Deborah Lynn Krick

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and choking with intent, as well as his sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's decision to permit cross-examination on his prior conviction for attempted murder under the Corbett framework, and alleged improper Crown conduct during cross-examination and closing argument.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to allow the cross-examination given the defence's all-out attack on the complainant's credibility and the absence of other evidence to neutralize that attack.

The Crown's conduct was found to be vigorous but proper advocacy.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded that the dangerous offender hearing should have proceeded under post-2008 legislation but sought to uphold the designation under the curative proviso.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the curative proviso was unavailable due to significant evidentiary overlap between the designation and sentencing stages and the possibility that fresh evidence could affect the designation determination.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of his common-law wife from a single stab wound.

He appealed his conviction on four grounds: failure to answer a jury question regarding mental state for murder; admission of bad character evidence; admission of a 911 call; and misdirection on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly admitted the evidence and gave appropriate jury instructions.

The first ground was abandoned after fresh evidence established the jury question was answered timely.

The remaining grounds were rejected as the trial judge properly balanced probative value against prejudicial effect and provided adequate cautionary instructions to the jury.

The appellant appealed his sentence of indeterminate detention imposed following his conviction for robbery with a firearm.

The trial judge had designated the appellant as a dangerous offender and sentenced him to indeterminate detention.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by applying an improper presumption that the appellant must be sentenced to indeterminate detention unless it was established that a reasonable expectation exists that Long Term Offender sentencing is sufficient.

This error was contrary to the principles established in R. v. Boutilier.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the proviso should apply.

The Court of Appeal disagreed and allowed the appeal, setting aside the sentence and ordering a new sentencing hearing to be conducted expeditiously.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code concerning the disposition of an individual found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant challenged the Ontario Review Board's decision to maintain a detention order rather than grant a conditional discharge.

The appellant argued his risk could be managed safely in the community with a conditional discharge and resort to the Mental Health Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it was not unreasonable given the evidence of the appellant's lack of insight into his mental illness, continued cannabis use, limited protective effect of anti-psychotic medication, and risk factors including occasional violence.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter, kidnapping, and offering an indignity to a body arising from the death of the victim.

The appellant ordered the kidnapping of the victim, believing he had stolen from him.

The victim was beaten, kidnapped, bound, and confined at the appellant's automotive shop, where he died.

The appellant's body was subsequently burned.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the actus reus and mens rea of manslaughter were established, and that the sentence was harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to either ground.

The appellant applied for release pending determination of his appeal on convictions of child luring under s. 172.1(4) of the Criminal Code and communication for the purpose of prostitution with a person under 16 under s. 286.1.

The appellant was sentenced to one year imprisonment.

The respondent opposed release on the basis that the appeal was frivolous.

The appellant argued that a pending Supreme Court decision in R. v. Morrison regarding the interpretation of s. 172.1(4) would be relevant to his appeal and that his continued custody would be manifestly unjust pending that decision.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the appellant failed to meet the threshold to demonstrate the appeal was not frivolous.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder on three grounds: (1) whether the trial judge erred in refusing to put the defence of provocation to the jury; (2) whether the trial judge misdirected the jury on the use of evidence that the appellant did not apply the brakes immediately after striking the victim; and (3) whether the trial judge erred in failing to recuse Crown counsel for failing to disclose certain information communicated by a Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in connection with the fatal shooting of a man leaving a New Year's Eve party.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant or his associate, Baptists Bernier, fired the fatal shot.

Bernier testified as a Crown witness after pleading guilty to being an accessory after the fact to murder.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) failure to instruct the jury that Bernier's guilty plea could not be used as evidence against the appellant; (2) failure to give an adequate Vetrovec instruction regarding Bernier's evidence; and (3) failure to adequately relate evidence to the issue of intent for the included offence of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds and upheld the conviction.

The Crown brought an ex parte motion for a production order under the Criminal Code against the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) to obtain audio and video footage of an interview with a sexual assault complainant.

The application was subject to the Journalistic Sources Protection Act (JSPA).

The CBC submitted written arguments opposing the order and requesting a special advocate, but did not appear in person.

The court granted the production order, finding that the general prerequisites were met, there was no other reasonable way to obtain the information, and the public interest in investigating and prosecuting sexual offences outweighed the journalist's right to privacy.

The court declined to allow the CBC to appear inter partes at this stage or appoint a special advocate, noting the JSPA's bifurcated procedure provides for a later disclosure hearing.

