Deborah Lynn Krick

The appellant was convicted of making, possessing, and distributing obscene material through his websites, which featured simulated explicit sex with violence.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing errors in the admission of meta-tags, hyperlinks, written stories, and expert testimony, as well as deficiencies in the jury charge and a failure to grant a stay for delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and upholding the $28,000 fine as a fit sentence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on five gun-related charges.

The trial judge had excluded a seized firearm and a videotaped statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding the respondent was arbitrarily detained during a pretextual traffic stop contrary to s. 9, and his right to counsel was violated under s. 10(b).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding of a pretextual stop was a factual determination not subject to appellate review, and there was no basis to interfere with the exclusion of evidence under the Grant framework.

The appellant appealed a dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the predicate offence constituted a serious personal injury offence likely to inflict severe psychological damage.

The court upheld the finding that there was no basis for a long-term offender designation and that a dangerous offender designation was necessary.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his conviction for sexual interference, seeking to introduce fresh evidence of the complainant's recantation and subsequent resiling from that recantation.

The Court of Appeal applied the Palmer test and declined to admit the fresh evidence, finding it would not have affected the trial result given the strong corroborating physical and DNA evidence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation following the accused’s conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child.

The defence conceded that the statutory criteria for dangerous offender status were met but argued that a determinate penitentiary sentence followed by a ten‑year long‑term supervision order would adequately protect the public.

The court reviewed extensive expert psychiatric and psychological evidence, actuarial risk assessments, and the offender’s lengthy history of sexual offences against children.

Applying the post‑2008 Criminal Code framework under s. 753(4.1), the court held that an indeterminate sentence must be imposed unless there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

The evidence established only a speculative hope of successful treatment and demonstrated that the offender would require lifelong structure and supervision to manage risk.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for multiple sexual offences arising from allegations by several complainants in circumstances involving crack cocaine use and alleged coercive sexual conduct.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the similar fact evidence was admitted, there was at least an air of reality to possible inadvertent collusion through media reports, rumours, and street communications, and the jury should have been left to assess that possibility when weighing the evidence.

The court also held that, after severing counts involving one complainant to preserve the accused’s ability to testify only on those counts, the trial judge erred in then admitting that complainant’s evidence as similar fact evidence, effectively undermining the accused’s right to silence and control of the defence under ss. 7 and 11(c) of the Charter.

The combined errors required a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in a Corbett application by allowing cross-examination on his entire criminal record, including the underlying facts of prior assault convictions.

The trial judge also instructed the jury that they could use the prior convictions to determine who was the aggressor.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in both the Corbett ruling and the jury instructions, as prior convictions under s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act go only to credibility unless they meet the similar fact evidence test.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, appealed his conviction for fraud.

At trial, he called the investigating officer as his own witness and elicited prejudicial opinion and investigative hearsay evidence.

The trial judge failed to give a limiting instruction on the use of this evidence and instead invited the jury to use it to support the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence was admissible only for a limited purpose and required a clear limiting instruction.

The curative proviso could not be applied, as the evidence provided a clear route to conviction.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, use of an imitation firearm, break and enter, and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully considered the evidence and was entitled to conclude that the circumstantial evidence, including descriptions of clothing and the discovery of a replica gun, proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed the 18-year period of parole ineligibility imposed following a conviction for a brutal domestic homicide.

The trial judge treated the appellant's mental state as a marginal mitigating factor, which was outweighed by significant aggravating factors including the brutality of the crime, a history of violence, and disregard for court orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that set aside the accused's convictions for obstructing justice.

The Supreme Court found that the appeal raised a question of law and that it had jurisdiction.

Adopting the dissenting reasons from the Court of Appeal, the Court held that suggesting a false doctor's note was an integral part of an overall attempt to dissuade a witness from giving evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions restored.

The appellant brought a motion to re-open his previously dismissed appeal against a robbery conviction.

The motion was based on the Crown's failure to disclose a partially vetted jury panel list at trial.

The Court of Appeal expressed doubt about its jurisdiction to re-open an appeal already decided on the merits.

Regardless, the court found no miscarriage of justice, as the non-disclosure did not impact the jury's impartiality or prejudice the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The motion was denied.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, arguing the trial judge applied the wrong legal test for mens rea and that the evidence did not support the finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge stated and applied the correct legal test.

The Court found the evidence fully supported the finding of recklessness, as the appellant spent nine hours at the complainant's business without a legitimate purpose, was obsessed with the complainant, and was aware of the risk his conduct harassed her.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because he lacked sufficient time to stage the crime scene without pre-planning, which the jury rejected by acquitting him of first degree murder.

He also argued the trial judge erred in refusing to disclose information from a confidential informant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the jury to conclude the staging occurred within the available two-hour window, and upholding the trial judge's application of the innocence at stake test to maintain informant privilege.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by allowing his full criminal record before the jury and by finding the arresting officer did not use excessive force.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's detailed reasons or application of legal principles.

The sentence appeal was abandoned and also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of fraud and appealed on two grounds: the trial judge's refusal to allow him to testify about conversations with a business associate regarding NSF cheques, and the Crown's undisclosed jury vetting process using police databases.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence as hearsay, the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because the jury had sufficient other evidence to assess the appellant's state of mind.

Regarding the jury vetting, the Court held that while the Crown breached its disclosure obligations and the police misused databases, the non-disclosure did not impact the reliability of the verdict or the overall fairness of the trial process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the judge improperly considered the actions of others and failed to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge sentenced the appellant solely for his own conduct and properly considered the request for a conditional sentence.

The appeal was dismissed as the sentence was entirely fit.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and break and enter after attacking his former partner and her new partner.

He was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate penitentiary term.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by relying on statements he made during a pre-trial fitness assessment, claiming they were protected under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying R. v. Jones to hold that such statements are admissible at the sentencing stage to accurately evaluate the danger posed by the offender.

The Court also found the appellant had consented to the admission of the psychiatric evidence.

The appellants were charged with the attempted murder of a drug dealer.

After a jury trial, one appellant was convicted of attempted murder, while the other was convicted of the lesser included offence of aggravated assault.

The appellant convicted of attempted murder appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defence's position regarding the mens rea for attempted murder.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the key evidence supporting the appellant's position that he did not intend to kill the victim.

The conviction for attempted murder was set aside and substituted with a conviction for aggravated assault, with a reduced sentence.

The other appellant's appeal regarding the jury instructions on party liability was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice and breach of recognizance after allegedly dissuading a witness from testifying by suggesting he obtain a false doctor's note.

The indictment was particularized to allege dissuasion 'by a threat or other corrupt means'.

The trial judge found the suggestion of a false doctor's note constituted the corrupt means.

On appeal, the majority held that the false doctor's note was not the means of dissuasion, but rather the fear of cross-examination on a prior fraud.

Because the Crown failed to prove the particularized means, and amending the indictment on appeal would prejudice the appellant, the appeal was allowed and acquittals entered.

Blair J.A. dissented, finding the false doctor's note was an integral part of the corrupt means of dissuasion.