Elizabeth Joann Porter

In a child protection summary judgment motion arising from severe unexplained injuries and the death of one infant sibling while in parental care, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Applying the cautious child-protection summary judgment approach under Rule 16 and the Hryniak framework, the court found the medical evidence overwhelming, the alternative explanations speculative, and the risk to the surviving children incapable of mitigation.

The court concluded one child continued to be in need of protection on status review and the other was in need of protection on the protection application.

Final orders placed one child in kin custody, the other in extended society care with an adoption plan, and provided supervised parental and sibling access.

A motion for mistrial was brought by the respondent father in a child protection status review application involving two children.

The father and the Office of the Children's Lawyer sought to overturn the trial on grounds including the agency's failure to promptly disclose a new investigation commenced during trial, alleged Charter rights violations, sequential and redacted disclosure, failure to produce police records, the children's expressed preference for a new trial, and potential judicial bias.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the agency's failure to promptly disclose the investigation was imprudent, the prejudice could be remedied through recalling witnesses for cross-examination.

The court found no fatal wounding of the trial process and determined that a mistrial should only be granted as a last resort in the clearest of cases.

In a child protection costs endorsement arising from a failed mid-trial application about a child’s asserted First Nation identity and community, the court held that the Office of the Children’s Lawyer had acted in a patently unreasonable and indefensible manner.

The issue was raised only after the applicant and another party had closed their cases, despite earlier pleadings and orders clearly identifying the child otherwise, and the OCL pursued the matter without a proper evidentiary foundation.

The court found that the OCL’s conduct wasted three and one-half days of trial time and materially delayed determination of the children’s status review.

In exceptional circumstances, costs were therefore awarded against the OCL on a full recovery basis at the Legal Aid rate, together with costs of the costs submissions.

This family law trial addressed the date of separation, child support calculations, and a property interest claim in the matrimonial home.

The court determined the separation date as February 2012.

The respondent's claim for a resulting trust or unjust enrichment in the matrimonial home was dismissed due to non-disclosure during his bankruptcy.

The court retroactively adjusted child support from 2017, granting the respondent a small credit for overpayment for 2017-2019, and set ongoing child support using a set-off approach.

The respondent was also ordered to contribute to Section 7 expenses.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a protection finding and an order for extended care for the child.

The parents opposed, arguing the Society's evidence was deficient.

The court found the Society's affidavits largely inadmissible hearsay and not specifically prepared for a summary judgment motion, failing to meet the evidentiary standard for disposition.

However, the court did make a protection finding under section 74(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act, based on the mother's admitted illegal drug use, which was undisputed.

The motion for summary judgment regarding disposition (placement and access) was dismissed, and the matter was adjourned for a trial management conference.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking continued protection findings for the child T.E.H., an order for deemed custody to the paternal aunt L.H., specific access orders for the mother and siblings, no access for the mother's partner, and discretionary access for the father.

The court found T.E.H. to be in continuing need of protection due to risk of emotional harm.

It granted deemed custody to the paternal aunt, L.H., prioritizing the child's best interests and Indigenous cultural identity.

The court made temporary access orders for the mother and siblings, but declined to make a "no access" order for the mother's partner or a discretionary access order for the father, emphasizing the court's obligation to impose specific terms and conditions for access.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's Motion to Change Final Order seeking child support for an adult child with a disability, the respondent sought full recovery costs of $40,903.17.

The court found the respondent was entirely successful and presumptively entitled to costs.

While the applicant's general claim was not unreasonable, her counsel advanced highly unreasonable arguments and litigation strategies that unnecessarily protracted the trial.

However, considering the applicant's limited financial means, the adult child's active resistance to disclosure, and the respondent's inappropriate behaviour during testimony, the court declined to award full recovery costs.

Costs were fixed at $8,000, payable at $150 per month.

The applicant mother brought a summary judgment motion seeking sole custody, child support, and access at her discretion.

The respondent father, who was incarcerated, agreed to primary residence with the mother but sought joint custody upon his release.

The parties settled all issues except the custody designation.

The court applied the Hryniak test for summary judgment and the Kaplanis principles for joint custody.

Finding a history of high conflict, poor communication, and the father's frequent incarceration, the court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted the mother sole custody.

This is a costs judgment following a successful jurisdictional motion by the applicant.

The court had previously determined that Ontario held jurisdiction over collateral relief matters including child support, spousal support, and equalization, despite the respondent's efforts to litigate in Saskatchewan.

The court found the respondent's conduct, including the dissipation of matrimonial home proceeds and failure to address collateral relief, to be an attempt to hinder the applicant's access to justice.

Consequently, the court awarded costs to the applicant, finding her requested costs reasonable.

A summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Lawyer on behalf of two Indigenous children seeking Crown wardship without access.

The maternal grandfather and Walpole Island First Nation opposed the motion, arguing a trial was necessary.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and granted Crown wardship, finding that the children's best interests were served by remaining in their current foster placement with an Indigenous family rather than transitioning to the grandfather's care on the First Nation territory.

The court considered the children's special needs, cultural identity, continuity of care, and the grandfather's inconsistent access pattern over two years.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of sex after her employment was terminated while she was eight months pregnant.

Prior to the application, her union had filed a grievance regarding the termination, which proceeded to arbitration.

The arbitrator found insufficient evidence of discrimination based on sex or race.

The Tribunal held a preliminary hearing and dismissed the application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, finding that the grievance arbitration had appropriately dealt with the substance of the human rights allegations.

The applicant, the maternal grandmother of a child in the care of the respondent children's aid society, applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board under section 68 of the Child and Family Services Act to review complaints about the society.

The applicant alleged that the society's Internal Complaints Review Panel did not listen to key issues and improperly excluded her daughter from the meeting.

During the hearing on the merits, the parties reached an agreement.

The Board issued a consent order requiring the society to convene a new ICRP to hear the applicant's complaints in accordance with the statutory timelines and procedures.