Elizabeth Joann Porter

A motion for mistrial was brought by the respondent father in a child protection status review application involving two children.

The father and the Office of the Children's Lawyer sought to overturn the trial on grounds including the agency's failure to promptly disclose a new investigation commenced during trial, alleged Charter rights violations, sequential and redacted disclosure, failure to produce police records, the children's expressed preference for a new trial, and potential judicial bias.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the agency's failure to promptly disclose the investigation was imprudent, the prejudice could be remedied through recalling witnesses for cross-examination.

The court found no fatal wounding of the trial process and determined that a mistrial should only be granted as a last resort in the clearest of cases.

This family law trial addressed the date of separation, child support calculations, and a property interest claim in the matrimonial home.

The court determined the separation date as February 2012.

The respondent's claim for a resulting trust or unjust enrichment in the matrimonial home was dismissed due to non-disclosure during his bankruptcy.

The court retroactively adjusted child support from 2017, granting the respondent a small credit for overpayment for 2017-2019, and set ongoing child support using a set-off approach.

The respondent was also ordered to contribute to Section 7 expenses.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a protection finding and an order for extended care for the child.

The parents opposed, arguing the Society's evidence was deficient.

The court found the Society's affidavits largely inadmissible hearsay and not specifically prepared for a summary judgment motion, failing to meet the evidentiary standard for disposition.

However, the court did make a protection finding under section 74(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act, based on the mother's admitted illegal drug use, which was undisputed.

The motion for summary judgment regarding disposition (placement and access) was dismissed, and the matter was adjourned for a trial management conference.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking continued protection findings for the child T.E.H., an order for deemed custody to the paternal aunt L.H., specific access orders for the mother and siblings, no access for the mother's partner, and discretionary access for the father.

The court found T.E.H. to be in continuing need of protection due to risk of emotional harm.

It granted deemed custody to the paternal aunt, L.H., prioritizing the child's best interests and Indigenous cultural identity.

The court made temporary access orders for the mother and siblings, but declined to make a "no access" order for the mother's partner or a discretionary access order for the father, emphasizing the court's obligation to impose specific terms and conditions for access.

This is a costs judgment following a successful jurisdictional motion by the applicant.

The court had previously determined that Ontario held jurisdiction over collateral relief matters including child support, spousal support, and equalization, despite the respondent's efforts to litigate in Saskatchewan.

The court found the respondent's conduct, including the dissipation of matrimonial home proceeds and failure to address collateral relief, to be an attempt to hinder the applicant's access to justice.

Consequently, the court awarded costs to the applicant, finding her requested costs reasonable.

A summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Lawyer on behalf of two Indigenous children seeking Crown wardship without access.

The maternal grandfather and Walpole Island First Nation opposed the motion, arguing a trial was necessary.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and granted Crown wardship, finding that the children's best interests were served by remaining in their current foster placement with an Indigenous family rather than transitioning to the grandfather's care on the First Nation territory.

The court considered the children's special needs, cultural identity, continuity of care, and the grandfather's inconsistent access pattern over two years.