C. Anik Morrow

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application following the offender's convictions for sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The offender had an extensive criminal record, including two prior convictions for sexual assault.

The court heard competing expert evidence on the offender's risk of re-offending.

The court found that while the offender had a pattern of repetitive behaviour, the Crown failed to prove beyond a balance of probabilities that there was a likelihood of the offender causing death, injury, or severe psychological damage in the future.

The court also declined to designate the offender as a long-term offender.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10.5 years, reduced to 2 years less a day after credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by 3 years of probation with strict conditions.

The accused applied for a change of venue under s. 599(1)(a) of the Criminal Code in relation to charges of first-degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains.

They argued that extensive pre‑trial publicity, community hostility, and alleged inadequacies in the Sault Ste.

Marie courthouse facilities created a reasonable likelihood of juror prejudice and an unfair trial.

The court reviewed the governing jurisprudence on venue changes and the safeguards inherent in the jury selection and trial process.

It concluded that the applicants failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that community bias or prejudice could not be mitigated through those safeguards.

The court also found that the courthouse facilities were capable of accommodating the trial and that logistical concerns did not justify relocation.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash their committal to stand trial for first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

They argued there was no evidence that the victim was killed while being forcibly confined or regarding the role each applicant played in the killing.

They also argued they were denied natural justice because the preliminary inquiry judge relied on post-offence conduct and specific medical evidence without giving them an opportunity to make submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the applications, finding that the applicants were permitted to address the evidence and were not denied natural justice.

The court further held that even if there was a breach, the applicants suffered no prejudice because a committal was inevitable based on the pre-offence and post-offence circumstantial evidence, which was sufficient to permit a jury to infer a common intention and that each applicant played a substantial and integral role in the killing.

The accused applied for disclosure of contact information for several civilian witnesses who had been interviewed during a homicide investigation but whom the Crown did not intend to call at the preliminary inquiry.

The defence argued that the information was necessary to conduct its own investigation and to prepare full answer and defence under the principles established in Stinchcombe.

The Crown refused disclosure citing specific safety concerns and evidence of intimidation, gang affiliation, and repeated breaches of non‑communication orders by the accused while in custody.

The court held that while witness contact information is generally relevant and normally disclosed, the Crown had established specific and credible security risks justifying withholding the information in this case.

Instead, the court adopted a structured procedure allowing defence counsel to interview willing witnesses at the courthouse while protecting witness safety and confidentiality.