The footage is to be sealed, and the CBC retains the right to apply for a non-disclosure order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault by pouring boiling water on a vulnerable adult victim.

The victim had initially recanted her allegations, claiming the injuries were self-inflicted, but later reverted to her original account during cross-examination.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on corroborating medical evidence from two treating physicians that the severe burns were inconsistent with self-infliction, combined with the victim's testimony regarding the circumstances of the assault.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: misapprehension of medical evidence, failure to exercise the gatekeeper function regarding expert evidence, misapplication of the burden of proof, and unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of historical sexual assault against two teenage nieces committed between 1976 and 1986, and received a global sentence of six years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence regarding his 2009 convictions for sexual offences against his step-daughters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis that the probative value of the similar fact evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, particularly given the striking similarities in the circumstances of the incidents despite some dissimilarities in the nature of the acts.

The appellant was convicted of unauthorized possession and careless storage of a sawed-off shotgun and possession of prohibited devices, including a silencer and high capacity magazines.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions relating to the shotgun and silencer on two grounds: first, that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by repeatedly referencing his decision not to testify; and second, that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge did not reverse the burden of proof and that the conviction was well-supported by circumstantial evidence.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his sentence of 14 months custody, arguing for a conditional sentence, which was also dismissed.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm arising from a swing stage collapse at a construction site.

The appellant, a project manager, was convicted of four counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after five workers fell more than 100 feet when the swing stage collapsed.

Only two lifelines were available for six workers, contrary to provincial law and industry practice.

The appellant had authority to direct the workers and was aware of the safety breach but failed to take corrective action.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the conviction and the three-and-a-half-year concurrent sentence, finding no legal error or palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of law.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and forcible confinement.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of seven years' imprisonment.

The appellant abandoned his sentence appeal and challenged only the convictions on three grounds: (1) the trial judge's instructions on the timing of complaints in sexual assault cases; (2) the trial judge's review of evidence relating to two separate incidents on both sexual assault counts; and (3) the overall fairness and balance of the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions when considered in the context of the trial as a whole.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of attempted murder following a judge-alone trial.

The charges arose from the appellant using his motor vehicle as a weapon against two complainants.

The sole issue at trial was whether the appellant intended to kill the complainants.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to consider evidence that, if he had intended to kill the complainants, he would have driven at them while they lay helpless on the ground after being struck.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not make a finding that the complainants had been struck and rendered helpless, having identified credibility and reliability issues with their evidence.

Instead, the trial judge relied on evidence from three independent neighbours and forensic evidence, including photographs showing tire tracks and extensive damage.

The Court upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant pursued the complainants at high speed with intent to kill was reasonable and grounded in the evidence.

A police officer was convicted of 46 offences related to fraud, making false documents, breach of trust, and obstruction of justice arising from nine fraudulent motor vehicle accident reports prepared in 2010 that resulted in insurers paying over $1,000,000 in claims.

The appellant conceded the actus reus but contested whether he was a knowing participant in the fraud scheme.

The trial judge found he was and convicted him on all but six counts, imposing a five-year sentence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of impermissible speculation, the application of the Kienapple principle, and the fitness of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal.

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The appellant challenged fraud convictions on the basis of improper jury vetting by prosecution offices and police database checks of prospective jurors.

The court held that while disclosure obligations were breached and some vetting conduct was improper, a new trial requires a reasonable possibility that proper disclosure would have produced a differently constituted jury.

On the record, that threshold was not met.

The court also held that the conduct did not amount to a miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court held that broad jury vetting consultations with police should not occur, that relevant jury-selection information from police must be disclosed, and that despite non-disclosure in this case there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have been differently constituted, no unfair trial, and no miscarriage of justice.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation following the accused’s conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child.

The defence conceded that the statutory criteria for dangerous offender status were met but argued that a determinate penitentiary sentence followed by a ten‑year long‑term supervision order would adequately protect the public.

The court reviewed extensive expert psychiatric and psychological evidence, actuarial risk assessments, and the offender’s lengthy history of sexual offences against children.

Applying the post‑2008 Criminal Code framework under s. 753(4.1), the court held that an indeterminate sentence must be imposed unless there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

The evidence established only a speculative hope of successful treatment and demonstrated that the offender would require lifelong structure and supervision to manage risk.