Deborah Lynn Krick

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery following a series of violent home invasions.

During the investigation, one of the appellants, Tran, was severely beaten by police officers after turning himself in, resulting in a broken jaw.

The officers attempted to cover up the assault and perjured themselves.

The trial judge found breaches of ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter but refused a stay of proceedings, opting instead to reduce Tran's sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the convictions of the other appellants, finding no errors in the jury charge regarding multiple conspiracies, the Vetrovec warning, or the admission of co-conspirator statements.

However, the Court allowed Tran's appeal and entered a stay of proceedings, holding that the egregious police brutality, compounded by the Crown's conduct at trial, fell into the clearest of cases where a stay is the only appropriate remedy to preserve the integrity of the justice system.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from an order dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal raised no issue of law of general importance and the grounds of appeal were not sufficiently strong to warrant leave.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for aggravated assault endangering life, break and enter, assault with a weapon, and failing to comply with probation.

He sought to set aside his guilty plea, introducing fresh evidence that he was not HIV positive, contrary to an admitted fact during the plea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not undermine the conviction, as the appellant admitted to a severe beating with a vase, biting the victim, and being positive for Hepatitis B and C. The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the global 10-year sentence given the appellant's lengthy record and the significant consequences of the attack.

The appellants, who were each found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) on consent, appealed their verdicts.

They argued that the Criminal Code violates sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by failing to mandate an inquiry into whether an accused's consent to an NCRMD finding is voluntary and informed, similar to the inquiry required for guilty pleas under section 606(1.1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Charter challenges, finding no violation of fundamental justice or equality rights.

The Court also dismissed the appellants' individual arguments regarding the reasonableness of their verdicts, fitness to stand trial, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant appealed the restitution order made at trial following a conviction for fraud.

The trial judge found the amount of fraud was at least $15,645, which was justified by the evidence.

However, the trial judge made an arithmetical error in calculating the final amount.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the restitution order to $10,845.

The appellant appealed his 12-year concurrent sentence for four counts of robbery using a firearm, related to a series of home invasions.

The trial judge had intended the sentence to run concurrently with a 14-year sentence imposed in a separate jurisdiction for related offences.

After the related 14-year sentence was reduced to 10 years on appeal, the Court of Appeal found the 12-year sentence offended the totality principle.

The court reduced the sentence to 8 years and 4 months to align with the time to be served on the related sentence, while rejecting arguments regarding sentence disparity with co-conspirators.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder in the death of his wife by strychnine poisoning.

He argued the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to lead reply expert evidence regarding fatal doses of strychnine and homeopathic remedies, and by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of demeanour in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding the reply evidence was admissible to respond to the appellant's unexpected testimony, and the demeanour instruction was adequate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that acquitted the respondent of driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The appeal judge had found insufficient evidence that the respondent's breath sample was received 'directly' into the approved instrument as required by s. 258(1)(c)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the provision does require the sample to be received directly into the instrument, but found there was ample circumstantial evidence from the breath technician to support the trial judge's conclusion that this requirement was met.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings ordered under s. 11(b) of the Charter in a sexual assault case that took 35.5 months to reach trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the delay was extraordinary for a simple case and was primarily caused by the Crown's desire to join the prosecution with a second charge and institutional delays.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding of prejudice and concluded the delay was unreasonable and unacceptable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and that the trial judge misapprehended defence expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's failure to prepare the appellant for cross-examination on his police statements, the ill-advised decision to call certain defence witnesses, and the failure to cross-examine the complainant on prior inconsistent statements constituted ineffective representation that prejudiced the defence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in her treatment of the defence urologist's expert evidence by misapplying the burden of proof.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his young nephew and niece.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding the use of evidence from multiple complainants, as the Crown did not allege similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to instruct the jury to keep the evidence of each complainant separate and failed to caution against propensity reasoning.

The misdirection constituted an error in law.

The convictions were quashed, a new trial was ordered on five counts, and an acquittal was directed on one count due to an unreasonable verdict.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge failed to explicitly apply the second step of the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge omitted the second step, her overall reasons, including her strong credibility findings, demonstrated she considered whether the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the burden of proof, motive to lie, and the risk of innocent collusion between the complainants.

The young person appealed the decision to sentence him as an adult.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider the immigration consequences and possible deportation resulting from the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's determination, particularly given the position taken by defence counsel at trial and the absence of a proper evidentiary record regarding deportation.

The applicant applied for bail pending his appeal from a conviction for second degree murder.

He argued that the trial judge erred in failing to disclose the identity of a confidential police informer and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The court reviewed the grounds of appeal and found them to be arguable but weak.

Applying the public interest test, the court concluded that the interest in enforceability of the murder conviction outweighed the interest in reviewability.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that excluded expert evidence from a practitioner of traditional Chinese medicine.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the evidence had been admitted on consent at trial and the expert was properly qualified.

The conviction was restored.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held that the sentence was fit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a 17-year-old, pleaded guilty to manslaughter, a presumptive offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The YCJA required the young person to justify why an adult sentence should not be imposed and why a publication ban should apply.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that these reverse onus provisions violate section 7 of the Charter because they are inconsistent with the principle of fundamental justice that young people are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral culpability.

The provisions were not saved by section 1, and the youth sentence imposed by the trial judge was upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 12 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in leaving section 21(2) of the Criminal Code with the jury, in instructing on the doctrine of recent possession, and in defining abetting to include purposeful presence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence of a predicate offence (robbery) and no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 12-year parole ineligibility period was within the appropriate range given the brutal nature of the murder.

The appellant, convicted of a designated sexual offence, challenged the constitutionality of Christopher's Law, which mandates that sex offenders register with police.

He argued the law was ultra vires the province, rendered inoperative by federal paramountcy, and violated his rights under sections 7, 11, and 12 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the legislation was a valid exercise of provincial power aimed at community safety, did not conflict with federal law, and did not constitute punishment.

The court also held that the law did not violate section 7, as its requirements were not overbroad or grossly disproportionate to the objective of protecting the public.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm and other offences, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in classifying an inoperable rifle without a breech bolt as a 'firearm' under the Criminal Code, as there was no evidence that parts to make it operable were available on the scene.

The convictions for robbery with a firearm were quashed and substituted with robbery with an imitation firearm.

The court dismissed the appellant's arguments regarding the admissibility of KGB statements from two witnesses.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court upholding the trial judge's discretion on pre-trial custody credit.