Deborah Lynn Krick

The young person appealed a decision upholding a committal order for trial on a charge of first degree murder.

The appellant argued there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a reasonable inference of planning and deliberation could be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, including the appellant carrying a large knife, making statements about wanting to do something stupid, and his actions before and after the stabbing.

The appellant pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal found that 15 years was outside the appropriate range given the appellant's young age, lack of prior criminal record, and strong rehabilitative prospects.

However, noting the brutal and senseless nature of the group murder, the Court concluded that an increase from the minimum period was warranted.

The appeal was allowed and the period of parole ineligibility was reduced to 12 years.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application for certiorari to quash a committal for trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found no basis in the evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the appellant knew death was a likely consequence of the bodily harm inflicted.

The committal for second degree murder was quashed and a committal for manslaughter was substituted on consent.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal noted that the sentencing judge's reasons were not helpful and failed to address mitigating factors such as the guilty plea and rehabilitative efforts.

However, the Court ultimately concluded that the total sentences imposed were fit in all the circumstances and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement and assault causing bodily harm.

He argued the trial judge applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence and erred in admitting his statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, including the complainant's injuries and the improbability of the appellant's version of events.

The court also noted that the appellant's statement was exculpatory and its admission did not affect the outcome.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided extensive reasons and imposed a fit sentence, and that the fresh evidence would not have changed the disposition.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a 1995 home robbery after being arrested over ten years later.

The Crown and defence made a joint submission for a six-month custodial sentence, but the sentencing judge rejected it and imposed an 18-month sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge failed to explain how the joint submission was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, as required by R. v. Cerasuolo.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to the jointly submitted six months.

The Crown appealed a 12-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded restricted firearm, arguing it was an illegal sentence under s. 95(2) of the Criminal Code which mandates a minimum one-year imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal agreed the sentence was illegal and held that a sentence of two years less a day would have been appropriate.

However, given the respondent's six months of pre-trial custody (credited 2-for-1), seven months served on the conditional sentence, and ten months on restrictive bail, the court declined to re-incarcerate him.

The court substituted a sentence of time served followed by two years' probation.

The Crown appealed a youth court decision that struck down provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) requiring a young person convicted of a presumptive offence to prove that a youth sentence is sufficient and to justify maintaining a publication ban.

The youth had pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the onus provisions violate section 7 of the Charter by presuming adult treatment and reversing the burden of proof for aggravating sentencing factors.

The Court also upheld the youth sentence imposed but quashed the trial judge's order requiring the Crown to pay the youth's costs for the Charter application.

The Crown appealed the sentence of a conditional discharge imposed on the respondent, a lawyer, for three counts of criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence manifestly inadequate, noting the prolonged and escalating nature of the harassment.

The trial judge erred by focusing almost exclusively on mitigating factors and the risk of the respondent's disbarment, while failing to emphasize general deterrence and denunciation.

The appeal was allowed, and a 12-month conditional sentence followed by two years of probation was imposed.

The appellant appealed convictions for counselling and mischief.

The Crown conceded that the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the counselling charge without a proper election, rendering that conviction a nullity.

The Court of Appeal quashed the counselling conviction, leaving the Crown to decide whether to proceed de novo.

The appeal regarding the mischief conviction was dismissed for lack of merit.

The appellant appealed a matter to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

A publication ban was ordered prohibiting publication until the end of the trial.

No reasons for decision or outcomes are provided in the available text.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of a prior sexual assault conviction as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal applied the framework from R. v. Handy and R. v. Blake, finding that the similarities between the prior incident and the current allegations were merely generic and lacked distinctive unifying features.

The court concluded the probative value of the evidence failed to outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who was found not guilty by reason of insanity on a charge of murder in 1976, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his detention in a minimum secure unit with a provision allowing him to live in the community in 24-hour supervised accommodation approved by the person in charge.

The appellant argued the order was defective because the person in charge required a facility with awake staff 24 hours a day, which did not exist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant risk was reasonable and the order was not defective.

However, the Court urged the Board to address the impasse between the treatment team and the person in charge at the upcoming annual review.

The accused, a black man, was charged with robbing an East Indian man.

At trial, the judge permitted the defence to challenge potential jurors for cause based on potential bias against a black accused, but refused to extend the challenge to include the race of the complainant.

The accused was convicted and appealed, arguing he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion.

The Court declined to take judicial notice of a general theory of race-based 'natural sympathy' between jurors and complainants of the same race.

The appellant, an aboriginal man found not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention.

The appellant argued the Board erred in finding he remained a significant threat to public safety and failed to adequately consider his aboriginal background.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the Board has a positive duty to ensure unique factors associated with aboriginal accused are considered under section 672.54 of the Criminal Code, the failure to elicit more information in this case did not amount to a reversible error.

The appellant was convicted of assault after striking a store employee who confronted him for shoplifting.

He appealed to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that he was suffering from diabetic shock during the trial, which impaired his ability to participate.

The appeal judge dismissed the application and the appeal.

On further appeal to the Court of Appeal, the appellant argued the appeal judge erred in rejecting the fresh evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the fresh evidence ruling and concluding the reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

The Court also declined to hear new grounds not raised below.

The young person appealed from a finding of guilt for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on a prior consistent statement (a handwritten letter) made by the complainant to bolster her credibility.

The court held that the letter was introduced only to explain how the allegations came to be reported, and its use to enhance credibility was an error.

The appeal was allowed, the finding of guilt was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his custodial sentence for an impaired driving offence that resulted in a collision with a motorcyclist whose leg was amputated.

The appellant had a very high blood alcohol level, was driving without insurance, and breached a zero-alcohol licence condition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly concluded that general deterrence required a custodial sentence rather than a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of six months' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

On the sentence appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and by failing to explain why general deterrence could not be met with a conditional sentence.

The court allowed the appeal and imposed a 12-month conditional sentence with 40 hours of community service.