harm, having already served the custodial portion of his sentence.

The appellant sought a four-year prohibition, while the Crown agreed that ten years was outside the range but submitted that five years was appropriate.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown, granting leave to appeal, allowing the appeal, and reducing the driving prohibition from ten years to five years.

The appellant appealed his sentence for fraud and possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by rejecting uncontradicted information in the pre-sentence report based on its sources.

Considering fresh evidence, including reasons from the Immigration and Refugee Board confirming the appellant's good prospects for rehabilitation, the Court allowed the appeal and replaced the remaining sentence with a 10-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed from a sentence, challenging a probation term excluding him from Muskoka and the trial judge's refusal to vary a probation term prohibiting contact with the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the geographic restriction appropriate given the appellant's intention to leave the area for rehabilitation.

The court also upheld the refusal to vary the no-contact order due to the nature of the offences and the short time since the appellant's release.

The appeal was dismissed without prejudice to a future application to vary.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a committal for trial.

The appellant argued that the committing judge erred in accepting documentary evidence showing that investment funds were transferred to the appellant's own account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the committing judge erred in admitting the evidence, such an error did not constitute a jurisdictional error, and there was a basis for the committal.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentence that would warrant appellate intervention.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for mischief.

The trial judge had convicted her of both mischief and impaired driving.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Judge acquitted the appellant of impaired driving but sustained the mischief conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, finding that the trial judge's finding of mischief was inextricably linked to the conclusion that she was impaired, and the evidence of requisite knowledge for mischief was very weak.