Deborah Lynn Krick

The appellant was convicted of unauthorized possession and careless storage of a sawed-off shotgun and possession of prohibited devices, including a silencer and high capacity magazines.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions relating to the shotgun and silencer on two grounds: first, that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by repeatedly referencing his decision not to testify; and second, that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge did not reverse the burden of proof and that the conviction was well-supported by circumstantial evidence.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his sentence of 14 months custody, arguing for a conditional sentence, which was also dismissed.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm arising from a swing stage collapse at a construction site.

The appellant, a project manager, was convicted of four counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after five workers fell more than 100 feet when the swing stage collapsed.

Only two lifelines were available for six workers, contrary to provincial law and industry practice.

The appellant had authority to direct the workers and was aware of the safety breach but failed to take corrective action.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the conviction and the three-and-a-half-year concurrent sentence, finding no legal error or palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of law.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and forcible confinement.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of seven years' imprisonment.

The appellant abandoned his sentence appeal and challenged only the convictions on three grounds: (1) the trial judge's instructions on the timing of complaints in sexual assault cases; (2) the trial judge's review of evidence relating to two separate incidents on both sexual assault counts; and (3) the overall fairness and balance of the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions when considered in the context of the trial as a whole.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of attempted murder following a judge-alone trial.

The charges arose from the appellant using his motor vehicle as a weapon against two complainants.

The sole issue at trial was whether the appellant intended to kill the complainants.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to consider evidence that, if he had intended to kill the complainants, he would have driven at them while they lay helpless on the ground after being struck.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not make a finding that the complainants had been struck and rendered helpless, having identified credibility and reliability issues with their evidence.

Instead, the trial judge relied on evidence from three independent neighbours and forensic evidence, including photographs showing tire tracks and extensive damage.

The Court upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant pursued the complainants at high speed with intent to kill was reasonable and grounded in the evidence.

A police officer was convicted of 46 offences related to fraud, making false documents, breach of trust, and obstruction of justice arising from nine fraudulent motor vehicle accident reports prepared in 2010 that resulted in insurers paying over $1,000,000 in claims.

The appellant conceded the actus reus but contested whether he was a knowing participant in the fraud scheme.

The trial judge found he was and convicted him on all but six counts, imposing a five-year sentence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of impermissible speculation, the application of the Kienapple principle, and the fitness of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a shooting that occurred during a drug transaction.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in responding to a jury question by failing to instruct the jury on the defence of a third party under former s. 37 of the Criminal Code, and by inadequately addressing the mens rea component of the question.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The court found there was no air of reality to the proportionality requirement of s. 37, as shooting the victim in the core to defend a third party who was not in immediate peril constituted excessive force.

The court also held that the trial judge's instruction on mens rea was correct and comprehensive.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder after his three children tried to kill their mother.

At trial, the Crown theorized that the appellant used his religious beliefs to influence the children, and made inflammatory remarks during closing submissions comparing the appellant to notorious cult leaders and calling him a 'Jesus nut'.

The trial judge did not correct these remarks or instruct the jury on how to use the evidence of the appellant's religious beliefs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Crown's improper comments and the trial judge's failure to intervene rendered the trial unfair and caused a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failing to stop at the scene of an accident involving bodily harm and death.

He argued that he rebutted the presumption of intent to escape civil or criminal liability under s. 252(2) of the Criminal Code because he pulled over after the accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly concluded the appellant knew his vehicle had been struck, stopped only to assess the damage, and left to avoid liability because he was driving without the requisite licence.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for multiple convictions of cruelty to animals.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly inadequate given the gravity of the offences, the respondent's criminal record, his probationary status at the time, and his failure to accept responsibility.

The court allowed the appeal, increasing the sentence to nine months' incarceration and varying the prohibition order to prevent the respondent from residing with any animal or bird.

The appellant was convicted of credit card fraud-related offences after police found skimming equipment, encoded gift cards, and a USB key during a traffic stop and subsequent searches.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the searches of his person, vehicle, and USB key violated his s. 8 Charter rights and the evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the pat-down search was lawful, and while the vehicle and USB key searches breached s. 8, the evidence was properly admitted under s. 24(2).

The court also affirmed that a conviction for possessing credit card data under s. 342(3) does not require proof that the data could successfully defraud an issuer.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, a prolific child sex offender diagnosed as a psychopath, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge conflated risk reduction with risk elimination and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence suggesting psychopaths can be effectively treated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly applied the long-term offender criteria and correctly concluded the appellant's risk could not be safely managed in the community.

The fresh evidence application was also dismissed as it merely offered a concurring opinion to evidence already rejected at trial and lacked sufficient probative value to affect the outcome.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the accused on charges of sexual assault.

The trial judge found that the accused's actions were involuntary and occurred while in an automatistic state caused by a series of small strokes, characterizing it as non-mental disorder automatism.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to presume the automatism was caused by a mental disorder, by treating the medical classification of a brain disease as determinative of the legal classification of a mind disease, and by improperly assessing the continuing danger factor.

A new trial was ordered to determine whether the automatism should result in a verdict of not guilty or not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant pled guilty to multiple charges arising from a series of robberies and break and enters, including robbery with a firearm, unlawful confinement, and use of a firearm in the commission of unlawful confinement.

On appeal, he argued that the Kienapple principle precluded multiple convictions for these offences arising from the same incidents.

The Court of Appeal held that while the unlawful confinement convictions could stand, the convictions for using a firearm in the commission of unlawful confinement must be stayed, as they punished the same criminal wrong as the robbery with a firearm convictions.

The court varied the sentences on the armed robbery convictions to maintain the total sentence of seven years and nine months' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a care or control driving offence and the resulting lifetime driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings met the essential elements of care or control under R. v. Boudreault.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court was satisfied the appellant received proper notice of the Crown's intention to seek increased punishment and the lifetime prohibition was warranted given the circumstances of the offence and the offender.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and provided two breath samples.

The trial judge found a breach of the accused's right to counsel before the first sample and excluded both samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal.

The summary conviction appeal court affirmed the decision, holding that all evidence obtained after the initial breach was tainted.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the lower courts erred by failing to consider whether the accused's consultation with counsel before the second sample constituted a 'fresh start' that severed the nexus between the breach and the second sample, and by failing to conduct a discrete s. 24(2) analysis for the second sample.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that two jurors demonstrated bias during the challenge for cause process, that the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment to retain counsel of choice, and that the jury instructions on the requisite intent for murder were flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for juror bias, no prejudice from the refused adjournment as counsel was re-retained on the second day of trial, and no error in the jury instructions regarding the appellant's capacity and intent.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault with a weapon and aggravated assault, as well as her sentence, following an incident where she punched her spouse, resulting in a ruptured spleen.

The appellant argued that the Crown failed to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt based on the medical expert's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, noting that scientific proof of causation is not required and common sense inferences may suffice.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.

The Court held that broad jury vetting consultations with police should not occur, that relevant jury-selection information from police must be disclosed, and that despite non-disclosure in this case there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have been differently constituted, no unfair trial, and no miscarriage of justice.

The appellant challenged fraud convictions on the basis of improper jury vetting by prosecution offices and police database checks of prospective jurors.

The court held that while disclosure obligations were breached and some vetting conduct was improper, a new trial requires a reasonable possibility that proper disclosure would have produced a differently constituted jury.

On the record, that threshold was not met.

The court also held that the conduct did not amount to a miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.